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ABSTRACT 
This study explores, the governance of higher education institutions in two UK countries, 
England and Scotland, focusing on the perceptions of lay university governors and their 
accounts of governance practices as well as observation of some of the activities of 
university governing bodies. Particular attention is paid to the process of corporatisation 
of university governance within the context of a series of higher education reforms 
starting from the 1985 Jarratt Report. The thesis specifically examined the motivations of 
governors for participating in governance, their engagement in strategic planning and risk 
assessments, their views on their accountability and the extent to which governing bodies 
review their effectiveness. The empirical analysis is based on comparative multi-site case 
studies of seven university governing bodies in England and Scotland (in both Pre-1992 
and Post-1992 institutions) and also involved 27 university governors, two thirds of 
whom were lay governors including chairs of governors. The theoretical framework for 
the study is based on corporate organisational governance theories. The research involved 
the use of semi-structured interviews, observation of meetings of governing bodies and 
documentary analysis. 
The business or private sector professional background and corporate governance 
experience of the chairs and other lay governors in the study appear to have enabled them 
to engage with and help to embed new corporate governance practices proposed by recent 
higher education governance reforms. The majority of university governors and five of 
the governing bodies were found to be proactively engaged in determining the strategic 
direction of their institutions in collaboration with the executive and academics. All the 
seven governing bodies were found to be risk-averse, rejecting the taking of the kinds of 
risks that those from a business background might habitually take in their own work 
context. The university governing bodies were found to be accountable only in the loosest 
sense but they did try to enforce and ensure the accountability of the executive and the 
academics concerning the accomplishment of the strategic activities of the universities. 
Although the seven university governing bodies adopted a common governance 
framework, they exhibited a number of local differences in certain areas of governance 
practices as a result of contextual characteristics and there were also some differences 
between the Scottish and English universities. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.0.0 Introduction 
This study examines aspects of higher education governance in two UK countries of 
England and Scotland. Starting from the mid-1980s, corporate governance Was proposed 
for adoption by universities in the UK by various higher education reform reports as the 
most appropriate governance model that would enable UK higher education institutions 
cope with pressures imposed on it by a globalised world. The collegial model of 
governance has been perceived by government to be most inadequate in overcoming 
these challenges (Bargh et al, 1996; Berdahl, 1990; Shattock, 1999). Some relevant 
higher education governance reform reports are those of Jarratt (1985), Dearing (1997) 
and Lambert (2003) as well as the Education Reform Act 1988 and Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992 and the Committee of University Chairmen (CUC) code of 
governance practice frameworks of 1995,2000, and 2004. These reports and legislations 
recommended the restructuring of university governing bodies with the subsequent 
appointment of lay persons mostly from business and industry into these bodies in order 
to institute corporate governance and management practices of the private sector in 
universities. It is within this changed scenario that university governing bodies are 
expected to exhibit effective leadership in controlling and directing the affairs of their 
institutions which are currently facing numerous challenges and uncertainties from their 
external environment. My study is a comparative study of the perceptions of the 
governance roles and practices of university governors in seven university governing 
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bodies in England and Scotland in meeting the challenges and pressures placed on these 
institutions. 
My interest in governance research arose from the few months I served as a council 
officer in a Nigerian university within which period I observed strong disagreements 
between the governing body and the vice chancellor concerning their perceptions and 
conceptualisations of governance and management roles in the institution. This created a 
lot of tension and conflict between the chair of council and the vice chancellor as the 
latter would always accuse the former of encroaching on his managerial duties. I had also 
experienced a glimpse of this problem in a degree-awarding college of education where I 
worked as an administrator. In my capacity as council officer and as a senior university 
administrator, I took a closer look at the charter and statutes of the university and those of 
other institutions as well as the framework document "A Manual on University 
Management" issued by the National University Commission (which is a supervisory 
body for all Nigerian universities) in 1997 in a search for ways to resolve this conflict by 
attempting to clarify the boundary between governance and management. In these 
documents, I discovered a lot of ambiguities surrounding the role and power of the 
governing councils in Nigerian universities, despite the fact that the external lay members 
of council are appointed by the Visitor to the institutions, which usually is the President 
of the country in the case of federal universities and Governors of the states in the case of 
state-owned higher education institutions. Even the accountability relationship between 
the vice chancellor and the governing body was not clear-cut and was subject to different 
interpretations by various actors in the higher education system. The source of the 
conflict between the chair of council and the vice chancellor of my university was 
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identified to be a lack of clarity between the governance role of the university governing 
body and the management role of the vice chancellor as well as the accountability 
relationship between them. It is important to mention that the system of university 
governance and management in Nigerian universities can be described as collegial 
because of the emphasis placed on greater participation of academics in institutional 
decision-making at the various levels of institutional governance and management. 
I turned to the literature of organisational management in search for ideas about modes of 
governance and also discovered that grey areas exist between governance and many 
management roles in organisations. It was the need to resolve this conflict-generating 
problem that aroused my initial interest in studying the governance activities of university 
governing bodies in the UK. I discussed my research interest with the vice chancellor of 
my home university and he offered me a scholarship to proceed to the University of 
Bristol to study the university governance system in the UK focusing on the activities of 
university governing bodies. 
On arrival in Bristol, I discovered higher education governance in the UK had been 
undergoing a series of government-initiated reforms starting from 1985 with at least three 
reports and two Acts of Parliament making recommendations and legislations that 
attempt to change the collegial style of governance and management of the universities to 
a more corporate approach to governance prevalent in business corporations in the private 
sector of the economy. However, I observed that the Post-1992 universities that were 
former polytechnics in England and the former higher education institutions in Scotland 
were never very collegial in their style of governance. There were also some recent 
governance developments in the corporate world of the private sector aimed at improving 
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the approach to governance of large business firms and the modernisation of public 
institutions programme of the UK government referred to as "Modernising Government" 
that have implications for the governance transformation taking place in the universities. 
The university governing bodies were being encouraged to restructure their governance 
structures and processes and with their powers enhanced they were asked to adopt and 
institutionalise a new corporate governance culture in their respective institutions (Bargh, 
Scott and Smith, 1996) in order to cope with the challenges imposed on them by the 
demands of their external environment and the UK government. These higher education 
governance reform initiatives created a further area of interest for me to explore in order 
to determine the response of university governing bodies to them and their possible 
effects on the governance and management of the institutions. 
As I searched the literature on organisational governance further, I 'discovered that the 
concept of institutional governance is ambiguous in itself, which makes it a contentious, 
contested and constructed phenomenon as well as riddled with conflict of interests among 
various actors at different levels of the higher education sector. I also observed that 
university governance in the UK is under-researched despite the series of governance 
reforms and the resultant shift in governance culture that have enveloped the system. The 
only notable and comprehensive research conducted in this area was by Bargh, Scott and 
Smith in 1996 and since then no other significant empirical studies have emerged. This 
noticeable gap in the literature of university governance in the UK became a source of 
interest to me and an aspect to explore further empirically. 
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1.1.0 Purpose of the Research 
The governance of higher education in the UK is being reformed to enable universities to 
cope with the challenges imposed on them by the forces of globalisation and 
internationalisation on one hand and the expansion of the university system, from elite to 
mass higher education by government with the accompanying reduction in the funding of 
universities, on the other. The higher education governance reforms were also intended 
to refocus the universities to respond positively to the increased demand for new 
knowledge, skills and technology in the UK economy and society. In the higher 
education governance reforms, university governors and their governing bodies were 
perceived by government as change agents (Bargh et al, 1996) and were to be held 
accountable as in school governing bodies (Deem et al, 1995; Poulson, 1998; Farrell and 
Law, 1999) for changing the governance and management culture of universities and the 
performance of the institutions. 
The purpose of this research is to examine in great depth how members of governing 
bodies in seven English and Scottish universities perceive, understand and play their 
governance roles and responsibilities, whether they are cognisant of the parameters of 
corporate governance and how they organise their governance activities to achieve the 
strategic purposes of the universities within the context of the UK higher education 
governance reforms. 
The present study also investigates the effect of a devolved UK higher education system 
on the governance roles and practices of governing bodies in English and Scottish 
universities. A comparative analysis of the governance roles and practices between 
English and Scottish universities become expedient since different regional bodies within 
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the UK now regulate the higher education institutions within their areas of political 
jurisdiction as a result of devolution of powers to the UK countries on 1" July 1999. But 
it is important to mention that education in Scotland had been devolved long before 
political devolution in 1999. 
The study also attempts to examine the perceptions of university governors, in both Pre- 
1992 and Post-1992 institutions, of the consequences of UK higher education 
governance reforms on the governance practices of their university governing bodies. 
The study adopted a comparative multiple case study approach to determine the extent to 
which the university governing bodies in English and Scottish as well as in Pre-1992 and 
Post-1992 institutions converge and diverge in their approach to university governance. 
1.2.0 Significance of the Research 
The study would be of immense interest to higher education policy makers, university 
governing bodies and researchers in the area of higher education governance because it is 
intended to possibly inform policy and improve the understanding and practice of 
institutional governance by university governing bodies in the UK 
In view of the under-researched nature of the activities of university governing bodies, 
this study attempts to contribute to knowledge in the area of university governance by 
filling the identified gap in the empirical literature on higher education governance in the 
UK. The findings of this study could be also be used as one basis for fostering co- 
operation between institutional governing bodies of English and Scottish universities by 
highlighting areas of good governance practices that can be shared between the 
institutions. 
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1.3.0 Research Questions 
The following research questions were formulated to empirically investigate the purpose 
of the study. 
" RQ1: What are the background characteristics and perceived motivation of university 
governors in seven case study governing bodies in England and Scotland for 
participating in institutional governance and their mode of recruitment? 
" RQ2: How do members of these seven governing bodies perceive and understand 
their governance roles and practices in English and Scottish universities and how 
have they been able to separate their governance roles from those of management? 
" RQ3: How do members of these seven governing bodies discuss the performance of 
their governance tasks and how do these governing bodies actually operate? 
" RQ4: In what ways do members of the seven governing bodies claim to assess 
effectiveness of their governance practices and performance? 
1.4.0 Organisation of the Research 
This dissertation is organised into ten chapters as follows: 
Chapter one describes my interest in the study, the aim of the study, the significance of 
the study and the research questions. 
Chapter two is the background to the study that provides the wider higher education 
policy and governance context in which this study is taking place. 
Chapter three discusses the concept of corporate governance and the corporate 
organisational governance theories that serve as the framework for this study. 
Chapter four discusses some of the governance processes and practices of university 
governing bodies. 
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Chapter five discusses the methodological issues of this study and provides the 
philosophical paradigm, research strategy, method of data analysis and some validity 
ethical issues of the research. 
Chapter six describes the characteristics of the case study governing bodies and their 
institutions. It serves as the prelude to the three empirical chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter seven provides the empirical findings on the background characteristics and 
motivation for participation in governance of the university governors, how they are 
recruited as well as their perceived governance roles and practices. 
Chapter eight presents the findings on the perceptions and participation of university 
governors in some governance activities of their universities. 
Chapter nine provides empirical findings on the university governors' account of 
accountability and performance review of their governing bodies. 




BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN 
THE UK 
2.0.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present some issues in higher education that have implications for the 
governance of universities in the UK and which provide the context within which this 
study is situated. In this chapter, I discuss some contemporary issues in higher education 
that are of interest to the UK government and which occupy a significant amount of the 
time of universities and academics. I briefly traced the history of lay participation in 
university governance as well as the various higher education governance reforms that 
have been taking place in the UK from the mid-1980s. I also present the UK higher 
education policy and the country and institutional contexts in which this study on 
university governance is taking place and how variation in contexts could affect 
governance practices. 
2.1.0 Contemporary Issues in Higher Education in UK 
This review is intended to highlight some of the issues that have engaged the attention of 
UK universities in recent times and that have also put some pressures on the institutions 
and challenged their governance and management arrangements. Although the review 
below is not exhaustive, it represents some key issues that the UK government and the 
higher education funding councils are concerned with and which have implications for 
university governance. 
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1. Third Mission Activities of UK Universities 
In 2004, the UK government formulated a science and innovation policy under the 
"Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004 - 2014" aimed at converting 
scientific and technological discoveries of the country into products and services that will 
contribute to the improvement and development of the British economy and society. UK 
universities have been encouraged to lead this policy goal of the government through 
their increased interaction with public institutions, local and business communities as 
well as with the small, medium and large enterprises. This move is also in response to the 
recommendations of the Lambert Review (2003) that advocated increased contribution of 
higher education to the development of the British economy and society through 
collaboration, partnership and interaction between UK universities and industries in the 
area of research, technology transfer and generation of new skills to service the economy. 
This move implies a greater hands-on involvement of universities in participating directly 
to revamp both the national and the local economy instead of the previous indirect way of 
producing adequately skilled labour and useful research for the economy. But in reality 
universities have been doing more than this already. In response to this policy initiative 
and direction, government, through the higher education funding councils of the different 
countries of the UK has allocated funds to the universities to enable them to engage in 
what traditionally were often called outreach activities. This is what is now known as the 
"third mission" or "third leg" activities of universities (Rolfe, 2003). The third mission is 
about the reaching out of the universities directly to their immediate communities through 
various activities that are outside on site teaching and learning and `blue skies' research. 
It is about "reconnecting the university to society and the economy" (Laredo, 2007). A 
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"third mission" activity is now being emphasised in the mission statements and strategic 
goals of universities (Rolfe, 2003; Coate et al, 2000). Hughes (2006) has identified the 
types of interactions that take place between universities, local communities, business 
and industries in relation to these third mission activities. These include the production of 
highly skilled manpower for industry, the transfer of useful knowledge and technology to 
industry and the promotion of entrepreneurial activities with small and medium 
enterprises. Other third mission activities undertaken by universities include organising 
conferences, workshops and seminars for the local community; and engaging in teaching 
and other activities in further education colleges and participating in the activities of the 
local communities (Coate et al 2000). These activities are directed at meeting the social, 
cultural, economic (Court, 2004) and technological needs of these constituencies in order 
to enhance their growth and development. Universities however, have been engaging in 
these activities for a long time. 
Although the Lambert Review (2003) recommended closer interaction and collaboration 
between universities and business, it did not specifically indicate the role of the university 
governing bodies in the third mission activities (Rolfe, 2003). However, they can be 
involved in determining the areas of strategic focus and the risks of the universities 
concerning the type of third mission activities the institutions should undertake. Some 
universities have also incorporated the widening participation agenda as part of their third 
mission activities as revealed in their mission statements and strategic plans. 
2. Widening Participation in Higher Education in UK 
The 2003 government white paper "The Future of Higher Education" dealing with 
planned changes to universities in the UK, among other things, focused on commitment 
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to widening participation in higher education to increase the level of participation of 
young persons aged 18 - 30 to about 50% by the year 2010. In order to actualise this 
policy initiative, another policy document known as "Widening Participation in Higher 
Education" was released by the DIES in 2003. It specifically aimed at ensuring that 
persons from low socio-economic groups in the society that are traditionally under- 
represented in higher education participate and benefit from it and to meet the increased 
demand for knowledge and skills in the British economy as well as tackle the problem of 
social exclusion of certain groups in the society from participating in higher education. 
The policy document also set to tackle the problem of social exclusion of certain groups 
from taking part in higher education. In 2006 another UK government policy document 
dealing with widening participation was released to further enhance the actualisation of 
both the 2003 white paper and DIES 2003 policy document. 
The DfES (2006) policy document on "Widening Participation in Higher Education" 
reviewed the progress made so far on the policy initiative and to further strengthen it. The 
actualisation of the policy by government needed the collaboration of the universities. 
The UK government, through the various higher education funding councils allocated 
funds to the universities to enable them engage fully with the implementation of the 
widening participation agenda, but have no powers over Scotland and Wales on this 
matter. The funds are allocated to the institutions based on the number of students 
recruited from the main target groups which are those persons from low socio-economic 
backgrounds that do not traditionally participate in higher education (DIES, 2006; 
HEFCE 2006). 
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In 2003, the UK government established an "Office for Fair Access (OFFA)" (DIES, 
2003) to enter into an initial 5-year agreement with universities on how they were to 
implement the widening participation policy. The office was also mandated to monitor 
and ensure compliance of universities with the widening participation policy. The 
institutions were also required to draw up widening participation benchmark they wish to 
attain and to indicate the amount of bursaries that they would award to target students as 
part of the agreement with Office for Fair Access. However, failure on the part of the 
institutions to fulfil their part of the agreement attracts sanctions such as reduction of 
annual funds allocation due the universities by the funding councils. 
The universities appeared to have responded to the policy initiative by incorporating 
widening participation into their mission statements and strategic goals in order to 
promote access of traditionally disadvantaged persons into higher education (Lynch, 
2006; Bridges, 2006; Thomas, 2001; HEFCE, 2006). The various strategies and 
approaches adopted by the universities to implement the widening participation policy 
include outreach programmes through partnership with further education colleges and 
schools, collaboration with human resource departments of private and public sector 
organisations, through c-learning to reach target groups and also through participation in 
foundation degree programmes (Rolfe, 2003; Bridges, 2006; Thomas, 2001). 
Court (2004) observed that in Scotland, the focus of widening participation is on 
widening access within the universities to accommodate the already increased 
participation level which stood at 50% at the time of the enactment of the legislation. 
However, this participation level was reached through the sub-degree programmes of the 
further education colleges. Rolfe (2003) noted that some universities, mostly the Post- 
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1992 institutions, have benefited immensely from the widening participation programme 
by increasing their student population and receiving more funds from the funding 
councils. However, the introduction of variable tuition fees in England in 2006-07 (since 
1998 English undergraduate students have paid fees) may affect the continuing 
participation of students from the target groups. In Scotland, Scottish undergraduates do 
not pay fees but pay what is known as a graduate endowment after their graduation from 
university. Newman ct al (2004) argued that the markctisation policy of the universities 
in terms of recruiting more full-cost fee paying students could negate the policy 
objectives of the widening participation programme, which is intended to attract students 
from low-income groups in the society to participate in higher education. 
Other criticisms have also been levelled against the widening participation agenda. 
Thomas (2001) argued that the assumptions made by the UK government, concerning 
traditionally under-represented groups in higher education, in the course of formulating 
the widening participation policy and strategies adopted, were incomplete and not wide- 
ranging enough to enable them deal with some of the barriers to low participation of the 
target groups in higher education. For example, Thomas (2001) observed that 
government was concerned with bridging just a 5% difference between students from 
high socio-economic (SEG) groups and those from low SEGs, who are qualified to enter 
higher education, while ignoring the area of main difference of 26% that exist between 
both groups in their A level scores. The author claimed that government has not 
addressed the cause of the disparity between both groups at A level, rather it concentrated 
efforts on tackling the problem of a few who are qualified to enter higher education. 
However, this problem appears to have been tackled by government in the policy 
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document DfES (2003) "Widening Participation in Higher Education", when it required 
universities intending to charge more tuition fees to undertake out-reach work in schools 
and colleges to raise the level of aspiration and attainment of the target groups to enable 
them enter higher education. 
Barrett and Barrett (2007) have also argued that widening participation has resulted in an 
increase in the workload of academics since they now have to teach more students 
without significant extra resources since it has resulted in a decrease in staff: student ratio 
in the universities. They also have to formulate strategies to make the students succeed in 
higher education thereby putting enormous burden on them. The widening participation 
agenda may be achieving its intended purpose but it could have serious implications for 
the way the university governing bodies, executive and academics incorporates it into the 
policy and strategic goals of the institutions and the development of new strategies to 
accomplish this policy objective of government. 
Although the concept of widening participation as an outreach programme may not be 
new to the Post-1992 institutions, what appears to be new is that it is now a policy 
objective of the UK government that needs to be complied with by all universities. 
University governing bodies can engage with the widening participation agenda by 
formulating policies and strategies jointly with the executive and the academics to ensure 
the successful implementation of the programme. They could also monitor the 
performance of the programme through regular reports from the executive. 
3. New Managerialism in UK Universities 
The concept of new managerialism is usually used to describe a set of organisational 
practices, values and beliefs that are more commonly associated with private sector 
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business organisations (Deem, 1998). Some of the characteristics of new managerialism 
in an organisations as well as universities include efficiency, effectiveness and economy 
in service delivery, setting of reasonable and achievable targets, use of performance 
indicators to determine achievement of set targets, monitoring and evaluation of 
performance of employees and that of the organisation in achieving objectives, use of 
benchmarking practices to determine performance level, adoption of 'best practices' for 
job performance, dc-emphasising of bureaucratic procedures, engaging in quality 
assurance activities, accountability performance in service delivery, partnership between 
public and private bodies, competition for resources, down-sizing, providing value-for- 
money, etc (Deem, 1998; Deem and Brehony, 2005; Clarke, Gewirtz and McLaughlin, 
2000). The various public sector reforms since the 1980s, including those of universities 
in the UK, appear to be based on the ideology of new managerialism (Clarke ct al, 2000; 
Deem, 1998; Deem and Brehony, 2005). New managcrialism was also perceived by 
Deem (1998) and Clarke et at (2000) as attempts to change the culture of management 
and governance of public institutions and universities in alignment with those of business 
organisation in the private sector. Clarke et at (2000) observed that the move to gradually 
managerialise public services by government started from about 1979 with the intention 
of giving more prominence to managerialism over professionalism as a better approach to 
the delivery of public services to society. New managerialism advocates the `right to 
manage' by managers instead of by professionals (Clarke et al, 2000; Deem and Brchony, 
2005). Some commentators on the reforms of higher education have observed that the 
recommendations of the Dearing Report (1997) were attempts to managcrialisc UK 
universities (Trow, 1997; Deem, 1998). 
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Deem (2004), Deem and Brehony (2005) and Thornton (2005) in their study of 
managerialism higher education observe that the set of practices that characterise new 
managerialism have found their way into UK universities and have also permeated the 
activities of manager-academics thereby displacing the collegial approach to managing 
the academic enterprise. Kogan (1988) had earlier observed the managerialisation of 
higher education institutions in the UK in order to weaken collegial forms of governance 
in these institutions. This appears to imply that New Managerialism has eroded the power 
and authority of academics in managing academia and their participation in the decisions 
concerning the organisations in which they work. It has enabled the university governing 
bodies to privilege the importance of the activities of manager-academics and other 
senior managers over the core business of teaching, learning and research in the 
universities. As a result of the managerial changes that are taking place in universities, 
Kennedy (2003) has described the institutions as "more corporate in nature, more 
externally-oriented, more reliant on private sources of income... greater attachment to the 
needs of the economy, commitment to research and development that meets the economic 
and social needs of the nation" (p. 59). This change in organisational culture brought 
about by new managerialism in universities in the UK met with resistance by academics 
that saw their status in the institutions being relegated from that of decision-maker to 
mere employees (Halsey, 1992, Dearlove, 1995). These managerial changes could also 
have implications for the way the universities are governed and managed because the 
governing bodies worked directly with the executive and not with the academics. 
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4. Research Quality Assessment in UK Universities 
The search for and production of new knowledge in order to push back the frontiers of 
knowledge, has long occupied a significant place in the life of universities. Research has 
been one of the purposes of universities apart from teaching and learning and which have 
also formed the basis of technological development for human benefit. Research has also 
become a veritable instrument for development and competition among nations and 
universities worldwide. 
The UK government in realising the role of university research for the development and 
competitiveness of the British economy and society and also as a means of generating 
more funds for the institutions have encouraged the engagement of its universities in 
applied and useable research through various science and research policies and research 
funding streams (Deem, 2008). The various UK government research policy documents 
include the following: DTI (1998) "Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge 
Driven Economy", DTI (2001) "Excellence and Opportunity: A Science and Innovation 
Policy for the 21"' Century", DfES (2003) "The Future of higher Education"and Higher 
Education Act 2004. The Dearing Report (1997) also emphasised the important role of 
university research for the economic competitiveness of the nation. 
The government's interest in university research has resulted in the assessment of the 
quality and quantity of research undertaken by university departments and their 
academics through the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). The RAE utilises peer 
academics panel to assess the quality of research outputs, funding, research student 
provision, research culture and infrastructure. It was originally termed a research 
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selectivity exercise in 1986 and 1989 and only became RAE from 1992 onwards (Deem, 
2008). 
The results of the RAE are used by the higher education funding councils in UK 
universities to allocate special research monies to the institutions (McNay, 2003). There 
are other benefits derived by the universities apart from the funding that comes from the 
HE funding Councils and Research Council, such as enhancing the reputation of the 
institutions in both national and world leagues tables. This has also enhanced the 
competitiveness of the institutions among other universities nationally and internationally 
with the subsequent attraction of high tuition fee-paying international students which 
generates more funds for the universities. The undertaking of high quality research in 
institutions has also led to the attraction of excellent and outstanding researchers to the 
universities. 
The research assessment exercise (RAE) began in UK universities in 1992 with 
subsequent ones in 1996,2001 and the latest being that of 2008 (Deem, 2008). However, 
despite the benefits that are accruable to universities from the outcome of the RAE, 
criticisms have trailed the exercise. Lucas (2006) and Deem (2008) contend that the RAE 
has been controversial because of the methodology adopted to assess the research 
performance of the institutions and the ways in which the universities have interpreted 
the RAE have implications for academic staff. The RAE has been criticised for enhancing 
the status of researchers over teachers in the universities and has also created a bigger gap 
between a small group of research-intensive Pre-1992 universities and some less 
research-intensive Pre-1992 and Post-1992 institutions (Deem and Lucas, 2007). 
19 
The various UK government research policies indicate the need for universities to play a 
greater role in the development of the UK economy and society through the use of 
applied research generated by the institutions. The research policies and the RAE have 
implications for the development of institutional policies and strategies at the level of the 
governing bodies, executives and the various academic departments. 
In implementing the four areas of higher education policy discussed above, the university 
governing bodies could comply with the policy initiatives by incorporating them in the 
strategies of the institutions. These policies are not without their accompanying risks for 
the institutions especially for the academics whose attention would be diverted from the 
areas of teaching, learning and research in order to pursue these activities. The risk 
aspects could be determined and managed through the usual risk management and 
governance processes of the institutions. The third mission activities are external outreach 
activities with commerce and industry which can be strengthened by the lay governors of 
the universities who have strong contacts and relationships with corporate bodies in the 
private sector. The presence of `business governors' with corporate governance and 
management experience on the governing bodies of universities have helped to entrench 
and strengthened managerial practices in UK universities. 
In summary, this review has highlighted the third mission activities, widening 
participation, research assessment and new managerialism as some of the issues that have 
engaged the attention of universities in the UK in recent times and which have serious 
implications for their governance and management. It is within this wider context of 
issues affecting higher education that university governing bodies are expected to exhibit 
effective governance leadership in addressing them. 
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2.2. O, Lay Participation in University Governance 
Lay participation in university governance is as old as university itself. Tracing the 
history of lay participation in university governance, Bargh, Scott and Smith (1996) and 
Shattock (2006) recounted that UK universities were previously governed and managed 
solely by lay people from the business class who founded them in the 19`x' century. 
University governing bodies were at that point in time dominated by lay persons from the 
external environment of the institutions who were engaged with the physical 
development of the institutions and employing the academic and non-academic staff 
(Bargh et al, 1996). The internal governance and management of the universities were 
lay-controlled. Academics were not part of the governance arrangement during this 
period since they were employed mainly to teach students (Shattock. 2006). 
However, from about 1945 after the war academics and vice chancellors took over the 
governance of universities with little lay representation and influence in decision-making 
(Bargh et al, 1996; Shattock, 2006). Although lay governors and their governing bodies 
were still governing the institutions at this point, they were no longer the ultimate 
decision-making bodies. Academics participated in governance decision-making along 
with the lay governors and some became members of their university governing bodies. 
Shattock (2006) claimed that the emergence of academics on university governing bodies 
and their participation in governance were the results of the agitation of the professoriate 
to participate in institutional governance. Academic voice in institutional governance 
decision-making increased thereafter and lay control of the institutions waned. The role 
of university governing bodies became limited to non-academic matters while academics 
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controlled teaching, learning and research as well as academic appointments and the 
separation of functions were defined in the statutes of the institutions (Shattock. 2006). 
Bargh et al (1996) argued that in the 1980s the trend towards 'massification' and 
'marketisation' of universities resulted in the redefinition of the role of university 
governing bodies as a result of the challenges and changes that were taking place in 
higher education. University governing bodies were required to become more active in 
governance in order to direct their institutions to meet with the changing circumstances 
and situations of the institutions (Jarratt, 1985). The UK government also intervened in 
changing the governance and management culture of universities through various 
governance reform initiatives by empowering university governing bodies and 
encouraging them to be more active in governance because it perceived that the 
universities can play a more vital role in developing the economy and society. 
The recommendations of the Jarratt Report (1985), Dearing Report (1997), Cadbury 
(1992) corporate governance reform reports and the various legislations of the Education 
Reform Act 1988 and Further and Higher Education Act 1992 were valuable in initiating 
and shaping a corporate approach to governance in these institutions in which lay 
governors were to become prominent again in university governance. The change in 
governance culture was perceived by Bargh et al (1996) and Deem (1998) to be linked to 
the emergence of new managcrialism but also to declining public funding. The 
restructuring of the size and composition of the governing bodies of universities with the 
subsequent appointment of majority of lay persons mostly from industry, business, 
commerce and the professions as recommended by the various higher education 
governance reforms were intended to change the governance culture of these institutions 
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from the academic-dominated collegial style to a lay-dominated corporate governance 
approach. The influence of lay governors had waned when university governance was 
mainly collegial but was resuscitated in the new approach to governance recommended 
by the reforms. The lay governors were to serve as culture change agents while the 
governing bodies were the main arenas for the change in governance culture (Bargh et al, 
1996). The lay governors were required to bring their skills, knowledge and experience in 
corporate governance matters and business practices to bear on their respective 
universities. The criteria for appointment of lay governors appear to re-define the original 
concept of lay governance in UK universities which does not specify the background of 
lay governors. 
Lay involvement in public services is a means of public representation in decision- 
making concerning the products and services that are produced by these organisations. 
Lay people are either appointed or elected into the governing bodies of public institutions 
as a result of the New Labour policy of ensuring service users and consumers are 
involved in the development of policies and decisions about the product which they 
consume and thereby relegating the power of service producers/professionals. This is part 
of the modernisation agenda of public institutions by the New Labour government in the 
UK on assumption of office in 1997. The Nolan Report of 1985 (Committee on Standards 
in Public Life) also recommended that members of governing bodies of universities 
should be appointed based on merit and that they should possess a good balance of skills 
and experience. The report also emphasised that the appointment process should adopt 
the principles of good, open and transparent recruitment practices. 
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The corporatisation and managerialisation of universities in the UK which resulted from 
the various higher education reform initiatives would imply a change in the traditional 
approach to governance in these institutions to a corporate governance style that is fit for 
purpose. 
2.3.0 Reform of Higher Education Governance 
There have been attempts at reforming the governance of higher education in the UK 
since the mid-1980s ostensibly to enable universities to cope with the challenges imposed 
on them by the effects of globalisation (Altbach, 2001; Gibbons, 1998; King, 2003) and 
internationalisation (Enders, 2004; Hahn and Tcichlcr, 2005). On one hand, the 
expansion of the higher education system from elite to a mass education was set up in 
response to the social inclusion policy of government and the accompanying reduction in 
the funding of universities on the other. The higher education governance reforms were 
also intended to reposition the universities to respond positively to the knowledge, skills 
and technological demands of the UK economy and society. In reforming the system of 
governance in the of higher educations from collegial to corporate model, lay governors 
appointed from the world of commerce, industry and the professions were required to 
bring about the change of governance culture (Bargh et al, 1996). Some of the higher 
education governance reform initiatives and their implications for the governance 
structures and processes of the universities are examined below. 
1. The Jarratt Report 
In April 1984, while pre-empting government, the Committee of Vice Chancellors and 
Principals of UK universities appointed a committee headed by Sir Alex Jarratt to 
conduct a series of efficiency studies on the management of UK universities (Jarratt. 
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1985 p. 6) as a result of the financial and management problems created by the 15% cuts 
in funding by government to universities and increase in student enrolment which led to a 
reduction in unit cost by 45% in the 1980s (Deem, 2004; Shattock, 1999; Williams, 
1997). Jarratt (1985) observed that planning, resource allocation and accountability were 
the biggest issues challenging university administration and that these institutions do not 
have the appropriate governance structures and processes to engage effectively in good 
and efficient practices in these areas of the life of the institutions that would enable them 
cope with the pressures. Jarratt (1985) saw the need for change throughout the university 
system and that the organisation of each university required restructuring to allow for 
change and improvement without compromising the purpose of the university. The Jarratt 
Committee made some specific recommendations to government, Universities Grants 
Committee (UGC), Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) and the 
universities to implement in order to bring about the desired efficiency in management 
and governance into the higher education system. 
The Jarratt Committee recommended that government through the funding council 
(UGC) should encourage universities to engage in strategic planning, adopt best practices 
in the areas of governance and management to make them more efficient and effective in 
achieving their purpose, develop performance indicators to determine the extent to which 
they are achieving their strategic objectives, and the funding council should allocate 
funds and monitor the use of such funds by universities. University governing bodies 
were directed to be more active and assertive in their governance roles especially in the 
areas of strategic planning, policy development, resource allocation, monitoring and 
accountability to ensure the achievement of the objectives and purposes of the 
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universities. The emphasis on the assertiveness of university governing bodies is argued 
to be aimed at curbing the resistance of academics to the change of governance and 
management cultures of universities (Dearlovc, 1995). Jarratt (1985) also recommended 
that there should be a reduction in the number of local authority representatives on 
university governing bodies and that their place should be taken up by lay persons with 
relevant skills and experience relevant to the functions of the universities recruited from 
local, regional and national sources. It also recommended a joint committee of the 
governing body and senate to oversee strategic planning, policy and resource allocation 
issues in the universities. This appears to imply the need for collaboration in governance 
between the university governing body, the executive and senate in strategic areas of the 
organisation of the institution. The Jarratt Report (1985) made university governing 
bodies the supreme decision-making bodies in the universities while senates were to play 
a subordinate advisory role to these bodies. But the extent to which this change in power 
relations between the two decision-making bodies have manifested in the Pre-1992 
universities is yet to be determined (Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999). These 
recommendations appear to set the pace for a gradual shift in governance practice from 
collegial to corporate governance which meant a change in the discourse of university 
governance and management, the introduction of language of business efficiency and 
business practices in UK universities (Bargh et al, 1996; Trowlcr, 1998; Middlehurst, 
2002; Buchland, 2004). The shift in governance and management appeared to have 
placed less importance on the role of academics and more prominence to role of 
university governing bodies in governance and those of vice chancellors in management 
(Dearlove, 2002). These governance and management reforms as proposed by Jarratt 
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(1985) were perceived as erosion of collegiality and academic self autonomy that 
characterised the governance 'model of the Pre-1992 universities and the rise of 
managerialism in UK universities (Dearlove, 1997; Deem, 2000; Deem, 2004; Kogan, 
1989; Shattock, 2006). 
2. The Education Reform Act 1988 
Another significant development in the reform of governance of higher education 
institutions was the enactment of the Education Reform Act 1988 converted polytechnics 
in England that were formerly funded and under the control of local education authorities 
into higher education corporations. But this Act did not affect Scotland as it had no 
polytechnics. The Act provided for institutional governing bodies to be the ultimate 
decision-making bodies responsible for all aspects of the universities including the 
education character and missions of the institutions. The Act restructured the governing 
bodies of these institutions by reducing the number of academics and other 
representatives groups on these bodies and increased the number of lay governors. These 
university governing bodies were made lay-dominated and the lay governors were to be 
recruited mainly from among persons appearing to have governance and management 
skills, knowledge and experience in business, industry and the professions. An emphasis 
on such criteria for appointment of lay governors would mean professionalising 
university governance (Baird, 2006; Considine, 2004) thereby redefining modern concept 
of lay governance in UK universities. The size of the governing bodies was fixed at a 
maximum of 24 members and minimum of 12 persons. The membership of the higher 
education corporation was synonymous with only members of the university governing 
bodies. With the enactment of the Education Reform Act 1988 the powers of academics 
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was greatly reduced and those of the governing bodies were enhanced. According to 
Bargh et al (1996), the post-incorporation institutional governing bodies were regarded as 
`key arenas of change' in governance and management cultures of these institutions and 
the lay governors were perceived as 'cultural change agents' (p. 21). The industrial and 
commercial knowledge and experience of the lay governors placed them in a better 
position to change the collegial style of governance to corporate model and to introduce 
business management practices in these institutions. The Education Reform Act 1988 
created a unicameral governance structures for higher education institutions in the UK 
(Shattock, 2006). These governance arrangements were further given legal backing by 
the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 that conferred degree awarding status to the 
Post-1992 institutions. Knight (2002) had criticised the lay dominance of university 
governing bodies saying that the governance arrangements caused the governance 
problems that were experienced by the some of the Post-1992 institutions. Shattock 
(1998) has also criticised the governance arrangements legislated by the Education 
Reform Act 1988 as not suitable for public accountability. The unsuitability of the 
arrangements for purposes of accountability may have resulted in such cases of financial 
crisis as was reported in University of Wales College, Cardiff in 1986-87 (Williams, 
2006) and University of Lancaster in the mid 1990s (Deem, 1998; Rowe, 1997) and also 
the instances of management and governance malpractices as was in universities of 
Portsmouth, Glasgow Caledonia and Thames Valley (Rowe, 1997, Shattock, 2003; 
Warner and Palfreyman, 2003) which caused government to call the institutions to 
account for such failures in order to remedy the situations. 
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A similar development, which had a significant effect on the governance and 
management of higher education institutions, took place some years later in the wider 
society. In 1992, the Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance 
(Cadbury Committee) was set up to look into the financial aspect of corporate 
governance of companies in the private sector. The Cadbury Committee recommended a 
code of best practice for which boards of all listed companies should comply with in 
order to ensure a high level of standard of corporate governance and financial 
accountability. 
3. The Nolan Committee Report 
The UK Government also appointed the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life in 
1995 to address concerns about the standard of conduct of public officers in order to 
ensure good morals and accountability in public life. The Committee sets out standards 
for adoption by publicly funded bodies in their day-to-day operations in order to institute 
transparency, credibility and accountability on these bodies. The standards include 
transparency and openness in appointment procedures and codes of conduct, training and 
whistle-blowing practices. In order to achieve these standards, the Committee put 
forward seven principles of public life which public office holders are required to abide 
by in the conduct of their official businesses. These principles are selflessness, integrity, 
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. Specifically, Nolan 
Committee (1995) recommended that university governing bodies should ensure that 
their recruitment practice should be based on merit and relevant skills and experience. 
The Committee also recommended that higher education institutions that receive public 






practice approach and that a statement of their approach to governance should be 
included in the annual report of the institutions. Dcarlove (1998) argued that the second 
report of Nolan (1995) set out to address the issue of sleaze in university and the 
appointment as well as the accountability of university governing bodies but failed to 
address issues relating to the organisation of the core mission of universities which is 
teaching and research. 
4. The Dearing Report 
In June 1997, the Dearing Committee was commissioned by the Conservative government 
to advise on the future funding and development of higher education institutions in the 
UK over a period of twenty years but the recommendations were implemented by the 
New Labour government in its first term in office. The Committee made wide-ranging 
recommendations that touched on the future of higher education especially concerning 
such issues as widening participation of students, effectiveness of teaching and learning, 
support for scholarship and research, communication and information technology, and 
management and governance. Deem (1998) observed that Dearing (1997) did not make 
any recommendations that would significantly improve the financial position of 
universities. It did introduce home undergraduate fees at a rather minimal level. All these 
recommendations were meant to strategically re-locate these institutions and by 
extension, the UK as a nation to meet the challenges of the economic and technological 
changes taking place worldwide. 
The Dearing Report ( and its equivalent in Scotland, the Garrick Report) recognised the 
contributions the governing bodies have made towards effective governance of these 
institutions in the past but still made proposals that could enhance the effectiveness of the 
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framework within which they work by recommending a code of practice for institutional 
governance. It believed that the effectiveness of these higher education institutions 
depends largely on the effectiveness of their governance and management structures and 
processes. Dearing (1997) therefore recommended that university governing bodies 
should be made up of majority of lay governors; membership of the body should not 
exceed 25 persons, the governing bodies should review their own effectiveness and those 
of their universities periodically with the help of external assistance and to also identify 
areas of improvement that may ensure effective performance. The lay governors were 
required to head all the committees of the governing bodies. The governing bodies were 
also to ensure the accountability of the institutions to their external stakeholders. The 
Dearing Report also reduced the powers and responsibilities of university courts to mere 
advisory role. Deem (1998) argued that the recommendations of Dearing Report (1997) 
are based on managerial practices of new managerialism perspective as against that of 
collegiality which vice chancellors readily accepted. The report also emphasised 
compliance of the institutions to codes of practices which could be interpreted as 
imposing a regulatory framework on universities. The Dearing (1997) recommendation 
of good managerial practices in place of finding solutions to the funding problems of 
universities is viewed as unsuitable to the purpose of the institutions (Trow, 1997). 
5. The Lambert Review - 
In 2003, the UK government released another higher education reform white paper titled 
"The Future of Higher Education" which was aimed at using universities and their 
teaching and research to create new skills, knowledge and technology in order to build a 
highly competitive economy (DIES, 2003). One of the highlights of the reform agenda is 
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to enable universities establish stronger links with business and the economy. The 
collaboration is aimed at enabling the universities to use their research capacities and 
capabilities and the knowledge they generate to meet the developmental and 
technological needs of business and industry. The 2003 white paper also proposed that it 
"will ask business of its view of the present governance, management and leadership 
arrangements and their effectiveness in supporting good research and knowledge transfer 
and providing relevant skills for the economy" (DIES, 2003; Lambert Review, 2003). 
In 2003, the UK government appointed the Committee on Review of Business-University 
Collaboration headed by Sir Alex Lambert to assess the possibility of wider and more 
formal co-operation between business and universities especially in the areas of research 
and knowledge transfer and the production of skills for the economy. This was in 
response to the 2003 White Paper that recommended that the views of business should be 
sought concerning these matters. The Lambert Review recommended increased co- 
operation between universities and business especially in the area of applied research that 
can be used to revamp the economy. It also recommended that universities should 
reorganise their governance and management structures and processes in order to ensure 
their effectiveness in meeting the challenges of managing modern and entrepreneurial 
universities and to support links with business and industry. It states specifically that the 
Committee of University Chairmen (CUC) with the approval of government, through the 
various funding councils and the administration of the universities should develop a code 
of governance representing best practices across the sector for the institutions to adopt. 
The body has responded by producing an up-dated 2004 version of its governance 
framework to guide the governance activities of university governing bodies in the UK as 
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discussed in the next section. The Review also recommended that the university 
governing bodies should systematically review their effectiveness against stated 
objectives and that such reviews should be published in the universities' annual report 
and on the internet. The Lambert Review acknowledge the earlier Dearing Report of 
1997 especially on its recommendation concerning the code of best practice for university 
governing bodies which they observed some institutions have already adopted and 
practising. The Lambert Review can also be viewed as advocating a'corporate approach 
to university governance (Middlehurst, 2002; Lapworth, 2004) in support of the Dearing 
Report (1997) and Education Act 1988. However, Lapworth (2004) has criticised the 
Lambert Review for not paying attention to the need for a collaborative governance style 
in university that is capable of addressing the core business of teaching and research in 
the universities, rather attention is given to university governing bodies complying with 
the dictates and wishes of external interests. 
6. The CUC Governance Framework 
The recommendations of the Dearing Report (1997), the Cadbury Report (1992) and the 
Lambert Report (2003) culminated in the formulation of a governance framework by the 
Committee of University Chairmen (CUC) first in 1995 and later revised in 2004 to guide 
university governing bodies in their governance practices. The governance framework 
was proposed by CUC in collaboration with the higher education funding councils of 
England and Scotland. All the aforementioned committees had recommended the 
corporate governance code of practice prevalent in the private sector worldwide because 
of their perceived efficiency and effectiveness in achieving corporate objectives for 
higher education institutions in UK. The CUC (2004) governance framework 
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incorporates current good governance practices in the private and public sector of the 
economy and the recommendations of the Lambert (2003) report. The governance guide 
is intended to improve the practice of university governance across the higher education 
sectors in the UK. However, the guide is supposed to be voluntarily adopted and applied 
by the universities but it has a proviso for the institutions to report on how they applied 
the code in their annual audited financial reports. 
The guide places on the university governing body the responsibility for the general 
control, direction and supervision of the institution as well as making it the ultimate 
decision-making body. The governing body is also saddled with the responsibility for 
approving the mission, strategic direction, strategic plan and budgeting plan for the 
delivery of the purpose of the institution. The governing body was also to appoint the 
vice chancellor, monitor his/her performance and to hold the vice chancellor accountable 
for the overall performance of the university. 
7. A Government Modernising Agenda 
By 1997, the advent of a new UK government (New Labour) signalled another policy 
agenda aimed at modernising the public sector. The purpose of the modernisation agenda 
was to improve the management of public services to meet the demands of the citizens 
and electorate as well as meeting the requirements of a dynamic business environment 
(Newman, 2000). But the Tories had been modernising public services since 1997. The 
aim is to improve performance of the public sector in delivering services. It emphasises 
efficiency, performance, collaboration and participation with partners, markets and quasi 
markets, customers instead of producers, and 'joined-up' government. Modernisation of 
public service is an improvement on New Public Management reforms in the UK. Both 
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the NPM and the modernisation agenda were part of the reforms that affected higher 
education in the UK. 
In summary, the various reforms concerning the governance of higher education as well 
as those taking place in the wider society have created a myriad of organisational 
problems for the institutions which the university governing bodies as the ultimate 
authority and decision-making bodies are required to direct their institutions to address. 
The governing bodies of universities have a strategic role to play in all these reform 
processes which they ensure are complied with and implemented by the vice chancellors, 
the executives and senates. The university governing bodies are constituted by the reform 
reports as culture change agents (Bargh et al, 1996) that will ensure the universities 
respond favourably to the reform initiatives and to serve as intermediary bodies between 
the universities and government. In order to effect a culture change from collegial to 
corporate and enterprise culture and to ensure the accountability of their institutions, 
university governing bodies were reconstituted with majority of their members appointed 
from industry where the corporate culture and managerial practices are well entrenched. 
Those appointed as governors are persons whose "social and cultural identities are 
aligned with a market ideology" (Bargh, Scott and Smith, 1996, p. 22). 
The way and manner university governing bodies in the UK respond to the reform of 
university governance system in view of the external challenges facing the institutions 
and the pressures to comply and conform to the higher education reform initiatives is the 
focus of this study. 
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2.4.0 England and Scotland: Two Different Policy Contexts 
In this study, I adopted a comparative case study approach to examine higher education 
governance in seven English and Scottish universities within the first decade of the 21" 
century, focusing specifically on the role and activities of governing bodies of these 
institutions. It is helpful however to provide the wider more differentiated and divergent 
policy context in which the study is taking place in order to set the tone for a proper 
comparison. 
A comparative study as this within such a divergent policy context may enable the 
analysis of some salient differences between the governance systems of English and 
Scottish universities that could be of interest and practical value to all stakeholders of 
higher education in the UK. It is also possible for the higher education systems of both 
countries to learn some institutional governance and policy lessons from each other as a 
result of making these comparisons between both countries of the UK. Such comparative 
study can also contribute to the on-going theoretical debates concerning the effects of 
political devolution in the UK (Hogson et al, 2003) especially in the area of higher 
education governance policy development and implementation. 
In England and Scotland, there are some noticeable differences in ideologies and the 
ideals they strive for, which seem to have affected the development and implementation 
of policies as a result of the 1999 political devolution in the UK. The policies and the 
priorities of both countries of the UK appear to be pursued based on certain perceived 
peculiar contextual factors such as their different identities and traditions (Ozga, 2003). 
However, Ozga (2003) observed that despite attempts for convergence in certain aspects 
of the legislations of UK-wide policies, there is also a tendency for these two countries to 
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diverge based on differences in the constitution of their ideals, cultural identities and 
priorities which appears to be very prominent in Scotland than in Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
Ozga (2003) also observed that prior to the 1999 political devolution, Scotland had 
always operated a `distinct and differentiated pattern of policy provisions' during the 
period of the system of administrative devolution beginning from 1872 when the Scottish 
Education Department was established. This appears to imply that education had been 
devolved long before political devolution in 1999. 
Political devolution has also resulted in England and Scotland having different priorities 
and directions which have led to different policy innovations and modes of delivering 
public services (Keatin, 2001; Ozga, 2003; Schmuecker, 2005). For example, Keatin, 
Stevenson and Loughlin (2005) observed that in making some major public policy 
decisions, the English executive adopted what they referred to as `consumer choice and 
diversity' approach while the Scottish executive favoured `professionalism and 
uniformity' and these two different approaches, they reasoned, have resulted in different 
policy provisions even on issues that affect both countries. Keatin et al (2005) also 
argued that Scotland embraces a social democratic approach to the delivery of public 
service while England adopts a more market-oriented and managerialist approach. 
Explaining further the divergent approach to welfare policy in Scotland in view of the 
distinctive character of the Scottish tradition in comparison with England, Lindsay 
Paterson argues thus: 
"The welfare state in Scotland was Scottish in implementation of large areas 
of policy... These were crucial in the sense that they shaped the character of 
society more profoundly than many of the topics that were not administered 
in Scotland... Scottish institutions were held to constitute Scottish identity. 
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They were taken to be the embodiment of a putative tradition of popular 
sovereignty which was believed to be older and more legitimate than the 
sovereignty of the parliament at Westminster" (Paterson, 1998, pp. 62 - 63). 
This according to Ozga (2003) is an attempt to view "devolution as a representation of 
difference' between Scotland and the other countries of the UK. 
Taking a historical perspective of the development of a differentiated national Scottish 
identity since the union of the Parliaments of England and Scotland in 1707, Brisand, 
Menter and Smith (2003) and McCronc (2005) observed that there were three major 
institutional structures in Scotland namely the church, the law and education which 
shaped the characteristic distinctiveness of Scotland from England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. The Scots seem to derive some of their cultural values and identity from their 
close interaction with continental Europe (Davie, 1993). Although, the Scots and the 
English may have some similarities in their cultural values and social attitudes, they 
arguably have different ways of actualising them politically and socially (McCronc, 
2005). The Scots adoption of a social democratic approach to political and social issues 
seems to be the reason public opinion has a way of influencing political decisions more in 
Scotland than in England (McCrone, 2005). Expressing this same view further, Davie 
(1993) contended that the perceptions of the Scots of a civil society is framed by a shared 
belief that national development takes place when there is a dialogue between 
professionals and lay people. Scotland therefore appears to adopt a more democratic and 
participatory approach to the development and implementation of policy than in England 
where government seems to engage only the participation of policy elites in the 
development of policy (Finlay and Egan, 2004). This view is manifested in the way the 
Scottish Parliament makes policy decisions which hinges on the "principles of power 
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sharing, accountability, equal opportunities, openness and participation" (Cairney, 2005, 
p. 1). Keatin et al, (2003) have also produced a typology of legislations enacted between 
1999 and 2003 based on policy divergence and convergence between Scotland and 
England in order to buttress the issue of differentiation between both countries 
occasioned by political devolution. 
In contrasting the areas of divergence in higher education policies between England and 
Scotland, Deem (2005) highlighted the following: 
" The result of assessment of research quality in universities in the UK is 
interpreted differently in both England and Scotland for the purpose of funding 
the universities. 
" While it is mandatory for English universities to subscribe to the Higher 
Education Academy to enhance the teaching capability of academics in England, 
it is optional in Scotland. 
" While in England there is a policy that separates teaching from research 
universities, in Scotland teaching and research activities are still being undertaken 
in all universities. 
" In England there are different funding councils for both its further and higher 
education sectors but in Scotland there is just a single funding body for post- 
secondary education institutions. 
" In Scotland, there is fund made available for the continuing professional 
development of teachers through the professional doctorate programmes but this 
is not the case for teachers in England (Deem and Lucas, 2007). 
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However, Deem (2005) had cautioned on the making of comparison between English and 
Scottish higher education systems because the sizes of the two systems arc not the same. 
The policy context that forms the basis for the comparison of higher education 
governance in both English and Scottish universities in this study reveals an interesting 
discourse of difference and divergence between the two countries of the UK. Based on 
the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that devolution has resulted in divergent 
policy development and implementation between England and Scotland which has 
enabled both countries to pursue their respective national development efforts by taking 
into cognisance the uniqueness of their peculiarities and priorities and this may affect the 
system of university governance in both countries. 
2.5.0 Institutional Context of Pre-1992 and Post-1992 Universities 
In this section, I discussed the contextual characteristics between the Pre-1992 and Post- 
1992 university governing bodies in the UK which forms the basis for comparison in this 
study by highlighting the history of the establishment of the institutions, legal framework 
in which they operate and the governance arrangements in these institutions. There arc 
two broad categories of institutions making up the higher education system in the UK. 
These are the Pre-1992 and the Post-1992 universities and they come from diverse 
backgrounds and different constitutional arrangements (CUC, 2004). 
1. Pre-1992 University Governing Bodies 
The Pre-1992 universities were established by Royal Charter granted by the Privy 
Council and are therefore referred to as chartered universities due to the way they were 
incorporated. But a few of the universities were established by Acts of Parliament and 
operate based on statutes and they are known as statutory corporations (CUC, 2004). The 
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Pre-1992 universities are a diverse group with different histories and constitutional 
arrangements as entrenched in the instruments of their establishment and their legal 
frameworks known as the charters and statutes but they appear to possess common 
governance characteristics (CUC, 2004; Coldrake, Stedman and Little, 2003). These 
institutions were established at various times in the history of higher education in the UK 
dating back to as early as the 19`h century (Coldrake et at, 2003) but Ackroyd and 
Ackroyd placed their establishment at between 30 to 300 years ago. These universities 
are governed through their individual charters and statutes and they make provisions for a 
bi-cameral system of institutional governance and another separate governing body 
known as academic senate. The bi-cameral system of university governance, according to 
Shattock (2006), first came into existence in English higher education at about 1880 at 
Owens College, Manchester. The bi-cameral system has an overall governing body 
known as University Court (not the same as court in Scottish universities) and a Council 
which is the executive governing body and have same role as court in Scottish 
universities. 
The university court is usually a very large body with size ranging from 50 to about 400 
members (CUC, 2004; Coldrake et at, 2003) that is charged with overseeing the 
institution and can advise the executive governing body and the vice chancellor on a 
number of issues affecting the institution. It serves as a stakeholder forum because it is 
composed of representatives of the identified internal and external stakeholder groups of 
the university. The university court meets once a year to consider the annual report and 
audited accounts of the institution and presents its own views on them which the 
university could take into consideration. But the Dearing Report (1997) which was also 
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echoed by the Lambert Review (2003) recommended that university courts should neither 
have any constitutional role to play in the universities nor have authority over the 
executive governing bodies of the institutions. Some university governing bodies have 
reviewed the role of their courts as recommended by Dearing (1997). In the current 
governance reforms, university courts ratify the policy decisions of the institutions but do 
not partake in formulating them (Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999). 
The governing bodies of Pre-1992 universities (known as council in England and court in 
Scotland) were usually fairly large bodies ranging from 25 to more than 60 members 
composed of majority of academics but with the higher education governance reforms 
(Jarratt, 1985; Dearing, 1997) the size of these bodies been reduced. They now range 
between 26 and 36 members composed of majority of lay governors, co-opted members, 
representative of university courts, academic and non-academic staff, and students as 
well as ex-officios who are usually senior managers of the institutions. 
The CUC (2004) governance framework stated the role of governing bodies of Pre-1992 
universities as: 
"... responsible for the university finances and investments... estates and 
buildings. It has authority to make contracts on behalf of the university 
and to enter into loan and mortgage agreements... has oversight 
responsibility for learning and teaching and research " (p. 40) 
The governing bodies of Pre-1992 universities would always seek the views of senate on 
many issues concerning the institutions (Shattock, 2006; Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999). 
However, the power over academic matters is ceded to academic senate of the 
universities which is the body statutorily established to deal with such issues (CUC, 
2004; Shattock, 2006). 
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The organisational structures and division of roles between the governing bodies of the 
Pre-1992 institutions prior to the higher education governance reforms and the unification 
of the higher education system in 1992 were more collegial in terms of approach to 
governance (Bargh et al, 1996; Dearlove, 1995; McNay, 1999). The collegial mode of 
governance was based on the principles of participatory decision-making, professional 
expertise, self-regulation and control over academic work by academics at both the level 
of the university governing body and the academic senate (Bargh et al, 1996; Dearlove, 
1995; Shattock, 1999; Berdahl, 1990). In collegial governance, the university governing 
body is usually academic-dominated with low lay representation and influence in the 
affairs of the institutions (Bargh et al, 1996). In order to facilitate participatory decision- 
making by academics, elaborate committee structures were constituted to deal with 
various aspects of the organisation of the universities. 
Collegial governance has been criticised by many commentators of higher education 
governance as being too slow in reaching decisions (Bargh et al, 1996; Dearlove, 1995), 
academics are too inward-looking and unresponsive to changes in the operating external 
environment of the institutions (Dearlove, 1995; Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999), elaborate 
committee system was operationally dysfunctional (Bargh et al, 1996) and academics are 
not trained to govern and manage organisations but to teach and conduct research. 
Collegial governance started its decline in the Pre-1992 universities with the higher 
education governance reforms initiated by the recommendations of Jarratt Report in 
1985. This decline in the power and role of academics in university governance was 
reinforced by the enactment of the Education Reform Act 1988, the Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992 and the Dearing Report (1997) with the re-emergence of lay- 
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dominated university governing bodies and stronger senior management teams led by 
vice chancellors (Bargh et al, 1996). The decline in collegial governance in UK 
universities appears to be initiated by government but it is an activity that is highly 
valued by the academics themselves and they resisted the change to corporate governance 
model (Dearlove, 1995). 
2. Post-1992 University Governing Bodies 
The Post-1992 universities in England and Scotland were established from different 
historical and contextual backgrounds. In England, the Post-1992 universities were the 
former polytechnics which were funded and controlled by the Local Education 
Authorities and became independent higher education corporations through the 
enactment of the Education Reform Act 1988. The Post-1992 institutions in Scotland 
were the former colleges of technology established as central institutions by the Central 
Institutions (Recognition) (Scotland) Regulation 1988. Both the polytechnics in England 
and central institutions in Scotland offered academic degree programmes accredited by 
the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA). The Post-1992 institutions arc 
referred to as independent higher education corporations as a result of their incorporation 
by the Education Reform Act 1988 and are conducted by instruments and articles of 
government. By 1992, these institutions were upgraded to university status and granted 
degree awarding powers through the legislation of the Further and Higher Education Act 
1992. The Post-1992 universities emerged from a civil service ethos with bureaucratic 
forms of administration since they were formerly controlled by the Local Education 
Authorities. But with the enactment of the Education Reform Act 1988. the Post-1992 
institutions were made to adopt managerial style of governance and management. Their 
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governing bodies known as board of governors are lay-dominated with no provision for 
staff and student representation. The external lay governors were appointed mainly from 
commerce, industry and the professions and they were to possess managerial and 
professional skills knowledge and expertise that are relevant to the activities of their 
institutions. The size of the governing bodies of the Post-1992 universities is usually 
between 12 and 25 members as recommended by Dearing (1997). Constitutionally, the 
corporation is the university governing body and membership of the corporation is 
limited to members of the board of governors only but in practice through the amendment 
of their statutes, some have included one or two staff and students. In the Post-1992 
institutions, staff are regarded as employees of the corporation. 
The governing body of Post-1992 institutions is the supreme decision-making body in the 
university with overall power and responsibility to determine the `educational character 
and mission' of the institution. It is also responsible for the efficient and effective use of 
the resources of the university as well as the accountability of the institution. The 
constitutional arrangements in Post-1992 institutions does not provide for the 
establishment of a university court as in the Pre-1992 universities thereby creating a 
unicameral governance structure which reflected their initial bureaucratic background as 
institutions formerly under the control of Local Education Authorities (Shattock, 2006). 
The vice chancellor of a Post-1992 university is also a member of the board of governors 
and is endowed with much power and authority over the day-to-day operational 
management of the institution (Ackroyd and Ackroyd, 1999). The role of the academic 
board in the governance of the higher education corporation (equivalent to senate in Pre- 
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1992 universities) is restricted to giving advice to the governing body in relation to 
resource and academic matters that were referred to it (Shattock, 2006). 
2.6.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I focused on some of the key issues affecting higher education institutions 
in the UK such as `third mission' activities, widening participation, managcrialism and 
research quality assessment. I also briefly traced the history of lay participation in 
university governance and examined the recent higher education governance reforms in 
the UK. Furthermore, I reviewed the differentiated higher education policy context within 
which English and Scottish universities operate as well as the institutional contexts of 
Pre-1992 and Post-1992 institutions in the UK. I argued that all these issues have 
implications for the governance and management of UK universities and they also form 
the background to this study. 
In the next chapter, I discuss the concept of corporate governance and the corporate 
organisational governance theories and their implications for the governance activities of 
university governing bodies and which form the theoretical framework for this study. 
46 
CHAPTER THREE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORIES 
3.0.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the numerous conceptual descriptions 
and definitions of corporate governance and to outline several corporate governance 
theories, namely: agency, stewardship, stakeholder, managerial hegemony and class 
hegemony theories and their underlying assumptions as put forward by their proponents. 
An attempt was also made to determine how the assumptions of these theories relate to 
and are relevant for the understanding of the governance roles and practices of university 
governing bodies in the UK. It serves as the theoretical framework for the study. 
3.1.0 The Meaning of Corporate Governance 
Insight from the previous chapter indicate that the recent higher education governance 
reforms have recommended and even legislated the adoption of corporate governance 
practices by university governing bodies to reposition the institutions to respond 
appropriately to the various external and internal challenges confronting higher education 
in the UK. It is therefore pertinent to review the concept of corporate governance and its 
theoretical underpinnings and their implications for the governance roles and practices of 
university governing bodies. 
Some scholars have attempted different definitions and descriptions of the concept of 
corporate governance but due to the complexity and diversity of corporate governance 
issues a consensual definition of the concept has been difficult to come by. Cadbury 
(1992) defines "corporate governance as the system by which organisations are directed 
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and controlled". Taking a cue from this definition, the OECD (2004) describes corporate 
governance as: 
"the system by which business corporations arc directed and controlled. 
The corporate governance structures specify the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the 
board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, spells out the rules 
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it 
also provides the structures through which the company objectives arc set 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance". 
The Australian National Audit Office (1999) defines corporate governance as "the process 
by which organisations are directed, controlled, and held to account". Turnbull (1997) 
offers a definition of corporate governance by attempting to accommodate the different 
perspectives of the concept of corporate governance. He defined "corporate govcmancc as 
all the influences affecting the institutional processes, including those for appointing the 
controllers and/or regulators, involved in organising the production of goods and services" 
(p. 2). Tricker (1994) describes corporate governance as "dealing with those issues 
concerned with the structures, processes and practices of boards of firms and the way the 
boards interact and relate with the owners, executive management and the various 
stakeholders of the organisation including government and other regulators" (p. xi). 
Keasey and Wright (1997) define corporate governance as "the enhancement of corporate 
performance via the supervision or monitoring of management performance and ensuring 
the accountability of management to shareholders and other stakeholders" (p. 2). Implicit in 
this description is the ability of the board to ensure that the management of the firm 
achieves the purpose for which the firm is established in order to meet the interest and 
expectations of both shareholders and stakeholders. Corporate governance can therefore be 
described as the process whereby the strategic goals and policies of an organisation. 
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whether for profit or not-for-profit, are formulated by the board and ensure their 
implementation by management in order to accomplish the purpose for which the 
organisation is established taking full cognisance of the interests of the various 
stakeholders of the firm. The board attempts to monitor the performance of management in 
the course of the implementation of these strategies to ensure the realisation of the set 
objectives. 
3.2.0 Corporate Governance Theories 
Turnbull (1997) argued that the diverse perspectives on corporate governance are a result 
of the different theoretical lenses with which analysts view the concept. The theoretical 
framework underlying corporate governance is based on some economic and 
organisational theories that have contributed immensely to the practice of corporate 
governance generally. However, due to the complexity and diversity of corporate 
governance issues, the proposed theories have not been able to articulate in any coherent 
manner the theoretical basis of the concept of governance and as a result there is no 
overarching corporate governance theory (Cadbury, 2004). A thorough search of the 
literature indicates that five outstanding theories form the theoretical framework for the 
practice of corporate governance in firms generally. These include agency theory, 
stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, managerial hegemony theory and class hegemony 
theory. 
It is pertinent at this point to look at the various conceptualisations of these theories, their 
basic underlying assumptions and what they individually contribute to the development, 
understanding and practice of corporate governance by the board of an organisation in - 
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general and university governance with reference to the governance roles and practices of 
university governing bodies in the UK. 
1. Agency Theory: The Agency theory, first articulated by Adam Smith in 1700s in his 
article "The Wealth of Nations", argues that in any modern corporation there are owners 
called the principals and there arc also managers known as the agents. The owners of the 
business can be an individual or a collection of persons known as shareholders who have 
contributed financially to the establishment of the business and therefore expect a good 
return on their investments and they also have ownership rights in the firm. The owners 
(principals) employ the managers (agents) who possess some knowledge and expertise in 
personnel and financial matters to administer the firm with the limited resources so 
allocated. The duty of the manager agent is to ensure a good return on investments to the 
principal while at the same time pursuing his own personal interest. The agent is assumed 
to be acting on behalf of and in the best interest of the owner who is the principal. Berle 
and Means (1932), in advocating the agency theory, noted this divergence of roles and 
interests between the principal and the agent. Agency theory assumes that managers will 
not act to protect the interests of principals but will rather pursue their own self-interest and 
personal gains. In this way, managers arc viewed as 'maximising their own utility' when 
they pursue their own interests to the detriment of the interest of the principals and this 
may lead to 'agency cost' incurred by the principals in their attempt to ensure the 
compliance of managers with the interest of the principal. This action of the managers 
gives rise to what is called the agency problem in a corporation. In order to resolve these 
problems, the principal enters into a contractual relationship with the agent by aligning the 
interests of both parties with each other through an incentive based scheme for the agent 
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(Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Letza and Sun, 2004). Since the principal is far 
removed from the firm, a board is usually appointed for the firm to act on behalf of the 
principal. One way of checking the self-serving behaviour of the manager is for the board, 
acting on behalf of the principal, to periodically audit and evaluate the performance of the 
manager (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Agency theory advocates the setting 
up of appropriate governance structures and processes to protect the interests of the 
principal (shareholders) by managers since they cannot be fully trusted to do so (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The board also convey problems and information from the agent to 
the principal and vice versa (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). The board can 
therefore be seen as playing a mediating role by aligning the interest of both parties. 
Agency theory advocates the separation of role of the board and chair on one hand and the 
management and CEO on the other thereby giving the independent non-executive board a 
control role over the organisation. The monitoring and control roles of the governing board 
of a firm are fully explained by agency theory which emphasises that the board should 
ensure conformance of the manager with the wishes and interests of the principal (Tricker, 
1994). The governance structures and processes are therefore designed to monitor and 
control the behaviour of the manager to make it conform to those of the principal. Clarke 
(2005) conceives agency theory as contributing immensely to the development and 
understanding of corporate governance in the 20`h century. 
One way in which agency theory could be used to explain the governance relationship 
between university governing bodies and vice chancellors is for the board to assume the 
position of representing the interest of the UK public and the government who provide the 
funds for the institutions and to ensure these funds are utilised effectively. The role of the 
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vice chancellor would be to utilise the funds to achieve the goals of government and the 
public as well as those of the institutions. The role of the governing body within the agency 
theory perspective would be to set the strategic direction of the institutions and to ensure 
the executive as represented by the vice chancellor is responsible for the accomplishment 
of the set strategic objectives and the performance of the university by taking the interests 
and wishes of government and society into consideration. The university governing body 
would also have the responsibility of calling the executive to account for the performance 
of the institution to the various constituencies and stakeholders of the university. 
In summary, the governance roles of the university governing body as advocated by 
agency theory are to direct and control the executive to accomplish the purpose of the 
institution as well as to call the executive to account for the performance of the university. 
The control, monitoring, strategy and accountability roles of university governing bodies 
appear to be explained by the assumptions of agency theory of corporate governance. 
2. Stewardship Theory: Proposed by Donaldson and Davis (1991) and derived from 
sociological and psychological theories, the stewardship theory assumes that managers arc 
good stewards of the firm and they need to be trusted to serve the interests of the owners 
and the organisation. They develop this theory of corporate governance based on their 
opposition to agency theory which claims that there is conflict of interests between 
managers and owners of the firm. They maintain that there is no conflict between managers 
and owners, rather managers act in the overall interest of owners. They argue that the 
assumptions of agency theory do not always apply to a firm because some managers may 
not be self-serving but motivated by achievement needs. In the stewardship relationship. 
the interests of both shareholders/ principals and those of other stakeholders including 
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those of the managers are protected through the maximisation of profit for the organisation 
(Smallman, 2004). The main duty of the manager is to achieve the purpose for which the 
organisation was established since 'managers are principally motivated by achievement 
and responsibility needs' and would therefore derive satisfaction from doing a good job 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1994). The stewardship theory advocates strong support and trust 
for the executive management of the firm by the board. In stewardship theory perspective, 
the firm would appear to favour the appointment of a board that would encourage the 
achievement-oriented CEO to succeed in achieving the purpose of the firm. The board in 
this case would also play more supportive and collaborative governance roles with the 
executive instead of a control role. In order to play these governance roles effectively, the 
board under a stewardship model of corporate governance would be composed of 
independent members possessing diverse expertise, skills, knowledge and experience that 
would be required to support the executive. The stewardship theory assumes the board 
would be involved in the collaborative setting of the strategic direction and development of 
strategies of the organisation with the executive. The engagement of the board with the 
strategy process of the organisation is what Tricker, (1984) referred to as the performance 
role of the board. The board would have an active and collaborative role to play in the 
strategy process of the organisation. 
The stewardship theory could be used to understand the role of a university governing 
body actively participating in the strategy process of the institution in collaboration with 
the executive. The governing body would jointly set the strategic direction of the 
organisation with the management in order to guide the latter to achieve institutional 
objectives. 
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3. Stakeholder Theory: A firm is established to serve a lot of interests including its 
shareholders and other people who have a stake in the organisation, commonly referred to 
as stakeholders. Stakeholders are all interested in the success of the organisation in 
achieving its set strategic objectives and overall purpose and the organisation in return 
affects the lives of the stakeholders with its products or services. The board and the 
management of a firm have a fiduciary responsibility to satisfy the varying interests of 
these stakeholder groups. The stakeholder theory is viewed as a sociological theory of 
organisation that is intended to explain the interaction between an organisation and its 
environment (Hung, 1998). Stakeholders can be described as any group of persons that can 
influence in one way or another the production of goods and services in an organisation 
(Smallman, 2004) and are in turn affected by the purposes and actions of the organisation. 
Freeman (1984) described the stakeholder as any individual or group that affect and is 
affected by the objectives of the organisation. Clapham and Cooper (2005) distinguished 
between primary and secondary stakeholders in an organisation. They described primary 
stakeholders as those who ensure the continued survival of the firm while the secondary 
stakeholders are those whose activities do not contribute in any substantial way to the 
survival of the organisation but they can be affected by the activities of the (inn. Examples 
of these primary stakeholders are financiers, employees, buyers, suppliers, lenders and the 
immediate community of the firm. Secondary stakeholders can be competitors of the firm 
and society in general. So generally speaking, stakeholders are those who have an interest 
in the organisation and who are also affected in one way or other by the organisation. 
The stakeholder theory advocates that the interests of all stakeholders of a firm should be 
given due consideration and such interests should be satisfied by the leaders of the 
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organisation. The stakeholders should also be allowed some decision making roles in the 
organisation but those of the primary stakeholders should be given top priority. It can be 
argued that any stakeholder who invests in the corporation should participate fully in the 
decision-making process of the organisation in order to ensure the success of the 
organisation (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001; Freeman, 1984). Stakeholder theory advocates 
the establishment of an independent, non-executive board made up of representatives from 
the identified stakeholder groups of the organisation in order to preserve their interests. 
Their role on the board would be to ensure their interest is taken into consideration in 
decision making and to serve as check on the executives and to make them accountable for 
their actions and performance. The stakeholder interests can also be guaranteed by having 
their representatives serve on important board committees where crucial decisions are 
taken on behalf of the board (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). The representatives of the 
stakeholders would also be able to provide relevant information, skills and experience that 
could enhance decision-making and the operations of the board and those of management. 
The stakeholder theory therefore advocates a mutual interdependent relationship between 
the various stakeholders and the organisation. Letza and Sun (2004) argue that stakeholder 
theory is based on the conception of the organisation as a social entity established 
specifically to create wealth for the owners and the provision of goods and services for all 
stakeholders and society at large. Luoma and Goodstein (1999) also argued that the 
stakeholder representation on the governing board can enhance the orientation of an 
organisation towards corporate social responsibility where the collective interests of the 
local community of the external operating environment of the firm are taken into 
consideration during decision-making. 
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The university governing bodies in the UK, as presently constituted arc partly made up of 
some representatives of identified primary stakeholder groups of the institutions such as 
staff, students, local and business communities as well as some other independent members 
appointed from the larger society. In the Pre-1992 English universities, the university 
courts are made up of representatives of the identified stakeholder groups of the institutions 
and they in turn elect their members to represent them on the governing bodies of their 
institutions. The charters and statutes of these universities provide for the constitution of 
the university courts. The university courts appears to serve as a stakeholders' forum which 
meet annually to discuss the annual reports presented by the vice chancellors and the 
executive of the institutions and also to offer suggestions and contribute to the debates of 
the institutions. In the UK, university courts are a peculiar feature of Pre-1992 English 
universities but some Post-1992 universities have also established their own courts but 
without legal provisions for them. Scottish universities do not have university courts. It 
could be argued that higher education institutions that have provisions in their charters and 
statutes for the establishment of university courts are most likely to have more stakeholder 
representations on their governing bodies, thereby ensuring and protecting stakeholder 
dialogue (Thomas and Martin, 1996) and interests than universities without such legal 
provisions. 
One major criticism of the stakeholder theory is that the organisation may lose focus of its 
strategic direction when attempting to take care of the interests of all groups of persons 
with a stake in the corporation. In trying to satisfy all stakeholders the organisation may 
not be able to take care of some of the important interests of its primary stakeholders. In 
terms of accountability, the board and the organisation could face the problem of 
56 
accounting to multiple stakeholders with divergent interests and expectations. The issue of 
multiple accountabilities to a diverse range of stakeholders has been observed to be one of 
the weaknesses of the stakeholder theory of corporate governance (Romzek and Dubnik, 
1987; Edwards and Hulme, 1996). 
Evidence from the literature indicates that not much is known about the appropriate context 
that would enhance the stakeholder model of corporate governance in a firm (Luoma and 
Goodstein, 1999). 
4. Managerial Hegemony Theory 
The managerial hegemony perspective assumes that management led by the chief 
executive has total control over the direction and the day-to-day operational activities of 
the organisation (Hendry and Kiel, 2004). The power over control of the organisation is 
derived from the fact there is information asymmetry between the board and management. 
This imbalance in power occurs because the management has more information and 
knowledge about the organisation than the board and it would therefore depend solely on 
the executive for its information needs. The management also has the power to influence 
the organisation especially when the board is not a direct source of funding which weakens 
the dependence of the executive on the board for funds (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The lack 
of control over the organisation by the board makes it a legal fiction (Drucker, 1974) and 
puts the board in a passive position in decision-making. The board is therefore viewed as 
an ineffective and reactive governing body that exists merely to legitimate and `rubber- 
stamp' the proposals and decisions of the executive of the organisation (Kosnik, 1987; 
Stiles and Taylor, 2001). It has no power to monitor the performance of the executive or 
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make any real input into the decisions of the organisation. One criticism of the managerial 
hegemony theory is that it lacks many empirical supports. 
In UK universities, the vice chancellors arc capable of operating under the theoretical 
assumptions of managerial hegemony theory because many of them arc academics that 
have full knowledge of the academic side of the business of the universities more than the 
lay governors that constitute a majority in the governing bodies of these institutions. They 
could therefore be in a better position to determine the strategies of the universities than the 
governing bodies. They would also be capable of leading their governing bodies instead of 
these bodies leading them in the universities. The role of university governing bodies in 
strategic governance would appear to be limited to a more passive and reactive role and 
participation in the strategy process of the institutions may be limited to confirming and 
approving the decisions of their vice chancellors and executives. 
5. Class Hegemony Theory: Following from the Marxist sociology of class hegemony 
theory, elites can be described as individuals belonging to the middle and upper social class 
of society which exercise control and power over many aspects of social, political and 
economic life (Adam and Tomsi, 2002). They arc also persons who occupy most of the key 
"top positions in various social sectors such as politics, media, civil service and business" 
(Engelstad, 2007) and influence important developments in society. They arc also capable 
of formulating and developing certain ideologies that can be adopted to socialise other 
people (Sample, 2006). The presence of these elites on governing boards of organisations 
has been observed by Clark (1989) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) as the forum through 
which the capitalist class is able to control social and economic institutions. The presence 
of this category of people forming a majority on governing bodies of universities could 
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signal a corporate takeover of higher education institutions in the UK and the subsequent 
institutionalisation of enterprise culture in academia as observed by Clark (1989). 
According to Sample (2006) and Sekulic and Sporer (2002) elites in positions of power 
and authority in organisations could perpetuate their likes through various recruitment 
procedures they adopt and which inadvertently exclude people from other segments of 
society. The higher education governance reforms of Jarratt (1985) and the Education 
Reforms Act 1988 recommended that lay members of university governing bodies should 
be recruited specifically from among corporate elites in business, industry and the 
professions. These categories of persons were to form a simple majority on the governing 
bodies of these institutions. 
In this present study, the class hegemony theory would form the theoretical lens through 
which the recruitment of persons into the university governing bodies in the UK would be 
examined and understood. 
In the next section of this chapter, I reviewed some risk theories that could enable me to 
understand and explain the approach to risk governance adopted by the university 
governing bodies in this study in their attempt to control and regulate the institutions to 
achieve their strategic goals and purposes in view of the external and internal challenges 
and pressures confronting the universities. The control role is an important governance role 
of governing boards of organisations. The Turnbull Report (1999) on risk management in 
corporate organisations was adopted by the higher education funding councils in the UK 
(HEFCE, 2001; HEFCE, 2005) in formulating a risk framework for the universities to 
enable the institutions to regulate their strategic activities. Both Turnbull (1999) and 
59 
HEFCE (2005) view risk governance as an important aspect of corporate governance of 
governing boards of organisations and universities. 
3.3.0 Risk Theories 
Individuals and organisations are exposed to many hazards, dangers and uncertainties in 
their everyday lives that seem to threaten their survival. These arise both as result of 
human activities and natural occurrences and arc associated with the phenomenon of risk 
as observed by contemporary social scientists (Ewald, 1991; Douglas, 1992; Beck, 1992; 
Lupton, 1999; Mythen, 2004). 
There are two major contrasting perspectives to the phenomenon of risk in the social 
science literature but they do not speak to each other. These arc the realist (technocratic) 
perspective and the relativist (constructivist) view. The line of distinction between the 
two perspectives is made apparent philosophically (Thompson and Dean, 1996). 1 am 
going to outline the debates about these two perspectives of risk as well as the 
relationship between them and how they could be applied to the governance of the 
strategic risks of higher education institutions by university governing bodies. 
3.3.1 The Realist Perspective 
The realist perspective which is based on the positivist paradigm derives its meaning 
from the disciplines of `science, engineering, economics, medicine and epidemiology' 
(Lupton, 1999). Within these disciplines and in the realist perspective as well as the 
positivist paradigm, risk is viewed as an objective and factual reality or phenomenon that 
exists in the physical `real' world and which needs to be identified and calculated and to 
determine the severity of its effect in order to mitigate or control it using actuarial science 
methods (Bradbury, 1989; Beck, 1999; Lupton, 1999; Stahl, Lichtenstein and Mangan, 
60 
2003; Zinn, 2006). The Royal Society (1992) also reported the existence of `objective 
risks' in any situation which people and groups respond to accordingly (Lupton, 1999). 
Frank Knight (1921), a realist, attempted to make a distinction between the concept of 
risk and uncertainty in terms of probability or possible outcomes of events. He argued 
that in risk, both the distribution and probabilities of outcomes are known while in 
uncertainty only the probabilities of the outcomes are unknown. He explains that when an 
event occurs once and for the first time the outcome is uncertain but when it occurs 
several times the outcomes become known and it turns into risk. In this manner, 
uncertainty has transformed into risk. This appears to indicate that uncertainty is a much 
bigger threat to existence than risk. Risk can therefore be described in a technocratic 
sense as the likelihood that something unexpected or major will happen to an individual 
or organisation as a result of changes taking place in the environment (Redmill, 2002; 
Royal Society, 1992). Risk has been described by Cassidy et al (2003, p. 2) as "any issue 
that affects an organisation's ability to meet its objectives". 
Theorists adopting the technocratic approach believe in the use of experts to measure and 
calculate risk based on the principles of probability and statistics (actuarial science). This 
type of technocratic approach assumes a rational method of risk assessment and 
evaluation. According to Bradbury (1989), a distinction between fact and value is 
usually made in technocratic risk assessment. The value-laden judgements of the expert 
risk analysts are often neglected by the realists despite their acknowledgement that 
human judgement is not value-free (Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 1999 Shrader-Frechette, 
1991). In my view risk perception is not value-free and therefore cannot be treated as an 
objective reality as described by technocratic risk assessment. The realists often 
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discountenance lay people's perception and approach to risk determination which they 
argue are influenced by social and cultural processes which arc based on value 
judgements rather than on factual information and arc therefore 'biased, subjective, 
inaccurate, unscientific and full of errors' as compared to those of experts that are viewed 
to be more factual, accurate, objective and scientific (Lupton, 1999; Beck, 1999, 
Bradbury, 1989; Bcamish, 2001). The realists "view risk avoidance as rational and risk 
taking as irrational" (Bloor, 1995 cited by Lupton, 1999, p. 21). However, the realist view 
based on the positivist paradigm which depends on technical calculations of risk has been 
the traditional and dominant approach to risk management in social science literature 
(Lupton, 1999; Beck, 1992; Stahl, Lichtenstein and Mangan, 2003) and especially in 
business. The overemphasis by realists on the taking of rational action to determine risk 
has been criticised by relativists (socio-cultural theorists) such as Douglas (1985) and 
Beck (1995) as inconsistent with the sociocultural dimension of human judgement, since 
people do not live in a rational world. 
3.3.2 The Relativist Perspective 
The other main theory of risk is the relativist perspective which is also known as the 
socio-cultural perspective. Its origin lies in the social science disciplines of sociology, 
cultural and social anthropology, philosophy and cultural geography (Lupton, 1999; 
Tierney, 1999). In this perspective, Beck (1992) described risk as a "systematic way of 
dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself" 
(p. 21). In this sense, Beck (1992) and Douglas (1992) perceive risk as a cultural strategy 
for transforming uncertainties about the future into something that can be managed. 
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This relativist perspective challenges the objectivity and the neglect of value judgements 
in risk assessment by the realists and risk experts. They are of the view that the way 
people perceive things (way of seeing) is dictated by a cultural pattern and what people 
discern as risk in one cultural milieu may be different from those of persons in another 
socio-cultural environment. So risk is perceived as a socially constructed phenomenon 
(Douglas, 1985; Lupton, 1991; Fox, 1999). 
Two socio-cultural perspectives on risk are discussed and these are the cultural 
perspective advanced by Mary Douglas (1985) and the `risk society' thesis put forward 
by Ulrich Beck (1992) 
1. Cultural Theory of Risk 
The main proponents of the cultural perspective of risk are Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1982). The cultural theorists are of the view that risk perception by people is influenced 
by human experience as well as social and cultural structures and systems (Douglas and 
Wildavksy, 1982; Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 1999; Beamish, 2001). This means that 
people's knowledge about risk is dependent on the sociocultural context in which it is 
taking place irrespective of whether they are experts or lay persons. This perspective 
challenges the claims of objectivity of the technocratic approach to risk analysis as do all 
relativist perspectives and that subjective value judgements are common to both expert 
and lay analysis of risk. The cultural theorists are of the view that risk management 
should involve the collaboration and participation of both experts and lay people with 
diverse perspectives on risk (Bradbury, 1989). This appears to imply that both lay and 
expert views and judgements are equally accurate and important in the assessment of risk 
(Shrader-Frechette, 1991, Thompson and Dean, 1996; Lupton, 1999). 
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2. Risk Society Theory 
Another relativist perspective on risk proposed by Ulrich Beck (1992) is the "risk 
society" thesis which argues that capitalist activities such as industrialisation and 
technological innovation have produced so much risk in modem society of which some 
cannot be controlled by scientific means and which has threatened people's existence. 
The industrial society has become a "risk society" as a result of the risk produced by 
modernisation which cannot be controlled by any means and people now live in a risk 
society (Beck, 1992; Beck, Giddcns and Lash, 1994). This has resulted in so much 
awareness of risk among individuals and organisations in modem society because risk 
has pervaded everyday life and people are forced to deal with the after effects of risks 
that they cannot control in their daily lives (Beck, 1992; Lupton and Tulloch, 2002; 
Luhmann, 1993). In a study conducted by Lupton and Tulloch (2002), the participants 
perceived risk as the defining aspect of people in their daily life. The main problem is 
how individuals, organisations, institutions and government can deal with risk by either 
preventing or mitigating its effect (Lupton, 1999). In modem society, as risk and 
uncertainty multiply the technical analysis of risk and the institutions established to 
assess and regulate risk (i. e., the relations of definition) have been criticised by the public 
for their inability to deal with risk (Mythen, 2004). Beck (1992) contended that the 
perception of lay people affected by environmental risk is not usually taken into 
consideration by the risk regulating institutions. 
Beck (1995) also argued that both objectivism and relativism have valid but divergent 
perspectives of risk and that the two views are all value-laden. He is of the view that "the 
decision whether to take a realist or constructionist approach (to risk) is for me a rather 
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pragmatic one, a matter of choosing the appropriate means for a desired goal (Beck, 
2000, p. 211). This appears to suggest that Beck (1995) integrated both realist and 
relativist perspectives in his "risk society" thesis which he labels the sociological 
perspective (Mythen, 2004; Lupton, 1999). Beck also contends that individuals and 
groups do not really understand the potential amount of risk they are exposed to in their 
daily lives as a result of technological innovations and so cannot determine them 
accurately by any particular means. Beck also maintains that individuals have become 
more reflexive due to anxieties about the increase in risks which emanates from 
modernisation and living in a risk society. 
The two socio-cultural perspectives on risk discussed have certain elements in common 
as observed by Lupton (2000). Firstly, risk is viewed as having become a part of the 
everyday political, social and cultural life of people. Secondly, risk is perceived as a 
phenomenon that can be managed by humans but only up to a point because there are 
uncertainties in everyday life. Thirdly, risk is concerned with people making choices and 
being responsible for their own actions (i. e. self-regulating individuals). However, most 
of the theoretical formulations on risks by the various theorists appear not to be based on 
any empirical data or to have been tested in relation to such data. They have also been 
rarely examined empirically with respect to university governing bodies. 
Both the realist and the relativist perspectives are attempts by risk theorists to develop 
frameworks for the management of the everyday risks that confront individuals, 
organisations and institutions in contemporary society. The difference between both 
perspectives depends on the `way of seeing' by both sets of theorists. 
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3.4.0 Risk Governance in UK Universities 
The external and internal environment in which UK universities operate has become 
unstable and unpredictable resulting in various types of risks that could affect the 
strategic directions and strategies of these institutions developed to accomplish their 
purposes. There is now a much greater emphasis in these institutions on the 
identification, management and governance of risk since 2001 when the higher 
Education Funding Council for England first proposed a risk management guide for 
adoption by universities to ensure the achievement of the strategic goals of the 
institutions and also to fulfil the purpose for which government have been funding these 
institutions. The management and governance of risk is to provide the assurance that the 
strategic goals of the institutions would be realised. 
In the literature of university governance in the UK, there is a dearth of empirical studies 
on the perception of risk by university governors and the role their governing bodies play 
in the governance of the strategic risks of the institutions. I3argh et at (1996) did not 
investigate the phenomenon of risk in their study of university governing bodies in the 
UK. The study conducted by Deem and Johnson (2003) on manager-academics in UK 
universities did look at risk but from a managerial rather than a governance perspective. 
This gap in the empirical literature could be as a result of the relative newness of this 
governance practice by university governing bodies in the UK. This study attempted to 
examine these issues as well as to determine which risk perspective (realist or relativist) 
prc-dominatcs in the governance and management of risks in the seven universities in this 
study. The risk perspectives discussed above would enable me to do so. Risk governance 
is different from risk management. Risk governance is the responsibility of the university 
66 
governing body and is concerned with ensuring the executive engages in the 
determination and management of the diverse risks associated with the strategies of the 
institutions and to make certain that the risk management process is effective in 
accomplishing the strategic direction of the institutions. 
3.5.0 Conclusion 
This review set out to examine the meaning of corporate governance as well as the various 
corporate governance theories that appear to be relevant to the governance activities of 
university governing bodies in the UK. Corporate governance was perceived generally as 
the way an organisation is governed and controlled by a governing board to achieve its set 
strategic purpose through various structures and processes. 
Five main corporate governance theories namely agency, stewardship, stakeholder, 
managerial hegemony and class hegemony theories were examined and how each theory 
relates to which aspect of the governance activities of university governing bodies in the 
UK was explored. It was observed that there is no overarching theory of corporate 
governance that could explain the whole governance roles and activities of university 
governing bodies as each theory appears to explain some aspect of the governance work of 
these bodies. 
I have explored the various views about risk by identifying two competing perspectives 
in the literature, namely, the realist and the relativist views and highlighting the main 
differences between them. I also explored the different relativist theories such as cultural 
theory of risk (Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and risk society theory (Beck, 1992). 1 
intend using these risk theories to explain and interpret the university governors' 
perception of risk and the approach to risk governance adopted by the seven university 
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governing bodies in this study. From a review of the literature, I observed the dearth of 
empirical studies on the risk governance role of university governing bodies in the UK. 
This study therefore intends to contribute to knowledge in this unexplored area of 
university governance. 
These corporate organisational theories would be used to interpret and understand various 
aspects of the governance activities of the university governors and their governing 
bodies in this study since there is no single overarching theory that can explain all aspects 
of a corporate board governance as revealed in the literature. 
In the next chapter, I reviewed and discussed some of the governance processes and 
practices of organisations with particular reference to higher education institutions in 
order to understand the main issues and identify the gaps in the literature. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 
4.0.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the motivations of 
people to voluntarily participate in organisational activities as well as some motivational 
factors that have emerged from undertaking such activities by individuals. I also explored 
the literature on the strategy role of governing boards of organisations and the theoretical 
debates and one model on boards' participation in the strategy process of their 
organisations. This subsequently led to my examining the concept of accountability and 
the accountability of university governing bodies within the context of the renewed call 
by the UK government for public bodies to be more accountable for the services they 
render to society. Following from that, I examined the issue of review of effectiveness of 
performance of governing boards and the various elements that constitute such 
effectiveness. 
The purpose of the review is to draw out the main themes and ideas from the various 
aspects of board governance in order to inform the aims of this study, the theoretical 
framework for the research, the research questions and the understanding of the 
governance activities of university governing bodies in this study. The chapter is 
organised into four sections dealing with motivation, strategy, accountability and 
performance review of governing bodies of organisations and universities in that order. 
4.1.0 Motivation to Participate in Organisational Activities 
In this review of the motivation for participation in voluntary activities in organisations, I 
have attempted to establish a link between citizenship, participation in organisational 
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activities and lay governance as they affect the reforms of higher education governance in 
the UK. The review also explored the relevant theoretical and empirical literature in order 
to identify the various factors motivating lay people to engage in voluntary activities in 
groups and organisations. Such a review may enable us to understand why people 
participate in voluntary activities and why an understanding of their various motivations 
can help improve the composition and governance capacities of governing bodies of 
universities. 
4.1.1 Citizenship, Participation and Lay Governance 
The idea of citizenship and participation in a democracy is well entrenched in the 
philosophy of UK government provision of public goods and services and voluntary 
participation in the voluntary sector of the economy. The concept of citizenship and 
participation in a contemporary democracy is to empower citizens to have greater control 
over the provision of goods and services they consume (Bargh, Scott and Smith, 1996). 
The participation of citizens in the form of lay involvement in the governance of 
universities in order to control the provision of educational services is as old as the 
history of the establishment of the `civic universities' in the UK in the 19th century. The 
governing bodies of these universities were composed of local professionals and business 
people (described as lay people) who formally applied for and obtained a Royal Charter 
to establish and fund the institutions (Bargh et al, 1996). In the 21st century, the growing 
importance of university governing bodies in directing and controlling these institutions 
to achieve their purpose has increased with the emergence of enterprise culture and the 
subsequent managerialisation of the institutions which are an extension of the wider 
reforms taking place in the public sector (Bargh et al, 1996, Deem, 1998). The voluntary 
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participation of lay persons in the governance of schools has been depicted by Deem et at 
(1995) as a `career' in active citizenship for these individuals. Governing bodies of 
schools and universities are a few of the existing spaces where people can practice active 
citizenship (Deem et al, 1995; Bargh et al, 1996) and to be involved in undertaking 
voluntary democratic activities, protecting the interest of society and contributing 
towards the development of an important public institution. 
The role of lay persons in the governance of universities received even greater attention 
in the higher education governance reforms beginning with the Jarratt Report (1985) and 
the Education Reform Act 1988. They recommended that university governing bodies 
should be lay-dominated and that they should be recruited based on their possession of 
certain skills and experiences that could enable them to play a more active role in the 
universities as well as to establish a corporate culture of governance and management in 
the institutions. It appears one way of establishing such a governing body is through the 
recruitment of persons whose motivations could match the values, aspirations and 
strategic goals of the university. Golensky (2002) had argued that one particular 
challenge in the recruitment process is how to identify and recruit board members that are 
intrinsically or altruistically motivated to serve in a governance capacity in organisations. 
4.1.2 Motivation for Participation 
Motivation as used in this study is the reason(s) responsible for someone to exhibit a 
particular behaviour or take specific action. Motivation can therefore be described as 
needs within an individual that drive a person to take an action that is directed at 
achieving a goal. Members of university governing bodies are usually people who 
voluntarily give of their limited time, 
knowledge, skills and invaluable experience for no 
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remuneration whatsoever to participate in the governance activities of their universities. 
Deem et al (1995) and Bargh et al (1996) argued that people who voluntarily participate 
in such activities without receiving any remuneration have diverse reasons or motivations 
for doing so. Taylor, Chait and Holland (1991) quoted Etzioni (1988) as predicting that 
the motivations for participating in the activities of a group affect the quality of 
participation and that those who are "morally committed will behave differently from 
those who do it purely out of self-interest" (p. 52). Motivation is therefore linked with the 
commitment of persons to certain ideals of the organisation in which they want to 
voluntarily participate to achieve. Dingle (2001) writing a report for the Independent 
Sector in collaboration with the United Nations specified the criteria for volunteering as 
(i) non-receipt of financial reward by the volunteer, (ii) the cost of volunteering should 
not exceed cost of hiring labour for the same purpose and (iii) the volunteer should 
undertake the activity on his/her own volition and not by coercion. An important point to 
note from these criteria is that it appears persons with low socio-economic background 
may not be able to participate in volunteering activities. 
Only very few studies have examined the motivations of people who volunteer to serve in 
governance roles on the boards of organisations (Inglis and Cleave, 2006; Taylor, Chait 
and Holland, 1991). Most of the studies were conducted in North America especially in 
the area of nonprofit organisations. Extensive studies conducted in the UK in both public 
and private sector organisations are virtually non-existent. Studies on motivation for 
participation in higher education governance are few in the UK. Bargh et al (1996) made 
some mention of the motivations of members of university governing bodies for 
voluntarily participating in institutional governance as part of their larger study that 
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explored the governance styles of post-1992 and pre-1992 universities. Taylor, Chait and 
Holland (1991) studied the relationship between trustees' motivation and the 
effectiveness of boards of private colleges in the US. Deem et al (1995) also examined 
the motivations of three school governors for participation in the governance activities of 
schools. 
Studies conducted in the area of motivation for voluntary participation usually set out to 
examine the motivational factors influencing the voluntary participation of people in the 
activities of groups or organisations. One specific question the researchers sought to 
explore but asked in different ways is "Why do people participate in voluntary 
activities? " Understanding the motivations of people who want to voluntarily participate 
in the activities of any organisation could enable these institutions to match their reasons 
to the type of governance activities they intend to carry out in order to enable them 
contribute effectively to the development of such bodies or organisations (Taylor et al, 
1991). However, the motivation of the volunteer alone may not be enough to ensure 
effectiveness of the performance of the individual in organisational activities. An 
understanding of the role to be performed in conjunction with the individual motivation 
could to a large extent determine the effectiveness of the performance of a volunteer. 
4.1.3 Motivational Frameworks 
A review of the relevant literature reveals that the most common approach adopted for 
the theoretical and empirical study of the motivation of persons who participate in 
voluntary activities is the use of theoretical motivational frameworks (Widmer, 1985; 
Inglis, 1994; Clary et al, 1998; Inglis and Cleave, 2006). Such frameworks are developed 
by conceptually grouping together related motivational factors of persons who participate 
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voluntarily in group activities. This would enable us have fewer meaningful categories or 
generalisations with some unique identity that is common to all the factors within the 
same group but different from the factors in all the other groups. However, the consensus 
among the researchers is that motivational frameworks are useful for exploring the 
motivations of people who voluntarily join groups and organisations to participate in their 
activities either in direct service or in a governance capacity. 
4.1.4 Motivational Factors and Empirical Findings 
The motivational factors presented below are those found as a result of a review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature. It focused mainly on the motivation of people for 
participating in voluntary activities generally in order to aid our understanding of why 
people voluntarily participate in the governance activities of their institutions. 
1. Development Factors: Empirical studies conducted in the nonprofit sector shows that 
people who voluntarily participate in the activities of groups and organisations are 
motivated by the need to contribute to the development of these bodies and through such 
participation to also help to bring some improvement to their immediate communities and 
society at large. Inglis and Cleave (2006) in their study of the determinants of the 
motivation for participation of members of boards of 58 nonprofit agencies in Canada, 
using motivational frameworks developed by Searle (1989), Inglis (1994) and Clary et al 
(1998), and adopting both quantitative and qualitative techniques in the analysis of their 
data found that respondents were motivated to participate in order to contribute to the 
development of the organisations. This particular motive was reported to be considered 
most important to the respondents for participating in the governance of the agencies. 
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Inglis and Cleave (2006), Widmer (1985) and Wandersman et al (1987) also identified in 
their studies that board members were motivated to serve in governance capacity because 
they want to use the opportunity provided for voluntary participation to contribute to the 
development of their communities and society. 
In studies on motivations of members of governing bodies conducted in educational 
settings such as schools, colleges and universities by Deem et al (1995), Taylor et al 
(1991) and Bargh et al (1996) respectively, the authors found that lay governors and 
trustees of the governing bodies of these institutions were motivated to serve in order to 
contribute to the improvement and development of the governing bodies and the 
institutions in general. The motivation to contribute to the development of the 
organisation and the society by voluntary participants has been described as an altruistic 
behaviour or attitude by Inglis and Cleave (2006) and Smith (1981). 
2. Efficacy: Smith (1994) in his review of relevant literature, Widmer (1985) in her study 
of directors of boards of nonprofit organisations in the US and Wandersman et al (1987) 
in their independent study of the motivation for the participation of people engaged in 
voluntary neighbourhood activities, found that they were motivated to participate because 
they think they have the skills, knowledge, experience and expertise to influence change 
in their organisations. This type of motivating factor is described as efficacy in the 
literature of voluntary participation in organisational activities. Inglis and Cleave (2006) 
also found efficacy to be a motivating factor among members of boards of organisation 
which they classified under the motivational component "Unique Contribution to the 
Board". Board members were quoted as saying that they were motivated to serve because 
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of the "opportunity to bring my skills and expertise to the board" and "the different 
perspectives and experiences I bring to the board" (p. 93). 
Bargh et at (1996) also found elements of efficacy among the reasons university 
governors participated in institutional governance. External lay governors were observed 
to have rated this motivational factor as being more important than internal members of 
the governing bodies. 
3 Personal Benefits: One of the most common motivational factors influencing the 
participation of people in voluntary activities is the perceived benefits derivable from 
such participation. Such benefits may be tangible or intangible rewards or incentives that 
are expected to accrue to a person for participating. These particular motivational 
characteristics are not directed at `others' or the organisation or society, rather they are 
self-directed and the purpose is for the personal development and enhancement of the 
status of the participant in order to make the individual feel good through participation. 
Wandersman et al (1987) viewed such motivational factors among their participants as 
feelings of satisfaction. Widmer (1985) observed that her respondents were motivated to 
participate by material benefits such as the opportunity to develop professional 
knowledge and skills. Inglis and Cleave (2006) in their study described personal benefit 
motivational factor as `Enhancement of Self-Worth'. Clary et al (1998) in their study 
identified opportunity for the individuals to make new business contacts and other career 
rewards as motives for voluntary participation. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) cited by 
Burke (1997) found personal motivational benefits to include the "opportunity to learn, 
seeing new businesses, establishing contacts to enhance other business relationships, the 
opportunity to contribute to society and compensation" (Burke, 1997, p. 119). 
76 
4 Relational Factors: The symbolic interactions between voluntary participants and their 
organisations themselves have been perceived as important motivational factors for 
joining organisations by participants. Such interactions or relationships may come in the 
form of an existing business collaboration or social relationship between the individual 
and the organisation as reported by Smith (1994). The study on the motivation of trustees 
by Taylor, Chait, and Holland (1991) found that the majority of the members of effective 
boards had previous close connections with their colleges while only very few members 
of ineffective boards had such close ties. 
5 Representational Factor: Bargh, Scott and Smith (1996) in their study of university 
governing bodies in the UK observed that the majority of internal members perceived 
that they were motivated to join their governing bodies because they were elected by their 
various constituencies to serve as their representatives on these bodies. Such 
constituencies include the various staff bodies, senate and university court (as in the case 
of English universities). This motivation was considered one of the least important 
reasons for participating in university governance. 
6 Employment-Related: Employment-related motivations are concerned with the direct 
relationship between the full-time or part-time jobs of the voluntary participants to the 
services rendered by the organisation in which the voluntary work would take place. 
Those who were motivated to participate as a result of job-related incentives were 
identified by Widmer (1985) as being professionals in one organisation who want to 
develop their professional knowledge through participation in such activities in another 
firm. 
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7. Cultural Values: The role of culture in the motivation of people to engage in certain 
social activities has been identified by Luthans (2002). He contends that cultural 
differences do influence the motivations of people to take up certain social and job- 
related responsibilities and which also affect their performance. Luthans (2002) affirmed 
that what motivates an individual to engage in a particular social activity in one culture 
may not be a motivator for another person in a different culture. 
In summary, the relationship between citizenship, participation and lay governance in UK 
universities was highlighted. It was observed from the empirical studies reviewed that 
people voluntarily participate in organisational activities because they were motivated by 
a number of reasons which could engender commitment to the values of the organisation. 
Only few studies such as those of Bargh et al (1996) and Taylor, Chait and Holland 
(1991) had investigated the motivation of members of governing bodies of universities 
and colleges. Most of the researchers in this area adopted various motivational 
frameworks to examine the motivation of voluntary participants in organisational 
activities. The motivational factors identified from the review of literature include 
developmental, efficacy, personal benefits, relational, representational, employment- 
related, contextual and cultural factors. 
However, more research needs to be conducted in the area of motivation of university 
governors in the UK especially within the context of the changes that are taking place in 
the institutions. In the next section, I review the strategy role of governing boards in the 
strategy process of their organisations as well as one model for participating in strategy 
by boards. 
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4.2.0 The Strategy Role of Governing Boards 
The purpose of this review is to examine the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
strategy role of governing boards of business and educational establishments. Due to the 
limited nature of the theoretical and empirical literature on the strategy role of governing 
bodies of educational establishments this review will draw mostly from the literature of 
business organisations. It is assumed that some of the views and research findings on the 
strategy role of boards of business organisations may apply to those of higher education 
institutions in view of the fact that business practices are being adopted to govern and 
manage these institutions. Though, this view might be contentious since universities are 
somehow different from business organisations in terms of their culture and multiple and 
sometimes ambiguous goals. The higher education governance reform report of Jarratt 
(1985) and the corporate governance reform report of Cadbury (1992) in the private 
sector have exercised profound influence on the practice of governance and management 
of higher educational institutions in the UK since the early 1980s (Shattock, 2006). 
Specifically, the Jarratt Report (1985) recommended a restructuring of the composition of 
university governing bodies to accommodate more lay persons with skills, knowledge 
and experience that is needed in the universities to enable them to play a more active role 
especially in determining the strategies of the institutions and to engage fully with 
resource allocation to enable the universities to achieve their purpose. Each governing 
body was required to have a planning and resources committee in order to integrate 
strategy with financial planning issues. This ensures the incorporation of the strategy role 
into the governance role of university governing bödies. Even in business organisations, 
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board members are recruited from business and industry mainly for their ability to 
contribute to the strategy of the organisation (Greer and Hoggett, 1999). 
Organisations including universities now operate in an external environment that is 
increasingly becoming uncertain and competitive more especially with the challenges 
imposed by globalisation and market principles. Moreover, in the higher education sector, 
the cuts in funds allocation by government to the institutions in the 1980s and the 
widening participation agenda of government which greatly expanded the universities 
and turned them from elite to mass higher educations institutions combined to make 
strategic planning imperative for the universities. In order to cope with the challenges and 
demands of the external environment, organisations appear to assess the various threats 
that are hostile to its existence and seize the opportunities that would enhance their 
survival after taking into consideration their strengths and weaknesses through both an 
emergent and deliberate strategy process. Porter (1980) argued that organisations should 
position themselves through the strategy process to enable them to withstand competition 
or turbulence in both their internal and external environments. There is also a prevalence 
of the discourse of strategy in business organisations (Greer and Hoggett, 1999) and in 
higher education institutions (Bargh et al, 1996; Rowley, Lujan and Dolence, 1997; 
Jarzabkowski, 2005). Strategy has been described as a means or a plan of action by which 
an organisation is developed and positioned to withstand the challenges of the dynamic 
changes in its environment that may affect its development, competitive advantage and 
survival through the use of its scarce and limited resources (Greer and Hoggctt, 1999; 
Porter, 1980). It can also be described as a "pattern in a stream of actions" (Mintzbcrg, 
1990). Following from the Mintzberg's definition, Jarzabkowski (2005) gave an extended 
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description of strategy as a "pattern in a stream of goal-directed activity over time" (p. 
40). This definition is consistent with the activity-based perspective that views strategy as 
a socially constructed practice that is intended to achieve desired future-oriented goals 
through some form of deliberate activities in an organisation (Jarzabkowski, 2005). 
Organisations exist for a purpose and to fulfil that end they engage in a deliberately 
planned course of action and are directed and controlled to achieve that end. The course 
of action or activity is usually undertaken by individuals at various levels in the 
organisation but co-ordinated by top-management where they interact with the various 
groups to shape the content and conduct of strategy (Jarzabkowski, 2005). Traditionally, 
strategy activities fall within the management role of the executive, but there is a growing 
tendency for governing boards to be statutorily charged with the responsibility of 
determining the future strategic direction of the organisation and to ensure the 
management accomplishes it by developing and implementing various strategies. The 
involvement of boards in strategy matters is increasingly becoming an aspect of their 
governance role but there is relatively little consensus in the literature as to the nature and 
extent of their involvement (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). 
4.2.1 Model of Board Participation in Strategy 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) observe a significant gap between the prescriptive 
literature that boards should actively engage in strategy and the little empirical literature 
which found that boards actually and actively engage in strategy. In their investigation 
into the contributions of boards to strategy found that they actually get involved in 
strategy matters, despite the assumptions of managerial hegemony theory that it is 
management that directs the whole strategy process in organisations and that the role of 
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boards is mostly to approve the proposed strategies of management. They proposed a 
model of board participation in strategy and identified three levels where boards get 
involved in strategy as including "taking strategic decisions, shaping strategic decisions 
and shaping the content, context and conduct of strategy" but that the extent of 
involvement of governing bodies differ along these three levels in the strategy process. 
McNulty and Pettigrew describe the model as follows: 
Taking Strategic Decisions: In the strategy process of the organisation, taking strategic 
decisions entails board members and the board approving, rejecting or referring for 
modification the strategic proposals presented by the executive. In taking strategic 
decisions, board members perform a decision-making role and this is the first and only 
time the board comes in contact with the strategic document. McNulty and Pettigrew 
(1999) observe that all boards take strategic decisions. They described taking strategic 
decisions as the lowest level of involvement of board members in the strategy process of 
the organisation. 
Shaping Strategic Decision: At the level of shaping strategic decisions, the executive 
consults with the board members during the preparation of the draft strategies of the 
organisation. The board members would have the opportunity to question some of the 
ideas and decisions of the executive, give the executive some advice on strategy and the 
executive takes these views into consideration when preparing the final draft strategic 
document for subsequent presentation to the board for approval. McNulty and Pettigrew 
(1999) are of the view that only some boards have the opportunity of getting involved at 
this level and contributing to shaping the strategic decisions of the executive. The board 
members are more actively involved in contributing to the development of strategy at this 
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level and they help to influence the strategic thinking of the executive prior to the 
preparation of the final draft strategic document. Boards who get involved in `shaping 
strategic decisions' also get involved in `taking strategic decisions'. Their activities are 
limited to these two levels only in the strategy process. 
Shaping the Context, Content and Conduct of Strategy: According to McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) only few boards participate in the strategy process up to this level. This 
is the highest level of involvement of board members in the strategy process of the 
organisation where they set the parameters for the development of strategies in the 
organisation. They also decide on how the strategies should be developed as well as the 
processes for monitoring the achievement of the strategic focus of the organisation. 
Boards and their members that operate at this level are also involved in the previous two 
levels. They shape the context, content and conduct of strategy, shape the strategies of the 
organisation and also take strategic decisions by approving the final strategy document 
submitted by the executive. 
In this present study, this model would be utilised to examine the extent to which the 
university governors and their university governing bodies get involved in the strategy 
process of the institutions. 
4.2.2 Passive and Active Strategy Debate 
There is a debate in the literature of board governance as to whether boards should 
participate in the strategy process of the organisation or not. This is referred to as the 
passive and active debate in strategy. The passive school of thought views the board as an 
approval body for the strategic decisions of management. This view receives the support 
of the managerial hegemony theory which assigns a more active decision-making role in 
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an organisation to the CEO and the executive. According to this perspective, the 
executive determines the strategic direction and the strategies of the organisation and 
presents them to the board for approval. The board only gets involved in the strategy 
process when a strategy document has been presented to it by the executive and their only 
role is to review and approve it. In this case, the board is passive and reactive to the 
strategic decisions of the executive. They do not initiate or contribute to the 
determination of the strategic direction and the strategies of the organisation. The 
proponents of this perspective are Herman (1981), Stiles and Taylor (2001) and Mace 
(1971). 
The active school of thought perceives the board as playing an active role in setting the 
strategic direction, contributing to the content of the strategies and also deciding the 
parameters within which strategic planning takes place within the organisation and this 
view receives support from the assumptions of the agency and stewardship theories 
perspective (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Hendry and Kiel, 2001). Within this perspective, 
the board and the executive collaboratively determine the strategies of the organisation 
but they do not get involved in the implementation of the strategies, which is the 
responsibility of the executive. Boards that adopt the active approach to strategy give 
their members the opportunity to contribute to the strategies of the organisation. The 
board in this regard plays a crucial leadership role in the organisation through the 
engagement with the strategy process. Proponents of the active role of board in strategy 
are Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), Golden and Zajac (2001), Hendry and Kiel (2004) 
and Pearce and Zahra (1991). The Jarratt Report (1985) also favours the participation of 
university governing bodies in strategy but through a strategy committee. In this case, 
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most of the lay governors may not have the opportunity to participate in the strategy 
process. 
The prescriptive literature favours an active role for boards in the strategy process 
especially in the formulation of the strategic direction of the organisation and the shaping 
of strategic decisions of the executives rather than the passive-reactive role described 
above. Lorsch (1989) and Farrell (2005) in their studies observe that board members do 
really want to get involved in strategy but are somehow constrained by certain factors. 
Andrew (1980) even recommended a collaborative planning of strategy between the 
board and executive management because of the quality of human resource available on 
boards of organisations. But boards appear to participate more actively in determining 
corporate level strategy which involves determining the vision, mission and values and 
also to maintain the strategic focus of the organisation so that executive management is 
left with the responsibility of planning the business strategy within that framework 
(Stiles, 2001) rather than engaging in business strategy, which is in the domain of the 
executive. This may help to create the much sought distinction between governance and 
management roles in organisations. 
Bargh et al (1996) in their study of governing bodies of UK universities identify the 
strategy role as the most important governance role performed by these bodies based on 
the perceptions of the university governors and which they anticipate participation to 
increase in the future. They, however, described the involvement of university governing 
bodies in strategy as mostly reactive. Farrell (2005) in her empirical study of some school 
governing bodies in the UK concluded that they are mainly reactive in terms of their 
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strategy role and that their involvement in strategy matters is limited to approval, 
rejection or modification of the strategic proposals of the head-teacher. 
Almost all the empirical studies conducted in educational institutions in the UK observe 
the passive-reactive involvement of governing bodies in strategy matters (Farrell, 2005; 
Bargh et al, 1996; Bennett, 2001). But the same cannot be said of boards of business 
organisations whose involvement in strategy range from passive to active (McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999; Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Golden and Zajac, 
2001). 
In summary, the review highlights the emergence of the strategy role of university 
governing bodies in the UK and the need for them to engage in strategy. I also described 
the concept of strategy and a model of board participation in strategy as well as the 
passive and active debate concerning the strategy role of governing boards. I observed 
that only Bargh et al (1996) had conducted an empirical study on the strategy role of 
university governing bodies in the UK and found that they play a mostly reactive role in 
the strategy process of the institutions. In this present study, the strategy role of the 
university governing bodies would be explored based on the passive and active 
dimension of board role in strategy and the extent of the participation of the governors in 
the strategy process would be examined through the McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) 
model of board participation in strategy. 
In the next section, the concept of accountability and the accountability of university 
governing bodies were reviewed in the light of the increasing demand by government that 
public institutions and bodies should be accountable for their performance. 
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4.3.0. The Accountability of University Governing Bodies 
This section attempts to explore the historical and policy antecedent of accountability in 
the UK public sector and higher education. It examines the concept of accountability 
generally as well as the accountability relationship between government and the 
universities and the role of the university governing bodies in the accountability process 
of their institutions. The section also considers some empirical studies that have been 
conducted on the accountability of governing boards of business and educational 
institutions generally in order to expose the gap in the literature of university governance. 
4.3.1 UK Government and Demand for Accountability 
There has been a renewed concern and emphasis on accountability in the UK, right from 
the early 1980s, as a result of the emergence of a new `audit society' (Power, 1993; 1997) 
and `new managerialism' (Clarke et al 1994). The late 1980s, witnessed the advent of 
`New Public Management' (Hood, 1991) as a management philosophy adopted by the 
Conservative government of the Thatcher administration (1979-90) in the UK for the 
reform of public institutions in order to improve their performance in delivering public 
services to society. Newman (2000) described the reforms as an attempt to redefine the 
"relationship between public and private sectors, professionals and managers, and central 
and local government" (p. 3). The traditional autonomy of professionals as producers of 
services and as representing and protecting the interests of citizens was challenged and 
reversed in the reform arrangements because they were perceived by the New Right as 
`monopolistic, self-serving and not accountable in any form' (Clarke and Newman, 1994; 
Deem et al, 1995). The whole concept of self-accountability based on autonomy and 
moral authority of professionals in service delivery was perceived as inadequate by 
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government and society. There was greater demand for increased transparency and 
accountability from professionals for their actions and performance. Humphrey et al 
(1993) and Deem et at (1995) argued that the `New Right' and `neo-liberals' in 
conjunction with the Thatcher administration in the UK were intent to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness of the performance of social services provisions through the reform of 
public institutions by the prescription and adoption of managerial practices of private 
sector organisations in order to bring about the desired change. Public institutions were 
being transformed from a `producer-dominated' to more `consumer-focused' 
organisations (Deem et al, 1995; Newman, 1998). 
The New Labour government under Tony Blair in 1997 continued the NPM philosophy 
of reforming public sector institutions which was started by the Conservative government 
in the 1980s by proposing its own modernisation agenda which was intended to 
modernise the functioning of public institutions to meet the demands of a modem 
economy and society (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Clarke et at, 2000, Deem and Brehony 
2005). The language of `effectiveness, efficiency, value-for-money, performance 
indicators, resource management, devolved budgets and internal markets' were perceived 
as the organisational practices that are associated with the new ways in which the public 
sector should be managed (Deem and Brehony, 2005). This was also aimed at increasing 
the efficiency and effectiveness of public institutions and their professionals in delivering 
public service to users and other stakeholders and to be accountable to them (Newman, 
2000). 
Accountability was associated with the culture of managerialism and the discourse of 
value for money was instituted in public institutions by government (Flinders, 1995; 
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Gibbons, 1998; Deem and Brehony, 2005; Newman, 2000). The reforms were intended to 
enable professionals in public institutions to respond more to the needs of the users of 
their services and products and to make them more transparent and properly accountable 
to government and society. 
Despite the appeal of management technologies such as accountability as a control 
mechanism, Humphrey et al (1993) observed some failures of this management approach 
in driving neo-liberal ideology of efficiency gains in the private sector which is still being 
recommended for adoption by public institutions. For example, they cited the failure of 
audits in the corporate world which is being advocated for use in public institutions and 
this represents a paradox in the neo-liberal ideology that is concerned with promoting 
efficiency. This paradox is even made more evident in the appointment of audit 
committees for governing boards of organisations through the recommendations of 
various corporate governance reports and codes of practice. 
4.3.2 Meaning of Accountability 
Over the years, the meaning of accountability has become increasingly blurred and 
ambiguous with various individuals ascribing different interpretations to the concept 
depending on the context in which it is taking place (Poulson, 1998; Savage and Moore, 
2004; Opfer, 2001, Mulgan, 2000; Berdahl (1990). Trow (1996) describes accountability 
as "the obligation to report to others, to explain, to justify, to answer questions about how 
resources have been used and to what effect" p. 310. Kogan (1986) in his analysis 
described accountability as "a condition in which the individual role holders are liable to 
review and the application of sanctions if their actions fail to satisfy those with whom 
they are in an accountability relationship" (p. 25). Implicit in these descriptions of 
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accountability is the view that there is a mandatory giving of information which can be 
referred to as rendering of an account by those who are required to explain and justify 
their own actions to those who are requesting for -the information or an account. Those 
demanding for an account would also have the power to evaluate such information and 
reach a decision or come to a conclusion as to whether some performance expectations 
have been achieved. 
Stewart (1984) proposed a comprehensive framework for the analysis of accountability in 
any organisation. He argued that accountability consists of three main parts namely the 
`element of account', `holding to account' and mechanism of accountability. In 
explaining the framework, Stewart argued that the `element of account' is the need for 
information by an authoritative body on the actions and performance of an accountable 
body in order to form judgements. The information so requested would also be presented 
by the accountable body in a form and language that is understandable and acceptable 
(Stewart, 1984; Day and Klein, 1987). Such information could be statement of account, 
performance targets, statement on corporate governance, performance review report, 
research assessment results, annual report, etc. Stewart maintains that information is a 
very crucial aspect of any account that is to be rendered and it also depends on the type of 
account to be given. 
The other aspect of the framework according to Stewart, which is the element of `holding 
to account', involves the right of the authoritative body to question and debate the 
information that is provided by the accountable body in order to form judgements about 
the account that is rendered. This means that the information or the account that is given 
will be evaluated in order to give approval or disapproval with accompanying reward or 
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punishment respectively. One-important consequence of the `holding to account' is the 
`giving of account' which Stewart argues is necessary for operationalising the former. 
This appears to be the compliance aspect of the accountability framework because 
whoever is held to account as a result of having responsibility for a given role and is 
allocated resources to accomplish that role is bound to give an account of performance. 
Stewart describes accountability as a bonding relationship between an accountable body 
that accounts and is held to account on one hand and an authoritative body who holds to 
account and is expected to receive an account. For example, the accountability 
relationship between the UK government and universities is made effective through the 
higher education funding councils. The government through the funding councils is the 
one who `holds to account' and expects to receive an account and the university is the 
one who accounts and is `held to account' for the use of resources allocated to it to 
accomplish some purpose. `Holding to account' is an attempt at evaluating effectiveness 
of actions or performance of an accountable body (Ranson, 2003). 
Stewart described the interaction between the two parties as a relationship of power 
where the authoritative body to whom the account is given exercises power and authority 
over the accountable body that renders the account. He said such bonds of accountability 
are entrenched in legislations and legal instruments establishing an organisation as well 
as in various compliance codes and frameworks. However, the author explains further 
that sometimes the bond of accountability between the two parties may be a weak one in 
that the accountable body would give an account but the body receiving the account may 
lack the power to `hold to account' and therefore may not be able to apply sanctions to 
the accountable body where expectations for standard of performance are not met. He 
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argued further that it is not just enough to render an account but that the information 
should be published or distributed to all stakeholders of the organisation. 
The accountability process is made manifest through various mechanisms of 
accountability which can be described as particular means or techniques adopted to 
achieve the giving of account by an accountable body (Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006; 
Baird, 1997). These mechanisms include documentations such as annual reports, audit 
reports, performance reports, financial memorandum, operational plans and budgets 
(Poulson, 1998; Tandon, 1995; Farrell and Law, 1999, Leveille, 2006; Christensen and 
Ebrahim, 2006). However, Stewart (1984) contends that the accountable body should not 
have the sole prerogative of determining the means of providing the account but the 
authoritative body that has the power to hold to account should also determine such 
mechanisms as well as the mode of publicity to ensure easy access to the information 
given. Stewart (1984) asserts that one reason for increased demand for accountability is 
most times as a result of expectations that were not met in the past and when there is 
growing dissatisfaction from stakeholders and the public. 
A formal accountability relationship and communication between an accountable body 
and its various constituencies of stakeholders is what Thomas and Martin (1996) referred 
to as `dialogue of accountability'. But when there is no such relationship between the 
accountable body and its stakeholders then there is an `accountability deficit'. 
Accountability deficit occurs when an accountable body does not communicate with the 
various interests, constituencies and stakeholders it purports to represent (Aucoin and 
Heintzman, 2000; Hanberger, 2006). However, Edwards and Hulme (1996) and Ranson 
(2003) observe that it is not possible for accountable bodies such as governing boards to 
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account equally to multiple stakeholders of the organisation and that there is the tendency 
for accountability to be tilted in favour of the most powerful stakeholder group or 
constituency when an accountable body has multiple accountabilities. In the case of UK 
universities, Buckland (2004) argued that the corporate model of governing bodies have 
separated university governors from their internal and external stakeholders to the extent 
that there is no communication and accountability relationship between both parties. But 
in the corporate world shareholders and stakeholders of the organisations are holding 
their boards to account and also have the power to sanction them. These accountability 
deficits appear to be prevalent in UK universities especially with the Post-1992 
universities. 
Trow (1996) argued that the accountability process in general should be determined by 
these questions: "Who is held accountable, for what, to whom, for what purposes, 
through what means, and with what consequences? " (p. 310) and these questions can be 
seen as forming the basis for an empirical investigation of the accountability of governing 
bodies of universities. 
The accountability relationships described above seem to portray the kind of principal- 
agent relationship advocated by the agency theory perspective within an organisational 
context. This involves a situation where the principal allocates the funds for the agent to 
accomplish a purpose and the agent is expected to provide information on the efficient 
and effective utilisation of the funds and the performance of the organisation to the 
principal in return. The application of sanctions in the form of reward for achievement of 
performance objectives and punishment for failure to meet expectations is an integral part 
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of this type of accountability. This type of accountability in an organisation is referred to 
as managerial accountability (Kogan et al, 1986; Baird, 1997). 
However, there are other conceptions and forms of accountabilities that exist in an 
organisation in the literature which could also be acknowledged in discourses about 
accountability. For example, moral accountability has been described as a situation where 
the board members perform their governance fiduciary responsibilities with personal 
integrity based on responsible action derived from inner moral and ethical values to 
ensure the purpose of the organisation is accomplished in order to meet the expectations 
of the diffused ownership and stakeholders of an organisation (Baird, 1997; Mulgan, 
2000; Carver, 2006; Sinclair, 2006). But Kogan (1986) referred to such moral 
accountability as responsibility and described it as a "moral sense of duty to perform 
appropriately" (p. 26). He is of the view that responsibility should be distinguished from 
the conventional notion of accountability described above. 
4.3.4 Accountability in Higher Education 
Higher education institutions were also subjected to the general reforms of New Public 
Management and modernising public institutions programme introduced by the UK 
government which aimed at institutionalising private sector organisational practices 
designed to bring about a change in the organisational culture of universities-(Bargh et al, 
1996; Deem, 2004). Accountability was also perceived to be the focus of the UK 
government in enacting the Education Reform Act 1988 and the Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992 with the resultant devolution of more powers and enhanced roles to 
the governing bodies of educational institutions so that they would in the final analysis be 
accountable and also held accountable for the performance of their institutions (Deem et 
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al, 1995; Poulson, 1998; Farrell and Law, 1999; Simkins, 2002). However, the Education 
Reform Act of 1988 in the UK was legislated for England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
but did not apply to Scotland. 
The reforms aimed to secure accountability of the universities through the use of external 
audits and internal regulation of the work of academics who are themselves professionals 
(Deem, 2004). Apart from the control of academic work, universities were also required 
to account to government for the funds allocated to them for the achievement of some 
specific political, economic and social programmes of the state. These reform efforts with 
the associated accountability requirements appear to have significantly diminished the 
autonomy of academics and universities in the UK. 
Through these reform acts, power was also transferred from the professionals in the 
educational institutions to the governing bodies as representatives of stakeholders and to 
the managers of the institutions (Deem et al, 1995; Bargh et al, 1996; Simkins, 2002) and 
this was particularly evident with the advent of new managerialism in educational 
institutions and universities ((Deem et al, 1995; Bargh et al, 1996; Deem, 2004). 
The new emphasis on accountability is much less for school governing bodies now but 
much more for the governing bodies of higher education institutions. This appears to be 
as a result of the fact that the governing bodies of schools were much talked about in the 
early 1990s but the emphasis has shifted to governing bodies of higher education 
institutions from the beginning of the 21S` century. 
The call for accountability in universities is as a result of the perceived insufficient 
accountability of these institutions and their professionals (academics) by government 
and society (Bargh et al, 1996; Gibbons, 1998; Ranson, 2003; Leveille, 2006) in spite of 
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the huge public funds allocated to them. The demand for more accountability by 
government is also perceived as one mechanism by which the university is linked to its 
external environment and society (Trow, 1996; Gibbons, 1998). It has been argued that 
the demand for accountability by the various stakeholders of organisations and the 
compliance of organisations with this requirement could also confer public trust and 
credibility to such organisations (Bogart, 1995; Trow, 1996; Gibbons, 1998 and Ranson, 
2003). 
Ackroyd (1999) argued that the problem of UK universities is not about inadequate 
accountability but that some managerial aspects of the organisation of the institutions 
which has resulted from the governance reforms have prevented them from maximising 
their academic self regulation to its full potential. This view is supported by Shattock 
(1998) who argued that the type of university governing body prescribed by the 1992 
Education Reform Act may not be suitable for the purpose of public accountability. He 
observed that governing bodies are "made to feel accountable" but in reality they are not 
accountable to any constituency. 
Kogan (1988) classified the different accountability models that coexist in educational 
institutions on the basis of locus of control. These models are the managcrial/public 
contractual, professional and consumerist modes of accountability. The managerial/public 
contractual mode involves the accountability relationship between a subordinate and a 
superior either within an institution or between an institution and a higher external 
controlling body. The professional mode is based on the assumption that the professional 
body of practitioners in a particular field of human endeavour would determine certain 
work standards and ethics which are expected to be followed by all members in the 
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course of engaging in their professional calling. The consumerist model requires teachers 
and academics to use their expertise to compete for funds, students and other resources 
they would need to accomplish the purposes and missions of their institutions. In 
summarising the accountability relationships, Kogan (1988) is of the view that 
"accountability covers a whole range of philosophies and mechanisms governing the 
relationship between any public institution, its governing bodies and the whole of society 
which includes the political environment" p. 2. 
In general, accountability relationship in higher education institutions is about 
hierarchical reporting relationship directed externally between universities as represented 
by their governing bodies and government and also internally between university 
governing bodies and academics (professionals) through the vice chancellors. However, 
in theory it appears university governing bodies are ultimately accountable for the 
performance of their institutions as recommended in the CUC (2004) governance 
framework but the financial memorandum issued by the higher education funding 
councils of England and Scotland (HEFCE and SFCHE) assigned the actual 
accountability functions of the university to the Vice chancellor. This means that in 
practice, it appears university governing bodies are not directly accountable to 
government and the various stakeholders of the universities. Baird (1997) and Epstein 
(1974) had argued that it is not clear as to whom university governing bodies are 
accountable. 
In terms of corporate organisational theories, accountability as a control and regulatory 
technology falls within what Tricker (1994) calls the `conformance role' of a board as 
advocated by the agency theory. In this regard, the role of the board is to ensure that the 
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organisation, through its management conforms with the wishes and interests of the 
owners, primary stakeholders and funders at all times and is accountable to them 
concerning the use of resources allocated and for the performance of the organisation. 
Agency theory views compliance as a control mechanism designed to ensure the 
accountability of managers of a firm to its principals or funders. 
4.3.5 Empirical Study of Accountability of Governing Boards 
In the literature of higher education governance in the UK, no attempt has been made to 
empirically investigate the accountability of university governing bodies although there 
are theoretical perspectives on this phenomenon. There are myriads of prescriptive 
approaches to accountability in the literature of governance but in practice it appears very 
few boards engage in these accountability practices. 
In empirical studies conducted by Holland (2002) and Stiles and Taylor (2001) on boards 
of organisations found that members of governing boards perceived they were not 
accountable to anybody other than themselves. Similarly, in separate studies conducted in 
some schools in the UK by Kogan et al (1984), Levacic (1995) and Deem et al (1995), 
they found that school governing bodies were also not in any way accountable and they 
do not take any particular interest in their own accountability requirements. They also 
discovered that school governing bodies do not perform any major accountability role in 
the accountability process of their institutions. Holland (2002) also found that most of the 
board members in their study were of the view that it is the responsibility of their CEOs 
to communicate board decisions to their respective stakeholders since they do not have a 
direct accountability relationship and communication with these constituencies. 
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Bennett (2002) in his analysis of minutes of meetings of boards of governors of some 
higher education institutions in the UK found that only 8.7% of the contents of the 
minutes border on issues of accountability. This appears to indicate the low level of the 
accountability activities of these governing bodies. 
However, Farrell and Law (1999) in their study of perceptions and practice of school 
governing bodies' accountability observed that school governors were accountable to a 
range of stakeholders including parents, government and the public. They also found that 
only a few governors and school governing bodies are held to account by their various 
stakeholder constituencies such as parents through their PTA meetings. 
Deem et al (1995) based on their study of school governing bodies in the UK observe that 
"few mechanisms are in place to make elected or selected school governors accountable 
to those whose interests they represent and whose views they are supposed to be aware" 
(p. 166 - 167). Farrell and Law (1999) in a similar study of the activities of school 
governing bodies identify annual reports and annual general meetings with parents as the 
main mechanisms for accountability adopted by school governing bodies to give account 
of their stewardship. 
However, despite all the theorising on the concept of accountability, there are very few 
empirical studies on accountability of governing bodies of educational institutions and 
boards of organisations (Farrell and Law, 1999; Holland, 2002; Deem et al, 1996; Kogan 
et al, 1984). The situation is even more precarious with higher education institutions and 
most especially in universities where there is limited empirical research on the 
governance activities of university governing bodies from the mid-1990s till date. The 
limited research and interest in the activities of university governing bodies within the 
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period may be as a result of the attention that was diverted to the activities of governing 
boards of corporate organisations in the 1990s arising from the celebrated scandals that 
rocked the corporate world within the period. Moreover, Deem et al (1995) described the 
nature of governing bodies of educational institutions as `evanescent' because they 
appear to be important in the life of organisations for a while then, after sometime, they 
go into obscurity. 
In summary, in this section, I reviewed the UK government NPM and modernisation 
agenda reforms and their emphasis on the accountability of public institutions including 
universities to government and their numerous users and customers in order to ensure the 
efficient and effective delivery of quality products and services. I also reviewed the 
concept of accountability and presented in some details Steward's (1984) analysis of 
accountability in order to highlight the constituent parts of accountability and the main 
actors involved in an accountability relationship. In addition, I examined the 
accountability relationship between the universities and government as represented by the 
higher education funding councils and the role of the university governing bodies in the 
accountability process of the institutions. A review of the literature showed that empirical 
studies on the accountability of university governors and their governing bodies in the 
UK are rare. Moreover, the accountability role of the governing body in the prescriptive 
literature seems to be inconsistent with the provisions of those in the financial 
memorandum of the funding councils to the universities. These provide bases for the 
examination of the accountability role of university governing bodies in this study. I 
adopted the accountability framework proposed by Stewart (1986) to understand the 
accountability role of the university governing bodies and their relationship with the vice 
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chancellor and the higher education funding councils. I also intend to examine the 
perceptions of the governors concerning the accountability of the university governing 
bodies. The following questions as put forward by Trow (1996) would be explored 
especially at the data collection stage when investigating the accountability role and 
practice of university governing bodies. 
In the next section, I discuss the review of the effectiveness of the performance of 
governing bodies. 
4.4.0 Review of Effectiveness of Performance of University Governing Bodies 
The Dearing Report (1997), Lambert Review (2003) and the CUC (2004) guide for 
university governors recommended that governing bodies should review their own 
effectiveness and those of the individual members of the governing body as well as their 
committees. The Lambert Review (2003) specifically recommended that university 
governing bodies should conduct the review of governance effectiveness by measuring 
their own performance against their stated governance roles and responsibilities. The 
CUC (2004) governance code proposed that the review of governance effectiveness of 
university governing bodies should be "measured both against the statement of primary 
responsibilities and compliance with the CUC code of governance practice" (p. 15). But 
the Lambert Review argues that codes are frameworks for the practice of governance, and 
therefore, compliance with codes is not a measure of effectiveness as proposed by the 
CUC (2004). The Higgs Report (2002) and UK Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (2003) also recommended that corporate boards should formally undertake 
an annual evaluation of their own performance and that of their committees and 
individual directors. The purpose of such performance reviews, according to all these 
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reports, is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the governing board, its committees 
and members in order to improve the effectiveness of their governance performance by 
addressing their weaknesses and build on their strengths. 
In the literature, the meaning of board effectiveness is hardly defined or described by 
researchers. When there is no such consensual definition, the meaning of effectiveness 
would be subject to various interpretations depending of the theoretical lens with which 
an individual frames the concept. In the literature of board governance, researchers have 
attempted to determine what constitutes the effectiveness of the performance of a 
governing board of an organisation but there seems to be no consensus in the governance 
literature (both prescriptive and empirical) as to what constitutes an appropriate and 
precise criteria or measure of the governance effectiveness of governing boards of 
organisations (Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin, 1992; Van der Walt and Ingley, 2002; 
Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Schmidt and Brauer, 2006). Bradshaw et al (1992) concludes 
that the lack of consensus among researchers as to what constitutes measures of board 
governance effectiveness is as a result of their inability to operationally define or describe 
the concept of effectiveness. This has resulted in the development of different theoretical 
frameworks and criteria for determining the effectiveness of boards of for-profit and non- 
profit organisations by researchers such as Inglis, Alexander and Weaver (1999), 
Holland, Chait and Taylor (1989), Kelleher (2006), Leblanc and Gillics (2005), 
Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin (1992), Nicholson and Kiel (2004), Herman, Rcnz and 
Heimovics (1997) and Van der Walt and Ingley (2001). 
The elements of board governance effectiveness developed by some of these researchers 
are briefly discussed below. Board effectiveness researchers such as Nicholson and Kiel 
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(2004), Leblanc and Gillies (2005), Van der Berghe and Levrau (2004) and Leana and 
Van Buren (1999) are of the view that the human resource possessed by boards should 
match the various governance role and responsibilities they are expected to perform in 
their organisations. The procedure for conducting this type of effectiveness review would 
be to clarify the particular governance activities to be performed and to determine the 
necessary competences and skills of the board members that would be required to 
accomplish the governance tasks (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). This approach could be 
problematic because board governance roles are sometimes ambiguously specified. 
It was also observed that some boards of organisations use their involvement in 
contributing, approving, and guiding the achievement of the strategy of the organisation 
as a measure of their governance effectiveness (Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin, 1992; 
Leblanc, 2004; Schmidt and Brauer, 2006). Leblanc (2004) argued that the missing link 
in the relationship between board effectiveness and corporate financial performance is the 
strategic decision-making effectiveness of the board. However, researchers have 
continued to question the relationship between effective corporate governance by the 
board and the performance of the organisation (Bennett, 2002; Patterson, 1998). Cadbury 
(1997) had also argued that the relationship between corporate governance and 
organisational performance is a complex one which cannot be empirically determined 
because some of the measurable aspects of corporate governance do not bear direct 
relevance to corporate performance. McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) had also observed 
that not all boards participate in the determination of the strategic direction and strategies 
of their organisations. 
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Some researchers have advocated that the compliance of the board with the various 
governance codes (Schmidt and Brauer, 2006; Ingley and van der Walt, 2005) and their- 
conformance with charters and constitutional frameworks of the organisation (Steinberg, 
2000) as determinants of their governance effectiveness. Some studies have also shown 
that boards that adopted prescribed governance roles and practices were adjudged to be 
more effective than those that do not completely implement them (Herman, Rcnz and 
Heimovics, 1997; Nobbie and Brudney, 2002). However, Garrratt (2007) and Lambert 
(2003) criticised the use of compliance with corporate governance codes as measures of 
the effectiveness of governing boards. 
Brudney and Murray (1998) in their study of the determinants of the governance 
effectiveness of boards found that continuing improvement of board members through 
training and development were perceived by their CEOs as measures of governance 
effectiveness. Kiel and Nicholson (2005) and Holland et al, (1989) in their development 
of frameworks for the study of governance effectiveness of boards of nonprofit 
organisations and universities respectively, also considered board improvement through 
induction, training and development as a determinant of board governance cffcctivcncss. 
In the literature of governance, board effectiveness is sometimes based on the perceptions 
and experiences of people that have a stake in the organisation (Bradshaw, Murray and 
Wolpin, 1992; Herman, Renz and Heimovics, 1997; Holland, Chait and Taylor, 1989; 
Leblanc and Gillies, 2005, Smart, 1989). Participants' satisfaction with their actions and 
activities in a particular undertaking is also an indication of their effectiveness 
(Zimmermann and Stevens, 2006). 
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In view of the plethora of frameworks and measures in the literature of board governance 
to determine the effectiveness of boards and their members, researchers such as 
Bradshaw et al (1992), Herman et al (1997 and Zimmermann and Stevens (2006) came to 
the conclusion that effectiveness of a board is a subjectively and socially constructed 
phenomenon in organisations. They argued that the determination of the effectiveness of 
performance would depend on what these persons subjectively experience and perceive 
as constituting the element of their effectiveness. The social constructionists' perspective 
however, appears to dominate the discourse and practice of the review of governance 
effectiveness of governing boards of organisations. 
The use of a questionnaire to elicit responses concerning the perception of board 
members and other stakeholders on board governance effectiveness is common practice 
among board governance researchers such as Herman, Renz and Heimovics (1997), 
Holland, Chait and Taylor (1989), Smart (1989), Van der Walt and Ingley (2001), 
Leblanc and Gillies (2005) and Gill, Flynn and Reissing (2005). Shattock (2006) also 
contend that the use of questionnaire to obtain the views of university governors 
concerning their effectiveness is a valuable practice. But such practice appears to rely on 
a lot of self-reflection on the part of the governors and not every one individual has this 
attribute. 
Only one study was identified to have been conducted by Holland, Chait and Taylor 
(1989) on boards of trustees of colleges and universities in the United States. Based on 
their empirical approach to developing a framework of board effectiveness, the authors 
found the following six areas of competence and that boards which perform well in these 
areas were considered to be effective 
boards: "understanding and valuing the institutional 
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history and context; building the capacity for boards' learning; nurturing the development 
of the boards as a cohesive group; recognising the complexities and nuances of issues 
before them; respecting and guarding the integrity of the governance process; and 
envisioning the shaping of the future institutional direction" (p. 451). They argued that 
these competencies can be assessed through the qualitative interview process with the 
university governors. 
In the governance of UK universities, the issue of the review of the effectiveness of 
performance of governing bodies is a relatively new governance practice and there are no 
empirical studies on this phenomenon. The review of the effectiveness of university 
governing bodies was not yet a recommended governance practice at the time Bargh et al 
(1996) conducted their study and as such was not examined by them. This present study 
would attempt to fill this gap in the empirical literature on university governance by 
exploring how university governing bodies in the UK engage with the issue of the 
evaluation of their own effectiveness of governance performance and to determine what 
constitutes their effectiveness based on the perceptions of the governors and the practices 
of their governing bodies. 
In summary, the above review highlights the recommendations of the various governance 
reports and codes of practices in the higher education and private sector concerning the 
issue of evaluation of the effectiveness of the performance of governing bodies. It also 
presents a view of the indeterminate nature of the concept of effectiveness review of 
governing boards of organisations and the efforts that have been made by researchers and 
boards themselves to determine what constitutes the effectiveness of these bodies. Based 
on the literature, it was observed that what determines the effectiveness of performance 
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of governing bodies is socially constructed by members of the boards, the industry 
regulators and other stakeholders of the organisations. The review identified the absence 
of any empirical studies on university governance concerning the review of performance 
of university governing bodies in the UK and hopes to fill this gap in the literature. 
4.5.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed both the theoretical and empirical literature on why people 
voluntarily participate in organisational activities which have been developed into a 
number of motivational factors for participation in such part-time tasks. I also reviewed 
the literature on the strategy role of boards and their participation in the strategy process 
of their organisations. The effectiveness of the performance of governing bodies and the 
elements that constitutes such effectiveness was also reviewed. 
The review showed that few empirical studies have been conducted in these areas as 
regards university governors and their governing bodies in the UK. The theoretical 
insights gained from these reviews in the areas of motivation, strategy, accountability and 
effectiveness of performance would be adopted to interpret and understand the 
governance roles and practices of university governing bodies in this study. 
In the next chapter, I presented the methodological approach adopted to conduct this 
research on the perceptions of university governing bodies in England and Scotland 





My main purpose in this chapter is to explicate and justify the philosophical paradigm in 
which this study on the governance roles and practices of university governing bodies in 
the UK is located, the research design and the various methods of data collection and data 
analysis. I will also address some ethical, validity and gencralisability issues about this 
study as well as some of my reflections on the entire research process. 
Specifically, my focus in this chapter is to describe the process by which I was able to 
produce valid knowledge about the phenomenon of governance within different 
institutional contexts in the UK. 
5.1.0 Philosophical Paradigm of my Study 
There are two competing philosophical paradigms in social science research. These are 
positivism and interpretivism. Each of these paradigms represents a set of philosophical 
assumptions and principles concerning the social world and how it should be studied. 
Positivism assumes that knowledge of the social world can be obtained only by direct 
observation of phenomenon through our senses or the recurring patterns of events in our 
experiences of the world that can be observed and quantified. It also assumes in the 
existence of an objective reality that can be apprehended and which is separate from the 
conceptions of the human mind. Positivism also attempts to be value-free when the social 
world is being investigated. Positivism also assumes associative relationship between 
observable phenomena. The positivistic paradigm is associated with the quantitative 
approach to social science research and is suitable for experimental, correlational and 
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survey study designs. The researcher can manipulate the variables in the research to 
achieve the purpose of the study. The basic tenet of positivism as it relates to the social 
sciences according to Comte (1798 - 1857) is that the methods and the insights of the 
natural sciences are relevant for generating knowledge in the social sciences. C. Wright 
Mills (1970) contends that the `political nature' (Delanty, 1997) and `cultural authority' 
(Benton and Craib, 2001) of positivistic empirical research is because of its claim of 
scientific objectivity. 
Positivism however has been one of the dominant paradigms in empirical social science 
research but some of its basic assumptions have been challenged by advocates of 
interprctivism as an alternative and competing paradigm for the investigation of social 
phenomenon. Although positivism maintains that empirical evidence should not be based 
on the value judgements of the researcher, interpretivism assumes that people make such 
important value judgements in their `everyday lives' (Punch, 1998). Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) also debunked the positivist value-free nature of research by arguing that facts are 
also value-laden and that value judgements are made by researchers to direct their 
empirical studies. 
Interpretivism as an alternative paradigm is based on anti-positivistic perspective and 
assumes that there is no objective reality in the social world but subjective perceptions of 
the world as a result of our experiences and meaningful construction of social reality(ies) 
through interactions with other people. This means that the knowledge of the social world 
(reality) is built through the interpretation of the subjective minds or perceptions of 
people within a given social context. The context is assumed to shape people's 
understanding and actions of the social world which they inhabit.. The purpose of the 
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interpretivist's researcher is therefore to obtain the description and explanation of a 
phenomenon (social reality) based on the `lived experiences' and understanding of the 
social actors and to examine how this reality is socially-constructed by them within that 
context (Dilthey 1833 - 1911). Interpretivism therefore involves the ability of the 
researcher to reveal the hidden meanings behind the intentions and actions of people in 
order to bring about an understanding (Delanty, 1997). Interpretivism advocates the 
importance of interpretation and observation in bringing about an understanding of a 
social phenomenon (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). It also emphasises the separation of the 
social sciences from natural sciences in terms of the subject matter and the method of 
inquiry. The positivist paradigm is not suitable for interpretive research which seeks to 
study the phenomenon within its natural setting and context and in-depth in order to have 
a full understanding of it (Punch, 1998). 
I have adopted the philosophical paradigm of interpretivism in conducting this qualitative 
study on university governance since it comprises the epistemological stances of 
phenomenology, hermeneutics and social constructivism (Schwandt, 2000). 
Phenomenology assumes that reality (social phenomenon) is understood from the 
perspective of the social actor and it is the place of the researcher to identify and describe 
the phenomenon precisely (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Kvale, 1996). This study is 
therefore phenomenological because it attempts to describe the governance roles and 
practices as re-lived through the perceptions and lived experiences of the university 
governors. The university governors come from various backgrounds and have different 
experiences which enable them to bring different perspectives to institutional governance. 
My place as the researcher within the phenomenological tradition is to explore and 
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describe the perceptions and experiences of the governors about their governance 
activities. 
Hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of meaning inherent in the oral 
discourse of the `everyday lived experiences' of the social actors (Kvale, 1996; Delanty, 
1997). It seeks understanding of the meaning of a social phenomenon from the 
perspective of the social actors. This study is also hermeneutical since I am exploring and 
interpreting the meaning of governance from the university governors' perspectives and 
experiences. A social constructivism perspective assumes that reality (knowledge) is 
socially-constructed through the cognitive structures of the minds of people (Delanty, 
1997; Kvale, 1996; Descombe, 2003) when they interact. This implies that the meaning 
of a phenomenon is inherent in the cognitive structures of people and needs to be 
interpreted to produce knowledge. Social constructivism deals with how a social practice 
such as governance can be collectively constructed by the people who participate in it. 
Social constructivism therefore relates to this present study since I am investigating how 
university governors have collectively constructed and enacted their governance roles and 
practices in their institutions. 
It is pertinent to mention that I have a strong background in the natural sciences with its 
positivist perspective of adopting quantitative approach to conducting research. However, 
my present position as a university administrator interested in conducting an in-depth 
study of the practice of university governance based on the perceptions of people greatly 
influences my adoption of a qualitative approach founded on the interpretivist paradigm. 
In conducting this study by adopting the interpretivism paradigm, I make no claim of an 
objective reality (knowledge) in the social world but that reality depends on how people 
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see and interpret it by making sense of it based on their individual and collective 
experiences. I also acknowledge the place of value judgements in determining the 
perspective individuals hold of a particular social phenomenon and in conducting an 
empirical study of this type. My adoption of the interprctivism paradigm fits the 
expectations of a qualitative inquiry, as with this one. 
5.2.0 Research Strategy 
A research strategy is described as a plan for undertaking a systematic empirical study of 
a social phenomenon that is of interest to a researcher (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). In 
line with this description of strategy, I adopted both a general qualitative research 
approach and multiple case study strategy to examine the governance roles and practices 
of governing bodies of seven universities in the UK. The general qualitative research 
strategy makes it possible for me to have a holistic picture of how governance is 
constructed and practised by the governing bodies of the institutions in this study. 
Yin (2003) described a case study as a strategy of qualitative inquiry that is concerned 
with the investigation of a `contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context' (p. 13). 
Both single case and multiple case studies designs are variations of the case study 
approach to qualitative research (Yin, 2003). 1 adopted a multiple case study research 
strategy which enables me to have an in-depth understanding of the governance roles and 
practices of university governors and their governing bodies in different institutional 
contexts (Stakes, 2005). The emphasis in this case is on understanding how the various 
governance themes are manifested in each context. The advantage of adopting a multiple 
case studies strategy is that it produces more convincing and compelling evidence (Yin, 
2003; Stakes, 2005). My major concern in this study is to bring about an in-depth 
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understanding of how governance is practised in these institutions and also to portray 
how the university governors in each institution collectively constructed their own 
governance practices. The study also involves a comparative analysis of two main types 
of cases, namely, institutional and country types. The institutional type consists of the 
Pre-1992 and Post-1992 institutions and the country type is made of universities in 
England and Scotland. The comparative case analyses would enable me to highlight the 
similarities in governance roles and practices between the cases and also the uniqueness 
of each of the cases. Contextual factors have been known to influence the type of 
governance structures and processes put in place by boards of organisations (Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005; Klein and Meyers, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Miller- 
Millesen, 2003). These contextual factors are critical to my understanding and 
interpretation of the views of the university governors concerning their governance 
activities and to account for whatever observed differences in the enactment of the 
governance roles and practices by the university governors in the case institutions. 
5.2.1 Sampling Strategy and Selection of Research Sites and Participants 
The choice of country and institutional types for this study is purposive because of the 
existence of certain contextual factors such as cultural differences and political 
devolution between England and Scotland. The institutional types were chosen 
purposively too because certain contextual factors such as different institutional histories, 
legal frameworks, emphasis on teaching and research exist between Pre-1992 and Post- 
1992 institutions. 
Only university governors were chosen to participate in this study because the focus of 
the study is on the governance activities of university governing bodies. The study is not 
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about the operational (management) and academic activities of the executives and senates 
(academic boards) of the universities respectively. This invariably excludes members of 
these categories of decision-making bodies from the study. However, there are 
representative members of these bodies on the governing bodies of the institutions. I am 
aware of the dynamic and interactive working relationship existing between the 
governing bodies, executives and senates of universities. 
In qualitative research, there is no rigid way of sampling but the most important thing is 
for researchers to ensure that the phenomenon of interest is present in the research 
settings and for the participants to have a general understanding of the phenomenon being 
investigated (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Patton, 2003; Bryman, 1988; Mason, 2002) and 
this informed my choice of the participating institutions and research participants in this 
study. 
5.2.2 Selection of Countries 
There are four countries making up the United Kingdom and these are England and 
Wales in the south and Scotland and Northern Ireland in the north. In terms of 
geographical distribution of the two countries included in this study, the south-north 
divide was used as criteria for selection. England and Scotland were chosen to represent 
this distribution. They also constitute the biggest higher education systems in the UK, 
though the English system is much larger than the Scottish system. 
I made a distinction between England and Scotland because a comparative analysis of the 
phenomenon of study between English and Scottish universities became expedient since 
the responsibilities for education have been assigned to the different countries of the UK 
as a result of political devolution of powers on 1s` July 1999 and this may result in their 
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having different higher education governance policies which may impact on the 
governance roles and practices of the institutional governing bodies. However, the 
Scottish higher education system had been different from that of England long before 
devolution. The selection of England and Scotland as countries of this study is also based 
on the fact that they both have larger higher education sectors than Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
5.2.3 Access to Research Sites 
Generally, qualitative researchers have expressed difficulty in negotiating access to 
research sites and participants to conduct their studies (Kvale, 1996; Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999; Lewis, 2003). The access problem is even more acute when researchers 
are interested in conducting studies on the actual governance behaviour of board 
members during board meetings (Hill, 1995; Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The reluctance of boards to allow researchers 
observe board meetings may be attributed to the confidential nature of the strategic 
discussions and decisions they make in their meetings. Moreover, researchers have also 
observed access difficulties to study these board members who are also known as 
corporate elites (Pettigrew, 1992, Ostrander, 1993; Smith, 2006; Hill, 1995). This makes 
both interview and observation as a data collection technique a rarity in board governance 
research and have also accounted for the dearth of empirical studies on the governance 
activities of boards including university governing bodies in the UK. 
During the pilot study, negotiating access to the institutions proved difficult but some of 
the lessons learned from that experience were put into use when I commenced access 
negotiation for the main study. For instance, I realised I had to give more time to the 
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process of negotiation of access to the institutions because one month was grossly 
inadequate to do so. Secondly, I also realised the need to state in the access application 
letter what the institutions and the participants stand to benefit from participating in my 
study. I stated that the research would offer them the opportunity to reflect on their 
governance practice. I also emphasised my capability to conduct a good piece of research 
by stating the type of research training I had undertaken prior to the commencement of 
the research process in order to facilitate entry into the research site. 
For this present study, I started the access negotiation process in late November 2005 and 
took almost four months to conclude it. The letter of application for access to conduct 
this research was sent by first class post to the chairs of university governing bodies and 
University Registrars/Secretaries of 40 universities in England and Scotland. Each letter 
was accompanied by an introductory letter from my supervisor. I also sent the letter to 
both Pre-1992 and Post-1992 institutions since these constituted the institutional types in 
UK higher education sector. The chairs of governors of seven institutions (four in 
England and three in Scotland) in the UK granted me access to conduct this study in their 
universities. Since it was not possible for me to gain direct access to the university 
governors based on my experiences from the pilot study, I depended on the chairs of 
governors of the institutions who play the gatekeepers' role to seek the consent of the 
university governors in their various institutions to participate in this study. Specifically, 
I requested that at least two each of lay and staff governors should be contacted to 
participate in the study in order to ensure a representative balance of governors' 
perspectives. 
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Five institutions granted me full access to undertake this study. One institution allowed 
me to observe only one committee meeting while another university gave partial access 
to conduct interviews only. The partial access denied me the opportunity to observe the 
meeting of the governing body of this institution. This, however, had no significant effect 
on the outcomes of the study. The letters granting access to conduct the research in the 
institutions were accompanied by the names of the university governors that had agreed 
to participate in the study. As soon as I received such letters, I solicited the help of the 
Registrars or Secretaries to schedule date, time and venues for the interviews with the 
participating university governors on my behalf since I did not have direct access to 
them. Most of the participating university governing bodies meet twice a term (at the 
beginning and at the end the term). The fieldwork at each participating institution was 
scheduled to coincide with the meeting days of the governing bodies since this was the 
only possible time to observe the meetings of these bodies and to have all the external lay 
governors come to the institutions where they can then be interviewed. There was a clash 
in the scheduled meeting days of two participating governing bodies. The clash was 
resolved by re-scheduling my fieldwork with one of the institutions to its next scheduled 
meeting time at the beginning of the next term. 
The interviews with the internal governors took place either a day before or a day after 
the day of the meeting of the governing body. The external lay governors were 
interviewed on the day of the meeting either before the commencement of the meeting or 
after the meeting. I commenced the main field work for this study in late February and 
concluded in July 2006. 
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5.2.4 Selection of Institutions 
I investigated the governance phenomenon in seven universities in the UK made up of 
four Pre-1992 and three Post-1992 universities. The Pre-1992 universities arc the older 
institutions that were established by Royal Charters. Although the powers of their 
governing bodies do not actually cover academic matters which are devolved to the 
senates of the institutions, in practice many of their decisions impinge on academic 
issues. Most of the Pre-1992 institutions, especially the Russell group, are regarded as 
highly research-intensive universities. 
The Post-1992 institutions are the former polytechnics in England and the former higher 
education institutions under the category of central institutions in Scotland but were 
upgraded to university status by the Further and Higher Education Act of 1992. The 
powers of their governing bodies cover all aspects of the institutions including academic 
matters. They are usually regarded as teaching-intensive institutions but some of them are 
becoming research-intensive too. 
An attempt was made to include both types of institutions in the study in order to 
accommodate the diversity and contextual factors they exhibited since these are capable 
of influencing the extent to which the university governors engage with their governance 
roles and practices. These contextual factors were also critical to my understanding of the 
practice of governance in these institutions and also influenced my approach to data 
collection (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003; Mason, 2002; Stakes, 2005). 
These institutional types are distributed in both countries of the UK as follows: two Pre- 
1992 and two Post-1992 institutions in England and one Prc-1992 and two Post-1992 
universities in Scotland. In selecting the institutions for participation in this study, I 
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contacted the chairs of governors of the universities in England and Scotland through the 
Registrars/Secretaries of the institutions. (See details of "Access Negotiation" to research 
sites and participants discussed in a previous section of this chapter). The selected seven 
institutional governing bodies are the ones whose chairmen willingly accepted to 
participate in this study out of the 40 universities that were contacted through written 
application letters. The institutions are University of Waterloo, England (Pre-1992), 
University of West Albion, England (Pre-1992), Ashgrove University, England (Post- 
1992), Liberty Trust University, England (Post-1992), University of Stokefield, Scotland 
(Pre-1992), University of St. Pancras, Scotland (Post-1992) and University of 
Gangeshire, Scotland (Post-1992). The names of the institutions are pseudonyms. For a 
general qualitative research and multiple case studies as this, I considered seven 
institutions to be more than adequate for this study because qualitative case studies unlike 
surveys do not require the use of a large number of institutions for the study. 
5.2.5 Selection of Participants 
A total of 27 members of the university governing bodies made up of 6 chairs of 
governors, 13 external lay members, 4 internal staff (academic and non-academic) 
members and 4 academics who are members of the senior management team (SMT) 
participated in this study. Altogether, 15 governors came from the four universities in 
England while 12 governors were from the three institutions in Scotland. Different 
categories of university governors participated in this study and they include governors 
from diverse backgrounds such as business, commerce, the professions, governmental 
bodies, other higher education institutions, internal academics and non-academic staff 
and members of senior management teams. In terms of gender representation, 5 females 
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and 22 males took part in the study. This ensured that there is a representation of various 
views and perspectives about governance among the participants of the study. The 
governors that participated in this study had served between 18 months and 10 years as 
members of their university governing bodies (See Appendix A for Profile of University 
Governors). 
The chairs of governors of each of the study institutions helped to solicit the participation 
of the university governors in their various institutions. I adopted this approach because it 
was impossible for me to get direct access to the individual governors since their contact 
e-mail addresses were not readily available on the websites of the universities. This 
approach to soliciting participation of persons for an academic research of this sort has 
some ethical implications, which I have discussed under the ethical consideration section 
of this chapter. However, this is a common problem associated with researching 
organisations with gatekeepers (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007; Lewis, 2003; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
In comparative multiple case studies, only a small number of participants chosen from a 
few institutions are required to generate a large and rich amount of data concerning the 
phenomenon of study (Yin, 2003). Although I was able to get 27 university governors to 
participate in this study, this number was considered adequate because it covers a diverse 
range of backgrounds and experiences. 
5.3.0 The Pilot Study 
Researchers have recommended the conduct of a pilot study prior to carrying out the 
main study (Mason, 2002; Arthur and Nazroo, 2003, Kvalc, 1996). The pilot study was 
designed to test the suitability of my research design, the interview guide and open-ended 
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questions, method of data analysis, understanding of the type of data collected and the 
kind of interpretations to ascribe to the analysed data. I was also interested in having 
advance knowledge of the type of persons involved in university governance, their 
orientation to the issues of corporate governance in general and university governance in 
particular and their behaviour in a typical interview session. Testing the interview guide 
would allow me to know whether it would be able to elicit from the participants a 
detailed account of themes to be covered in the study (Arthur and Nazroo, 2003). I 
intended using two universities (one Pre-1992 and one Post-1992 institutions) for the 
pilot since I was planning to conduct multiple comparative case studies. 
In October 2005, I applied to chairs of governors of ten universities in the south west of 
England through their Registrars/Secretaries to grant me access to conduct a pilot study 
for my main research using both interviews and observation of meetings but only one 
university granted me partial access to conduct interviews only. Since I had no direct 
access to the governors, the university secretary helped to secure the consent of two lay 
and two staff governors to participate in the pilot study. The secretary also helped to 
schedule the date, time and venue for the interviews with the four governors on my 
behalf. In November 2005,1 proceeded to conduct the pilot study in this institution with 
the four members of the university governing body. 
I learned some lessons from the outcome of the pilot study which was later used to 
strengthen my research strategy in the main study. Firstly, I had to recast those interview 
questions that appeared to be confusing to the participants in the pilot study. Secondly, I 
observed that one lay governor dictated the direction of the interview to suit what he 
wanted to tell me. This kind of behaviour somehow did not permit me to follow my 
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interview guide to obtain the kind of data that would enable me to address some of my 
research questions. This type of `interview control' has been identified by organisational 
researchers as asymmetrical power relations between interviewers and interviewees 
(Delaney, 2007; Ostrander, 1993; Desmond, 2004). In such situations organisational 
elites have always attempted to transfer their power into the interview space (Desmond, 
2004; Smith, 2006). 1 took notice of such behaviour in order to guard against a similar 
occurrence during the field work of the main study. This would mean having a pre- 
interview discussion with the participants to mutually agree the conditions for the 
conduct of the interview. For example, the interviewees would be told that I have a 
number of issues concerning my research that I wish to explore with them within the 
time frame of the interview. Thirdly, after the pilot study, I realised I needed to know 
from the university governors why they were interested in voluntarily participating in 
university governance, since such motivation could have an impact on how they perceive 
and perform their governance activities. Fourthly, I noted that strategy and risk were 
topmost issues in the governance agenda of this university governing body according to 
those I interviewed and I gave these matters special attention in the interview schedule of 
the fieldwork of the main study. 
My inability to get access to at least two universities to participate in the pilot study did 
not enable me to carry out an initial test case study comparison which I intended to 
undertake in the main study. However, I was able to make a comparison of the interview 
data between lay and staff university governors that participated in the pilot study and the 
result gave me some insight into what to expect in the analysis of data in the main study. 
Also, my attempt to personally transcribe the tape-recorded interview took a lot of my 
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time so I engaged the services of a professional transcriber to do the transcription in the 
main study. 
5.4.0 Data Collection 
In qualitative multiple case studies such as this, the method of data collection requires the 
use of multiple data collection techniques and data sources (Yin, 2003; Denzin, 1978). 
The rationale for the use of multiple methods and data sources in this study is that each 
approach captures different aspects of the governance activities of the governors and their 
governing bodies. I adopted three techniques of data collection namely interview, 
observation and document analysis for this study. The qualitative interview using semi- 
structured open-ended questions enabled me to obtain the perceptions and accounts of 
university governors. The observation of sessions of meetings of the university governing 
bodies allowed me to gain insight into how they actually performed their governance 
roles and practices. The analysis of documents emanating from the institutions and other 
related bodies allowed me to have insight into some of the documented governance roles, 
practices and policies. The period of data collection for this study was between February 
and July 2006. 
1. Interviews: Interview is a major qualitative data collection technique which is 
frequently used by qualitative researchers for capturing people's perceptions, experiences 
and understandings and the meanings they ascribe to a particular phenomenon in order to 
`construct or reconstruct' a reality about the phenomenon (Punch, 1998; Mason, 2002; 
Kvale, 1996). The interview session provides the forum for both the interviewer 
(researcher) and the interviewee to jointly construct knowledge based on the perspective 
of the latter (Kvale, 1996; Miller and Glassner, 1997). 
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Since the purpose of this research is to explore university governors' perceptions, 
understanding and how they performed as well as accounted for their governance roles 
and practices, the qualitative interview was deemed to be most appropriate technique for 
collecting this type of data in this study. Their perceptions, views, experiences and 
knowledge are some of the attributes of social reality (Mason, 2002). It is these meanings 
that the university governors give to their governance experiences that guide their 
everyday governance actions. 
I therefore examined this phenomenon by conducting qualitative interviews with the 
university governors using semi-structured open-ended questions. The qualitative 
interviewing enables me to probe in-depth the participants' accounts of governance 
processes and their interpretation of the meanings and understandings of these processes 
in their various governing bodies which a questionnaire would not permit me to do. Most 
of the questions that were asked are open-ended, focusing on the "what", "how" and 
"why" (Yin, 2003; Patton, 2002; Lacey and Luff, 2001) of the issues of university 
governing bodies' governance activities. 
I am aware of some of the limitations of qualitative interviewing such as poor recall of 
events and inaccurate articulation on the part of the participants concerning the 
phenomenon (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983). In recognition of this inadequacy, I used 
other sources of evidence such as observation of meetings of governing bodies and 
document analysis to corroborate the interview data. 
The internal university governors were interviewed a day before or a day after the 
meeting of the governing body while the interviews of the lay governors took place on 
the days of the meeting in small rooms or in the council chambers of the institutions 
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devoid of any outside distractions. The interviews were conducted with the help of an 
interview guide in order to ensure that all relevant governance issues were explored with 
the university governors within the time limit (see Appendix C for a copy of the 
interview guide). The questions in the interview guide were developed from theoretical 
and empirical literature on governance, my own experience and from the issues raised by 
the participants during the pilot study. For instance, the question of determining the 
governance roles of university governing bodies from the perspective of the lay 
governors was derived from the literature on board roles which lacks consensus on the 
exact roles these governing boards perform (Zahra and Pearce, 1998; Daily and Estrand, 
1996; Hung, 1998; Bargh et al, 1996). 1 asked the governors: "What do you think are the 
main governance roles of governors in this university? " The question on performance 
review was derived from the literature on corporate governance reforms that emphasises 
the need for governing boards to review the effectiveness of their own performance 
(Higgs, 2002; CUC, 2004). I also asked the governors: "How do you assess the 
effectiveness of the performance of the governing body, the committees and the 
individual lay governors? " Furthermore, I did not consider the issue of risk governance 
when the interview guide for the pilot study was developed but it emerged from the 
discussions with the governors and was incorporated in the guide for the main study. I 
asked the governors: "Do you as a governing body engage in risk governance? If so, what 
are some of the risks that confront the university? " 
Each of the interview sessions with the participants which lasted about one hour were 
tape-recorded with the consent of the interviewees. The essence of tape-recording the 
interview sessions was to ensure that the perspectives and the accounts of the participants 
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were fully captured in their own words. The verbatim recording also increased the 
accuracy of the data collection and allowed me to pay greater attention to the interview 
process. Note-taking instead of tape-recording would have impaired my ability to listen 
carefully to the interviewees and to make the necessary probes for more in-depth 
questioning. The participants were re-assured confidentiality of the interview data in 
order to enable them to open up and discuss their perceptions and governance 
experiences freely with me. The recorded interview sessions were later transcribed 
verbatim in preparation for analysis. The verbatim transcription ensured that the actual 
words and `voice' of the participants were captured as text data. 
2. Observation: Observation is one of the many qualitative data collection techniques 
used by social researchers and mainly by ethnographers and cthnomcthodologists. It is a 
good means of collecting `naturally occurring' data from and gaining insight. into the 
context in which the phenomenon of study is taking place (Atkinson and Ilammersley, 
1994; Mason, 2002; Marshall and Rossman, 1999). It is through observation that the 
researcher is able to `capture' and describe the dynamics of the behaviour of research 
participants as they occur and ascribe meaning to them (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). 
Researchers have noted very few studies that reported on the observation of actual 
behaviour of boards by observing boards-in-action and the difficulty in gaining access to 
conduct these observation studies (Parker, 2007; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Samra- 
Fredericks, 2003; Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). 
I adopted observation as a technique of data collection in order to examine and 
understand the actual governance behaviour and practices of university governing bodies. 
The meeting session is the forum where university governors assemble to actually enact 
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the governance roles and practices they have collectively constructed. Observation as a 
data collection technique enabled me to immerse myself in the meeting sessions of the 
university governing bodies and have an insight into how the university governors 
collectively engaged in strategic debates, decision making, the issues they discussed and 
how the governance processes were carried out within the context of the institutions. It is 
all about experiencing first hand instances of how university governors perceive and 
enact their governance roles and practices. It is about understanding actual governance 
behaviours of the university governors as they occur. The qualitative data obtained 
through observation from these meeting sessions are `naturally occurring', unlike the 
interview data which is a particular account that is given with hindsight by the individual 
governors and which may or may not represent what really occurs in practice. Another 
reason for doing observation as a data collection technique is that it affords me the 
opportunity to crosscheck the interview accounts of the university governors in actual 
practice. The data that was obtained through this observation process indicates that 
knowledge is both `contextual and situated' within a particular setting (Mason, 2002). 
In using observation as a means of collecting qualitative data, I developed an observation 
guide that stipulated some of the critical governance issues and themes I focused on 
based on my research questions and the purpose of the study as well as my theoretical 
framework. Some other issues relating to my research questions emerged during the 
meetings that were not initially included in the observation guide. These issues were also 
recorded accordingly. 
My role as a researcher during the observation process was that of a reflexive observer 
which is described by Coffey (1999) as the `ethnographic self'. This involved bringing 
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my previous governance experiences gained from working closely with the governing 
body of my university for six months as a secretary and my career as a university 
administrator for 16 years to make sense of what took place during the meetings of the 
governing bodies in this study. My theoretical knowledge of various governance theories, 
processes and practices were also very useful in interpreting the activities of the 
governors. I am also aware that my presence in the meeting as an observer may affect 
some of the actions of the governors during these meetings and this might have some 
implications for the type of data that is obtained. All these are based on the beliefs I share 
with Mason (2002) that researchers in observation settings cannot be "detached from the 
knowledge and evidence they are generating" (p. 7). All the meetings that were observed 
were scheduled meetings on the calendar of the various institutional governing bodies. 
During the observation process, I took a substantial amount of notes based on the 
governance issues in the observation guide and also some other relevant emergent issues 
that emanated from the discussions and interactions of the university governors at the 
meetings. My observation field notes also contained my reflections and interpretations of 
some of the critical issues I observed at the meetings. The field notes were developed 
within 48 hours of observing each meeting when the critical episodes were still fresh in 
my memory despite the exigencies of travel. The meetings lasted between three and fours 
hours. 
I was able to observe meeting sessions of the following five universities namely 
University of Waterloo (England), University of West Albion (England), Liberty Trust 
University (England), University of Stokefield (Scotland) and University of St. Pancras 
(Scotland). Ashgrove University granted me access to observe its Marketing and 
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Communications committee meeting only. The University of Gangeshire granted me 
access to interview only the governors. Only one meeting session was observed in each 
of the five university governing bodies that granted access, which was useful to the study 
but more observations could have revealed much more about the activities of the 
governing bodies. The observation was used to support the other methods of data 
collection used in this study. 
All the meeting sessions of the university governing bodies that I observed were held in 
the council or board chambers of the various universities, although, one particular Chair 
of governors told me that they sometimes hold their meetings outside the university in 
order to ensure full attendance. However, all the observed meetings were well-attended 
by the university governors including all those that volunteered to participate in this 
study. 
3. Documents: Social researchers are of the view that documents are a rich source of 
qualitative data and they represent and give continuity to the various institutions in which 
they originate as well as give identity, meaning and directions to these institutions 
(Mason, 2002; Atkinson and Coffey, 2004; Prior, 1997). Mason (2002) describes 
documents in terms of both ontological and epistemological perspectives as representing 
`meaningful elements of the social world' and they also `count as evidence' of reality 
respectively (p. 106 - 107). The collection of documents from research sites are common 
means of generating qualitative data for the purpose of analysis in order to bring about an 
understanding of the institution and associated phenomenon. I followed the same 
tradition of gathering qualitative data through the documents retrieved from the various 
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research sites in this study because the information contained in them represents a reality 
about the governance phenomenon, the governing bodies and the institutions. 
During the period of data collection, I retrieved for review and analysis such documents 
as governance handbooks, agendas and minutes of meetings as well as a few other 
documents about the institutions. I also retrieved from the wcbsitcs of the institutions for 
review purpose, the minutes of some past meetings, the university annual reports and 
strategic plans. I also visited the websites of the Committee of University Chairmen to 
retrieve the 2004 governance framework for UK universities, and the websites of the 
funding councils of England and Scotland to obtain documents such as the financial 
memorandum, risk governance framework, etc. Other documents reviewed included the 
various higher education governance reforms in the UK. The documents were used for 
triangulation purposes and to back-up evidence from the interviews and observation. 
5.5.0. Method of Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis according to Marshall and Rossman (1999) is the "process of 
bringing order, structure and interpretation to the mass of collected data"... and to "search 
for general statements about the relationship among categories of the data" (p. 150). In 
this study, the qualitative data that were analysed are the interview accounts of the 
perceptions of university governors concerning their governance activities, the 
observation notes taken during the meetings of the university governing bodies and 
relevant textual documentary evidence emanating from the various institutions and other 
related bodies such as the CUC and funding councils as well as my own reflections and 
interpretations. All the data obtained from the different sources provide an account about 
how governance is understood individually and constructed collectively by the governors 
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in each of the governing bodies and in collaboration with me as a researcher during the 
interview phase of data collection. 
In preparation for data analysis, the recorded oral interview tapes were labelled 
accordingly with the pseudonyms of the governors and their institutions and were given 
to a proficient secretary for verbatim transcription. The purpose of the transcription is to 
transform the oral data into textual data to make them amenable to analysis. In order to 
ensure the accuracy of the transcriptions, I listened to the interview tapes while reading 
through the transcripts and effecting corrections where applicable. The interview 
transcripts were assigned the governors' pseudonyms. I also returned the transcripts to 
the governors for respondent validation. 
The observation notes I took during the meetings of each of the governing bodies were 
also developed into elaborate and readable textual forms. The notes were assigned the 
pseudonyms of the institutions. The observation notes represent the contextual and 
situated knowledge that is generated from the boardrooms of the individual governing 
bodies. For example, in almost all the meetings, I observed that issues bordering on the 
strategies of the institutions were common features of the discussions of the governors. 
Furthermore, at the meeting of the governing body of University of Waterloo, the 
financial position of the institution was discussed in relation to the expected increase in 
the price in utility gas. I took note of the decision-making process on this strategic issue 
which involved the chair introducing the topic and calling on a lay member of the finance 
committee to make a formal presentation of the issue. The chair summarised the 
presentation and asked the governors to debate the matter. After many members had 
made their individual contributions to the issue, the chair highlighted the main points 
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raised and asked the governors to take a decision on the matter. The decision made on the 
issue was consensual as no votes were taken. This type of board processes were observed 
and developed into textual data and coded accordingly for thematic framework analysis. 
Lacey and Luff (2001) suggested that the chosen approach to data analysis depends on 
the research questions, the time at the disposal of the researcher for the conduct of the 
research and the priorities of the researcher. For the purpose of data analysis in this 
research, I adopted the thematic framework analysis procedure (Ritchie and Spencer, 
1994; Lacey and Luff, 2001; Ritchie, Spencer and O'Connor, 2003) which is an inductive 
method of qualitative data analysis because the purpose of this study and the research 
questions are theme and concept based. 
Prior to data, I compiled a list of themes and concepts developed from the theoretical 
framework of this study, issues which arose in terms of the governance changes that had 
been going on in higher education, those from the pilot study, my own governance 
experience and from what the governors said at the interview. I developed descriptive 
codes specifying the meanings of these themes and concepts which were derived from the 
definitions and descriptions in the literature, from my knowledge of governance 
experience and from the meaning given by the participants (Mason, 2001; Ritchie, 
Spencer and O'Connor, 2003, Lacey and Luff, 2001). Miles and Huberman (1994) 
described codes as "tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or 
inferential information compiled during the study" (p. 56) and coding is the process of 
affixing the codes to the pieces of data (Punch, 1998). The codes also provided a way of 
accessing evidence of the governance roles and practices of the university governors and 
their governing bodies in this study. 
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During the first stage of the analysis, I read through the entire data set twice in order to 
become familiar with the accounts of the participants. I read through the whole data set a 
third time and affixed the codes to any particular piece of data that corresponded to the 
themes and concepts. This means that I attached meaning to particular pieces of 
information in the data set which are relevant to my research questions and the overall 
purpose of the study. The coding process was done manually on the transcripts with the 
help of a computer (see Appendix E for a sample of my coded transcript). I did the 
coding manually because I found it more straightforward than the Nvivo package in 
handling such multiple case studies research. Furthermore, I also wanted to be reading 
and re-reading the transcripts all the time to enable me to be more conversant with what 
the participants were saying. 
The coding also made it possible for me to organise and index the data as well retrieve 
any piece of evidence from the data set with ease for the purpose of illustration during the 
description and explanation stages of the analysis as well as during the reporting of the 
study. 
A total of 108 themes related to the purpose of study were identified, compiled and 
labelled with 3-letter textual codes. These themes were later conceptually grouped into 10 
major themes (see Appendix D for a list of main themes and sub-themes and their codes). 
The developed major themes and sub-themes formed the thematic framework of the 
analysis of data in this study. 
In the next stage of the analysis, I created a thematic chart where I cross-tabulated the 
participants (university governors) against their own responses concerning each theme in 
the data set. This also enabled me to examine each participant's overall conception of the 
133 
governance themes along the rows in the thematic chart. Presenting the data in this 
manner enabled me to make comparisons between the perceptions of the participants 
concerning each of the research themes in the thematic framework. This approach also 
made it possible for me to have the convergent and divergent views of each of the 
governance themes generally in the universities represented in this study. The observation 
notes obtained from the meetings of the governing bodies were also read several times to 
enable me make sense of the data and coded accordingly and analysed thematically. 
The main thematic chart also enabled me to explore the general perception of each 
governing body (constituted as the various participants from a particular institution) 
concerning a particular research theme. This enabled me to examine the similarities and 
variations in the responses of the governing bodies. In analysing the case (group) data, 
the dominant perspectives were taken to represent the constructed governance practices 
of a particular governing body. However, there are few cases where minority views 
corroborated by observation and documentary evidence could represent current practices 
of the group. 
After constructing the thematic charts, the next stage of the analysis involved my reading 
through the columns in the chart and interrogating the data in order to understand the 
various manifestations or representations of particular governance themes and the 
associations between the themes generally and across the case study institutions. The 
patterns that emerge from this exercise were adequately labelled, described and explained 
and case institutional governing bodies were assigned to them. For example, through this 
process I discovered that there are various conceptions and interpretations of 
accountability by the university governors in this study. Also in terms of the strategy role 
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of the governing bodies, I found two main patterns of participation in the strategy process 
of the institutions among the governing bodies in this study. 
I also explored associations between the various themes by looking for their co- 
occurrence within the text data in order to identify possible associations and influences 
on each other. For example, in the university governors' discussion of strategy during the 
interview sessions and in their meetings, they frequently talked about the risks associated 
with the strategies of the institutions. This implies that there are potential risks that may 
impact on the achievement of the strategies of an institution. 
The descriptions and explanations of the concepts and patterns that emerged during data 
analysis were either those given by the participants or the ones developed using the 
theoretical framework of this study (Kvale, 1996; Ritchie, Spencer and O'Connor, 2003). 
In his description of the method of interpretation of data, Kvale (1996) highlighted three 
contexts of interpretation of data which I adopted in this study. These are: 
" interpretation given in the data by the respondents which the analyst should 
highlight (self-understanding); 
" interpretation imposed on the data by the researcher through use of general 
everyday concepts and understanding (critical common-sense understanding); 
interpretation imposed on the data by the researcher by using a theoretical 
framework (theoretical understanding). 
The various pieces of data that were used for illustration in reporting the data analysis 
and interpretations were the ones that best represent a particular theme, concept, process, 
practice, views and perspectives of the study. The presentation of the analyses and 
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interpretations were based on the major themes and sub-themes that were identified in the 
study and how these vary across the case studies (Yin, 2003; Kaufman, 1981) 
In the analyses and interpretations of the case studies, comparisons were made between 
institutional types (Pre-1992 and Post-1992 universities) and country type (England and 
Scotland). The main focus of the cross-case comparisons was on the' variations in 
governance roles and practices as they manifest in the different case sites. This was done 
to find out the extent of the influence of contextual factors on the collective construction 
of the approach to governance in the case study institutions. The CUC (2004) governance 
framework is recommended by the CUC and funding councils to serve as the benchmark 
for governance practices in UK universities since institutions are required to report on 
how they complied with its provisions. This document forms the template with which I 
explored the variations in governance practices across the institutions vis-h-vis the 
empirical data that were collected from the research participants and sites (Yin, 2003). 
I also used documents as a form of cross-referencing to obtain evidence to verify and 
corroborate the interview and observation data. Some of these documents were also used 
to provide history and the context in which governance operates in the institutions 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Mason, 2002). For example, there were conflicting claims 
among the participants as to who in reality between the governing body and the vice 
chancellor is the financially accountable authority to the funding council. I perused the 
financial memorandum document issued by the funding councils to the institutions to 
determine the officially designated accountable authority of the institution. The 
documents were not used as a source of primary data for the study as to warrant their 
detailed analysis. 
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The aggregate of the findings and conclusions from the general perceptions of the 
participants and the cross-case comparative analysis of governance between the 
institutions formed the overall content of the findings chapter of this thesis. 
5.6.0 Ethical Considerations 
The conduct of qualitative research is laden with a great deal of ethical issues and moral 
implications since most of the studies deal with people and, due to the in-depth nature of 
these studies, they are likely to encroach on the private lives of the research participants 
(Punch, 1998). It is imperative for the researcher to consider the study in relation to the 
rights of the research participants as well as to the risk or harm that they may face in the 
course of the study and even after the research has been concluded (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Punch, 1998). Ethical problems pervade every stage of the research process from 
conception to conclusion (Kvale, 1996; Mason, 2002; Lewis, 2003). 
It is pertinent to mention that in carrying out this study, I followed the ethical guidelines 
for conduct of educational research prescribed by the British Educational Research 
Association (2004) and those prescribed in the literature on research ethics. I am aware 
that some of the ethical issues raised in the guidelines and the prescriptive literature are 
difficult to implement fully during the conduct of a study but they serve as templates for 
me to reflect on the ethical dimensions and morality of my research practice. 
In the conduct of this study some ethical and moral issues were taking into consideration 
especially as they affect the research participants. These issues are discussed below. 
Informed Consent: Kvale (1996) described informed consent as "informing the research 
subjects about the overall purpose of the 
investigation... and obtaining the voluntary 
participation of the subjects with 
his or her right to withdraw from the study at any 
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time... " (p. 112). I had earlier mentioned under the section "Selection of Participants" of 
this chapter that the chair of governors and secretaries helped to solicit the participation 
of the university governors in this study on my behalf since I do not have direct access to 
them. However, it was still pertinent on my part to formally secure their consent to co- 
operatively participate in this study. By a letter through the university secretaries, I 
formally sought the consent of the university governors to participate in the study. In the 
letter they were informed of the purpose of the research and their role in it. They were 
told that they would be interviewed for about an hour to discuss how they were governing 
their institutions. A consent form was also attached to the letter for them to complete, 
sign and return to me through their respective university secretaries. Some of the consent 
forms were received by post through the governing bodies' secretaries while others were 
received on the days of the interviews with the participants. In the consent letter, the 
participants were also informed that they could withdraw their participation at any stage 
of the research as well as the permission granted to me to use the data obtained from 
them. I also told them that the interview session could enable them to reflect and gain 
more insight into their governance activities. In another letter, I requested the chairs of 
governors to inform all the members of their respective governing bodies that I would be 
observing particular scheduled sessions of their meetings. 
Confidentiality and Anonymity: Lewis (2003) distinguished between confidentiality 
and anonymity in research ethics. She described confidentiality as "avoiding the 
attribution of comments, in reports or presentations, to identified participants" (p. 67) and 
anonymity as the "identity of those taking part not being known outside the research 
team" (p. 67). But as earlier mentioned complete confidentiality and anonymity of the 
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participants in this study could not be guaranteed by me because their initial consent to 
participate was negotiated on my behalf by the chairs of governors and the university 
secretaries. This has been identified as one of the problems of researching organisations 
with gatekeepers (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007; Lewis, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 
1994). However, the participants were assured both in the consent letter and during the 
interview that their confidentiality would be protected by me in the reports of the study. I 
ensured that during the interviews I did not disclose the information given by one 
participant to the others. I further ensured that the interview transcripts of each of the 
participants and the research reports did not bear their real names but pseudonyms. In the 
interview transcripts wherever the participants mentioned the names of their institutions 
and other governors these were replaced with pseudonyms. At the end of the interview 
session, I obtained the e-mail addresses of the participants from them to enable me have 
direct correspondence with them. 
Representation: I made a concerted effort to ensure that the views of the participants 
were not distorted or taken out of context when they were used as illustrations in the 
research reports. I also made certain that the voices of the participants were represented 
in the report. Furthermore, the interview transcripts were returned to the participants for a 
validation check via e-mail. This check was conducted to confirm that their accounts 
were correct as recorded during the interview session and also for them to expand on 
their views and perspectives (Kvale, 1996) and to return the validated scripts to me. Some 
of the governors replied through e-mail that the recordings adequately represented their 
views while some others did not 
bother to respond. 
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5.7.0 Validity and Generalisation 
The concepts of validity and generalisation have serious resonance within positivistic and 
quantitative research tradition but concerted attempts have been made by qualitative 
researchers to apply these concepts to evaluate qualitative studies. Mason (2002) argued 
that the philosophical perspective of positivism and its accompanying research 
methodology on which these concepts are based conflicts with the interpretivist view of 
conducting qualitative research. While Denzin and Lincoln (1998) dismiss the application 
of these evaluative criteria to qualitative research as irrelevant, Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
suggested the concepts of `credibility' and `transferability' as more appropriate measures. 
Hammersley (1992)explains that "an account is valid or true if it represents accurately 
those features of the phenomenon that it is intended to describe, explain or theorise" (p. 
69). This implies that applying the concept of validity to qualitative research entails that 
researchers should be able to demonstrate clearly that their research approach is capable 
of exploring, identifying, describing and interpreting the various concepts associated with 
the phenomenon of study (Mason, 2002; Lewis and Ritchie, 2003). 
Validity: There are two main aspects of validity that appears to be relevant to qualitative 
study and these are construct validity and internal validity. Construct validity means that 
the researcher has been able to operationally describe the various themes and concepts 
associated with the phenomenon of study in order to identify them during the interviews 
and observation sessions and also in the data. In this study, I derived the operational 
descriptions of the various governance themes and concepts from the literature review 
chapter of this thesis. For example, I had highlighted the different conceptions and 
debates about accountability in the literature review chapter. This enabled me to identify 
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them in the field especially when the participants gave different interpretations of the 
accountability of the university governing bodies. 
The internal validity of the study is about determining the extent to which the conclusions 
represent the collective and individual views of the research participants concerning the 
phenomenon of study (Hammersley, 1992; Lewis and Ritchie, 2003). In determining the 
internal validity of this study, I examined the correspondence between the interpretations 
of the data and the conclusions drawn with the type of data that were collected and the 
research questions that were proposed which Yin (2003, p. 105) referred to as 
establishing a `chain of evidence'. I was also able to relate the characteristics of the case 
study institutions with certain outcomes of the study. Furthermore, the analyses and 
interpretation of data were validated through peer review during my presentation of 
papers at various conferences and seminars. 
I also used two types of triangulation techniques to validate the interpretations of this 
study. I adopted methodological triangulation by collecting data from three sources of 
data, namely, the university governors, meetings of the governing bodies and documents. 
I also adopted theory triangulation by using various theoretical perspectives such as 
corporate governance theories, risk theories and accountability theories and strategy 
model to interpret the data. For instance, I applied the McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) 
model of board participation in strategy to the data to determine the extent of 
involvement of university governors and their governing bodies in the various stages of 
the strategy process of the institutions. I also used the risk theories to interpret the 
approach to risk governance adopted by the university governing bodies. All these 
techniques are intended to strengthen the internal validity of the study. 
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Generalisation: It is not the purpose of this study to gcncralise the findings of this study 
to a wider population but to obtain and portray a rich insight into governance practices 
within different institutional contexts within the project itself. Since this research is a 
multiple comparative case study, empirical generalisation of the findings could be made 
within the sample of this study (Silverman, 2000; Yin, 2003). This type of generalisation 
is what Simons et al (2003) described as `situated generalisation' where knowledge 
generated within a particular context can be utilised within that same context. For 
example, some of the findings of this study are peculiar to the pre-1992 institutions while 
others are related to the post-1992 universities in this study. This has implications for 
policy formulation and practice (Yin, 2003; Mason, 2002). This explains why the 
characteristics of each of the participating institutions and governing bodies have been 
described in the next chapter which describes the case study institutions. However, some 
of these findings are tentative since there was no opportunity to explore some of the 
themes in greater depths. For example, I could not observe any meetings of the strategy 
committees or the strategy away-days of the governing bodies so as to determine the 
specific contributions lay governors make to institutional strategy. 
5.8.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have located this study within the philosophical paradigm of 
interpretivism which enables me to explore the perceptions of university governors 
concerning their governance activities. The research strategy adopted for this study is a 
comparative multiple case study approach involving seven universities (3 Pre-1992 and 4 
Post-1992 institutions) in England and Scotland. The interpretivism paradigm permitted 
me to adopt interview, observation and document analysis as data collection techniques. 
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The data were analysed using thematic framework procedure since the study is theme- 
based. The data were interpreted using the interpretive approach within the specific 
context of the case study institutions in order to bring about an understanding of the 
underlying meanings of the constructed approach to governance adopted by university 
governing bodies in the UK. A description of how the study should be evaluated was 
given in terms of validity as well as the extent to which the findings can be generalised to 
specific contexts. 
In the next chapter, I present the contextual characteristics of the governing bodies of the 
case study institutions (i. e., the institutional cases and the country cases) and also make a 
comparison between each of the two sets of cases in order to understand the extent of 
convergence and divergence in their governance arrangements. An understanding of 
some of the contextual characteristics of the governing bodies and the institutions are 
important in explaining the governance arrangements in these institutions (Bargh et al, 
1996; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Heracleous, 2001). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CASE STUDY GOVERNING BODIES AND THEIR UNIVERSITIES: AN 
INTRODUTION 
6.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter intends to serve as a prelude to the main empirical chapters of this study. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present some of the characteristics of the governing 
bodies and their institutions that served as my seven case studies. I also presented a 
comparison of the characteristics of the institutional (Pre-1992 and Post-1992 
institutions) as well as those of the country cases (England and Scotland). All the names 
of the institutions have been anonymised using pseudonyms. This chapter specifically 
examines the extent of convergence and divergence in the governance arrangements of 
the governing bodies of the institutions under study within the context of the reforms in 
public sector and higher education governance in the UK and the corporate governance 
reforms taking place in the wider society. As a result of these reforms, governance 
frameworks have emerged with the purpose of guiding the practice of governance in both 
private sector organisations and public institutions including universities. Such 
frameworks include the Combined Code on Corporate Governance and the CUC (2004) 
governance guide for university governing bodies in the UK. 
Researchers such as Bargh et al (1996), Pye and Camm (2003), Pettigrew and McNulty 
(1995) and Heracleous (2001) have emphasised that contextual and historical factors are 
important in understanding the settings in which governance occurs and these may also 
be responsible for some of the governance practices adopted by particular governing 
bodies The information for this chapter came from various documents obtained from the 
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institutions during the field study and also materials from the websites of the universities. 
The case studies presented comprise seven university governing bodies in the UK (four in 
England and three in Scotland with a mix of pre-1992 and post-1992 institutions). 
6.1.0 Characteristics of the English Universities 
In England, the responsibility for the formulation of higher education policies and the 
funding of universities rests with the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 
(DIUS). But the task of implementing these policies and the allocation of funds to the 
institutions lies with the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE). 
Through various funding mechanisms, HEFCE is able to ensure the compliance of 
universities with government policies and directives. In terms of the implementation of 
the higher education governance reforms, HEFCE directs that university governing 
bodies should explain in their annual reports on how they have complied with the 
governance `best practices' recommended in the CUC (2004) governance framework as 
well as in the provisions of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992. The Higher 
Education Funding Council for England would be allocating about £5.989 billion to 
higher education institutions in England for the 2008/09 academic year (Source: HESA, 
2007). 
The governing body of an English Pre-1992 university is called a Council while that of a 
Post-1992 institution is known as a Board of Governors. 
In response to the higher education governance reforms, there are certain contextual 
characteristics that are peculiar to these higher education institutions that could determine 
the extent to which they comply with recommended governance practices. Enumerated 
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below are contextual characteristics of each of the two Pre-1992 and two Post-1992 case 
study institutions in England in this study. 
1. University of West Albion, England (Pre-1992) 
History of Establishment: The University of West Albion is a single-site institution 
located in the midland region of England established in the 1960s. It has no previous 
evolutionary history as an educational institution. But it has a long history of 
collaboration and partnership with industry and business. 
Legal Status: The university was established by Royal Charter granted through the Privy 
Council as a chartered corporation. The activities of the institution arc guided and 
conducted by the provisions of its charter and statutes. The membership of the university 
includes lay governors, academic and administrative staff, students and graduates of the 
institution. 
Mission: One important mission of this university is to be among the leading research 
institutions in the world. It is committed to engaging in high quality research in specific 
areas of strategic focus. The University of West Albion has a commitment to 
collaboration with business, industry and the local community and is a big employer of 
labour within its locality. It is also committed to the government policy of widening 
participation. It has an annual turnover of about £270m. The university is highly 
research-intensive and balanced with commitment to excellence in teaching. 
Enrolment: The university has a student population of about 16,000 with less than 25% 
made up of international students coming from about 120 countries worldwide. 
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Curriculum: The academic programmes of the university are offered in five faculties 
which include engineering, arts, applied sciences, social sciences and health sciences. All 
the faculties are research active and with an academic staff strength of about 2000. 
Composition and Size of Governing Body: The governing body of the institution is 
composed of 30 members and 15 of them are lay governors appointed from a diverse 
range of backgrounds with specific expertise and experience that are required to add 
value to the entire governance processes of the institution. Lay members of council can 
serve up to two terms of three years each. Other members of the governing body include 
the vice chancellor, members of the senior management team, six academics, one 
administrative staff representative and two student representatives. Members of the 
governing body are regarded as trustees of the university. 
Table A: List of Governors from University of West Albion, England (Pre-1992). 
S/ Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ Work 
N Governor Status (Years) Occupational sta- 
Status tus 
I Mr. West Albion, England M Chair (4) CEO/IT Cons, Rtrd 
Lawrence Pre-92 Chair of 2 Plc, 
Lay gov. in 3 
schls. Member 
CUC 
2 Mr. Tyler West Albion, England M Lay Gov (2) Former Snr. Rtrd 
Pre-92 Public Servant 
3 Prof. Joseph West Albion, England M Pro-VC (6) Pro-VC/Prof Acti- 
Pre-92 of Maths ve 
4 Prof. West Albion, England M Senate Rep (1) Prof. of Acti- 
Simpson Pre-92 Physics/ Dean ve 
of Faculty 
5 Prof. Mrs. West Albion, England F Pro-VC (2yrs) Prof. of Acti- 
Kay Pre-92 Accounting ve 
Committees of Governing Body: The governing body of this institution is served by 
about eleven committees made up of 8 council committees and 3 joint council and senate 
committees. The council committees are composed mainly of lay governors with 
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appropriate skills and expertise and about half of the committees are chaired by these lay 
members. The chair of governors is a member of at least six of these committees which 
includes finance, nominations and remuneration committees. This appears to indicate a 
strong presence and influence of the chair of governors in the governance processes of 
the university. 
The joint committees of council and senate afford internal members of the university to 
participate in the governance decision-making process of the institution. These 
committees are composed of mostly staff members with one or two lay governors and are 
chaired mostly by senior staff such as the vice chancellor, pro-vice chancellors, senior 
academics, etc. The more the number of joint committees in a university, the greater are 
the opportunities for both academic and non-academic staff members to participate in 
governance decision-making. 
There is a strategy committee among the three joint committees of this governing body 
and it is charged with making recommendations concerning strategic issues in the 
university to both the senate and the governing body. The committee has 21 members 
made up of two lay governors (which include the chair of governors), 2 pro-vice 
chancellors and 16 academic staff. In this committee, the academics and the executive 
may be highly influential in determining the strategies of the institution. 
Induction and Development: The newly appointed university governors undergo a 
process of induction organised by the secretary but there is no evidence to show that they 
undertake a development programmes. However, the CUC recommends that university 
governors should attend the development programmes put together by the Leadership 
Foundation for Higher Education. 
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Effectiveness Review: The governing body of this university has conducted two 
effectiveness reviews of its governance practices and its own effectiveness of 
performance. The reviews were conducted by a governance review panel and assisted by 
an external review expert through the use of a self-assessment questionnaire given to 
each governor to present their views. 
2. University of Waterloo, England (Pre-1992) 
History of Establishment: This university is a single-site campus in England. It has its 
origin before it was upgraded to a college of technology and later attained full university 
status. The University of Waterloo has strong collaboratory links with business, industry 
and the local community. 
Legal Status: The university was established by Royal Charter with the approval of the 
Privy Council around the mid-20`h century. Its activities are organised and guided by the 
provisions of its charter and statutes. 
Mission: The university is committed to high level teaching and research that is geared 
towards meeting the needs of the students and those of the local and national business 
and industry. It has the intention of moving up the university league table and to be 
among the best 25 universities in the UK in the 2008 research assessment exercise. The 
activities of the institution are supported with an annual budget of about £160m. 
Enrolment: This university has a student population of about 13,000 students and an 
international student profile from about 100 countries. 
Curriculum: The university offers several academic programmes spread over four 
faculties such as social sciences, arts, applied sciences and engineering. It has a strong 
applied research tradition that is geared towards the needs of industry, business and the 
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local and national economy. Teaching is also a highly valued activity in this university. It 
has a staff strength of about 1600. 
Composition and Size of Governing Body: The governing body of the institution is 
composed of about 26 members out of whom 14 are lay governors and arc in the 
majority. The lay governors are appointed directly from local, national and 
internationally and can hold office for a period of two terms of three years each. There is 
also a constitutional provision for the co-optation of more lay members into the 
governing body. Four categories of persons constitute members of the governing body. 
These are the lay governors, the members of the university executive, academics and 
student representatives. This appears to indicate a collegiate working relationship in the 
university. The lay governors have served an average of five years as members of the 
governing body. The chair was appointed directly from outside. 
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Table B: List of Governors from University of Waterloo, England (Pre-1992) 
S/ Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ Work 
N Governor Status (Years) Occupational Sta- 
Status tus 
1 Mrs Thomas Waterloo, England F Lay Gov/ Rep. Pers Mgt/ Rtrd 
Pre-92 of Univ Court Chair, Schl 
(6) GB. Voluntary 
work ex p. 
2 Dr. Blade Waterloo, England M Lay Gov (10) Solicitor/LLb, Acti- 
Pre-92 MD ve 
3 Mr. David Waterloo, England M Lay Gov (3) Engr/ Acti- 
Pre-92 Fin. Mgt,. ve 
4 Mr. Waterloo, England M Chair (4) Univ. Acti- 
Carrington Pre-92 Prof. /Chartd ve 
Acct/ CEO, Dir 
of Pics. NED 
of 3 Pics. 
Chair of Govt 
arastatal. 
Committees of Governing Body: 
The governance work of the governing body is 
supported by six standing committees namely audit, nominations, health and safety, 
alumni board and treasurers committees and about nine joint committees in the 
institution. There is also a joint research committee that monitors the research activities 
of the academics and the university as a whole. The main committees of the governing 
body have a majority of lay governors and are chaired by a lay person. The joint 
committees have majority of internal staff members with a little lay presence but are 
chaired by either lay governors or the vice chancellors or other members of the 
institution. The number of joint committees and the presence of academic and other staff 
members on these bodies appears to 
indicate that majority of the detailed governance 
work is done in these committees and 
decision-making is participatory. There is no 
strategy committee in this university 
invariably the governing body in collaboration with 
the executive and senate appears to take charge of strategy matters in the university. This 
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gives all the lay governors and other staff members the opportunity to participate in the 
strategy process of the university. 
Induction and Development: There is no evidence of a formal induction and 
development programme for governors on the governing body of Waterloo University. 
However, the report of the review of effectiveness of the governing body recommended 
that the governors should be exposed to such developmental experiences. The induction 
and development programmes are intended to enable the university governors to 
understand and adjust to their new role and environment as well as to acquire more skills 
and update their knowledge about governance issues in order to increase their 
effectiveness as governors (Jackson, Farndale and Kakabadse, 2003). 
Risk Governance: The risks of the university are governed by the governing body 
through its audit committee. 
Effectiveness Review: The governing body of this university engaged the services of an 
external assessor to review its governance practice and the effectiveness of its own 
performance. 
3. Liberty Trust University, England (Post-1992) 
History: Liberty Trust University is a multi-campus institution and was formerly a 
college of higher education. It has a long history of mergers to become a university. 
Legal Status: This institution became an independent higher education corporation 
(HEC) through the Education Reform Act 1988 and attained the status of a university and 
awarding its own degree through the Further and Higher Education Act, 1992 and 
therefore categorised as a post-1992 institution. The conduct of its activities as an 
institution is guided by its articles of government and statutes. The institution is governed 
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by a Board of Governors whose members alone constitute membership of the corporation 
as provided by the Education Reform Act 1988. All staff of the university are regarded as 
employees of the institution. 
Mission: The mission statement of the university reveals that it is committed to widening 
participation of previously under represented social groups in higher education and the 
production of adequately skilled manpower for local economy through co-operation with 
other further education institutions and small and medium size enterprises within the 
locality of the university. This commitment is reflected in the strategic plan document of 
the institutions. The strategic focus of the institution is bolstered with an annual budget of 
about £80m. 
Enrolment: This institution has a population of a little less than 17,000 students made 
up of about 30% overseas students and staff strength of about 1,100 persons. The student 
body is highly multi-cultural from about 120 countries. 
Curriculum: Liberty Trust University offers a broad-based curriculum of mostly 
professional and vocational programmes which is employment-focused to both home and 
overseas students. The institution concentrates more on teaching than research activities. 
Composition and Size of Governing Body: The governing body of Liberty Trust 
University is composed of a total of 25 members including 19 lay governors appointed 
mainly from industry, business and the professions. The chair of governors was appointed 
from outside with the help of a head-hunter firm. The remaining members of the 
governing body are the vice chancellor, two ex-officio (PVCs), two staff and two student 
representatives. The lay governors have tenure of two terms of three years each. 
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Table C: List of Governors from Liberty Trust University, England (Post-1992). 
S/N Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ Work 
Governor Status (Years) Occupational Status Sta- 
tus 
1 Mr. Lander Liberty Trust, England M Lay Gov (6) Markct/CommCEO Acti- 
Post-92 ve 
2 Mr. Barry Liberty Trust, England M Chair (1) Bus/ Acct, CEO. Intl Acti- 
Post-92 Ex p. ve 
3 Mr. Liberty Trust, England M Staff Rep Bus. Admin Acti- 
Atkinson Post-92 2 rs ve 
Committees of the Governing Body: There are six committees of the governing body of 
this university. These are the audit, nominations, remuneration, human resources, 
marketing and communications; and planning, finance and resources committees. Each of 
the committees has at least 3 lay governors among its membership and is also headed by 
a lay governor. The marketing and communications committee is a special committee 
established to link the university with the local community and international student 
market, local enterprises and other important stakeholders of the institution. There is no 
strategy committee in this university. 
Induction and Development of Governors: Newly appointed university governors of 
this institution undergo an induction process by studying an induction booklet distributed 
to them and through a mentoring approach known as a 'buddy system' on appointment. 
The governing body appears to recognise the need for the development of governors and 
therefore also encourages and sponsors interested governors to attend available external 
training and development courses. 
Risk Governance: The audit committee is charged with governing the risks of the 
institutions on behalf of the governing body. 
Review of Effectiveness: The governing body of Liberty Trust University has reviewed 
its governance practices using the CUC (2004) governance framework as benchmark. 
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The governance effectiveness of the governing body was reviewed through a self- 
assessment questionnaire distributed to governors and the executive of the institution by 
the secretary. 
4. Ashgrove University, England (Post-1992) 
History of Establishment: This university dates back to the 190' century when it started 
as a technical institute and by the 1950s it had developed into a college of advance 
technology. The university is situated in a large commercial and highly multicultural 
town on a single site campus. 
Legal Status: It was converted to an independent higher education corporation by the 
Education Reform Act, 1988 and attained both degree-awarding and university status 
through the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act. Its instrument of incorporation is the 
instrument and articles of government which described how the institution should be 
conducted. In this higher education corporation the members of the governing body are 
regarded as members of the corporation while staff are the employees. 
Mission: The strategic mission statement of the institution shows that its programmes are 
geared towards meeting some specific needs of both the local and national economy. It 
also has a strong foundation degree programme that enables it to be committed to the 
widening participation of people in higher education which is employment-focused. The 
university is also committed to establishing and maintaining strong links with local 
industries, commerce and its immediate community which offers employment to a 
relatively high percentage of its home graduates. The institution currently supports its 
strategic goals with a budget of about £80m as revealed in its current financial plan. 
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Enrolment: It has a student population of fewer than 10,000 and approximately 20% of 
them are international students from around 100 countries. 
Curriculum: The institution offers academic programmes in about five schools in the 
areas of business and vocational education, language and communications, health 
sciences, engineering and applied sciences. It is committed to both excellent teaching and 
collaborates with other universities in specific areas of research. 
Composition and Size of Governing Body: The governing body is made up of about 24 
governors out of which the majority (14 persons) are lay members appointed as well as 
co-opted from public bodies, industry, commerce and academia. The university 
governors are required to serve a single four-year term on the governing body. The chair 
of governors was elected from among the current lay governors. The vice chancellor is 
also a member of the governing body. There are two each of academic and non-academic 
staff and student representatives on the governing body but they can be excluded from 
participating in certain areas of decision-making. 
Table D: List of Governors from Ashgrove University, England. 
S/ Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ No. 
N Governor Status (Years) Occupational of 
Status Mohr 
I Mr. Fratton Ashgrove, England M Lay Gov Acct/ Fin. Dir. Acti- 
Post-92 7 rs ve 
2 Mr. Ashgrove, England M Lay Gov Univ. Admin. Acti- 
Matthew Post-92 4 rs MD ve 
3 Mr. Francis Ashgrove, England M 4-FL-ay Gov MD Acti- 
Post-92 R rs ve 
Committees of the Governing Body: The governing body has six committees that report 
directly to it. These are the nominations, marketing and communications, remuneration, 
finance and projects, audit, and strategy review committees (which is a joint committee 
of the governing body and academic board). These committees arc composed of a 
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majority of lay governors and also headed by a lay member of the governing body except 
for the Strategy Review committee which is chaired by the vice chancellor. Only the few 
lay governors who are members of this latter committee may have the opportunity of 
making any tangible contribution to the debates on the strategies of the institution. 
The marketing and communications committee is a special body constituted to maintain a 
collaborative link between the university and external stakeholders. Minutes of meetings 
of this committee obtained from the website of the university indicates that this 
committee discusses and monitors strategic issues such as students' block grants and 
bursaries, student recruitment and retention and tuition fees. 
Induction and Development: There is no readily available documentary evidence that 
the university governors undergo any formal induction on appointment to the governing 
body. The external lay governors appear to have some experience of corporate 
governance and business practices since they are mostly appointed from industry and 
commerce. However, the governing body and senate has established a strong 
collaborative relationship which encourages lay governors to attend senate meetings as 
observers to enable them to understand and have a greater insight into the academic side 
of the business of the university. This could also serve as an induction process for the lay 
governors. However, they are sponsored to attend various training and development 
courses such as those organised by the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education. The 
governing body also organises special briefing sessions aimed at educating its members 
on strategic issues confronting the university. Such special briefing sessions precede the 
meetings of the governing body and it lasts for about an hour 
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Effectiveness Review: The governing body of Ashgrove University has yet to formally 
review its governance practices and its own effectiveness of performance. However, 
there is an indication in its annual report that it complies with best practices in corporate 
governance as recommended in the UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003) 
and the CUC (2004) governance framework. 
Risk Governance: The governing body governs the key risks of the institution mainly 
through its audit committee. 
6.2.0 Characteristics of the Scottish Universities 
In Scotland, the Scottish Executive is responsible for higher education policies and 
funding but this is done through the Department for Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong 
Learning. This department is in charge of higher education matters in Scotland. However, 
the execution of government higher education policies and directives as well as the 
allocation of funds to the universities lies with the Scottish Funding Council for Higher 
Education (SFCHE). Through various funding formula entrenched in the financial 
memorandum to the institutions, the funding council is able to enforce the compliance of 
the universities with government higher education governance policies in Scotland. The 
Scottish Funding Council for Higher Education has earmarked the sum of £1.138 billion 
for universities in Scotland for the 2008/09 session (Source: HESA, 2007). 
The governing body of universities in Scotland is known as court. This is not the same as 
the university court in English institutions. 
However, contextual factors peculiar to the institutions could engender differences in 
governance practices among the institutional governing bodies. The characteristics of the 
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one Pre-1992 and two Post-1992 case study institutions from Scotland in this study are 
presented below. 
1. University of Stokefield, Scotland (Pre-1992) 
History of Establishment: The University of Stokefield was founded in the 1960s and is 
located in central Scotland. It operates as a multi-campus system. 
Legal Status: The University of Stokefield was established by Royal Charter through the 
approval of the Privy Council. The members of the institution include the members of 
court, conference, the principal, academic and non-academic staff, students and graduates 
of the university. The conduct of the activities of the institution is entrenched in its 
charter and statutes. The Charter of the institution specifies the role of the governing 
body as being responsible for the finances and properties as well as the overall conduct of 
the institution. It also places the responsibility for determining the strategic direction of 
the university on the governing body. 
Enrolment: The student population is a little less than 10,000 with about 16% of them as 
overseas students from about 90 countries. 
Mission: This university is committed to high level research that is focused on meeting 
the economic and social needs of the Scottish economy. It is also dedicated to promoting 
widening participation in higher education backed by innovative teaching. The strategic 
activities of the university are supported with an annual budget of about £90m. 
Curriculum: The university offers academic programmes in the natural sciences, arts, 
human sciences and social sciences at both undergraduate and post-graduate levels. It 
has an academic staff strength of about 700 academics. 
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Composition and Size of Governing Body: The governing body of the institution is 
called the Court and it is composed of 22 members that include 12 lay governors who 
form a majority and are appointed from outside the university. Membership of this body 
also includes the ex-officios such as the principal, deputy principal, and two student 
representatives. Others are six representatives of the academic council, one member of 
academic assembly and one representative of alumni association. The chair and lay 
governors can hold office for two terms of four years each. The chair was elected from 
among the serving lay governors. The average number of years served by the lay 
governors is about six years. 
Table E: List of Governors from University of Stokefield, Scotland (Pre-1992). 
S/ Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ No. 
N Governor Status (Years) Occupational of 
Status Moty 
I Dr. Miller Stokefield, Scotland F Chair (7yrs) Solicitor/ CEO Acti- 
Pre-92 ve 
2 Mr. Stokefield, Scotland M Lay Gov Engr., MD Acti- 
Silberston Pre-92 R rs ve 
3 Prof. Stokefield, Scotland M Senate D/Prin/ Prof. Acti- 
Kenneth Pre-92 Re 3 rs of En lish ve 
Committees of Governing Body: The governing body has about six committees which 
include audit, fmance and infrastructure, ethics, strategy and resources, appointments and 
remuneration committees. Each of these committees has lay governors as members and 
they are also chaired by lay members except the strategy and resources committee which 
has the principal (vice chancellor) as chair. The strategy committee is made up of 14 
members and include only two lay governors and the chair of the governing body. There 
is a high presence of academics on this committee. All the committees report to the 
governing body. 
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Induction and Development: There is induction for new governors which covers a 
limited range of issues, but there is no readily available evidence of formal training or 
development programmes for members of the governing body. But the governing body 
organises some special briefing sessions to up-date the knowledge of the university 
governors in areas of strategic significance to the university. 
Risk Governance: The risks of the university are governed by the governing body 
through a special committee known as Strategic Risk Management Committee (SRMC). 
Effectiveness Review: The governing body of Stokefield University has reviewed its 
own governance effectiveness which was conducted by a special committee known as the 
Working Group on Court Effectiveness and assisted by an external assessor considered 
the extent of compliance of the governing body with the recommended practice in the 
CUC (2004) governance framework. The review of the effectiveness of the governing is a 
regular governance practice of this university governing body. 
2. University of St. Pancras, Scotland (Post-1992) 
History of Establishment: The university is a multi-site campus situated in the west of 
Scotland. It started as a college of technology under the category of central institutions 
constituted legally by the Central Institutions (Recognition) (Scotland) Regulation 1988 
in Scotland and accredited by the Council for National Academic Award (CNAA) for the 
of award of degrees with much more emphasis on teaching than research prior to 1992. 
Before incorporation, this university had experienced a series of mergers with other 
institutions. 
Legal Status: The Education Reform Act (Scotland) 1988 enabled the institution to 
become an independent corporation while the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 
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upgraded this institution to the status of a university. The instrument of incorporation of 
the institution prescribes that the governing body should oversee the general strategic 
direction of the university, manage the finances and properties of the university and 
administer the employment of personnel. It delegates purely academic matters to the 
academic board. Staff are employees of the university while members of the governing 
body form the corporation. 
Enrolment: The university has about 17,000 students out of which about 1,250 are 
international students from around 100 countries. 
Mission: It is committed to providing access to higher education to people from diverse 
backgrounds in Scotland and internationally. It is engaged in serious collaboration and 
partnership with a range of businesses, industries, educational institutions and other 
important stakeholders locally and nationally. The institution has an annual budget of 
about £80m to support its strategic activities. 
Curriculum: The institution offers programmes in about eight schools and covers areas 
such as media, applied sciences, engineering, education studies, health sciences, business, 
information science and social sciences. The academic programmes arc focused on 
meeting the needs of industry, commerce, various stakeholders and society. It has about 
1,600 academic staff. 
Composition and Size of Governing Body: The governing body of the University of St. 
Pancras has membership strength of 24 governors out of which 17 are lay members 
appointed from business, commerce, public service and the local community. Lay 
governors serve a minimum of 3 years and a maximum of 9 years on the governing body 
which is three terms of three years each. Like all other Post-1992 universities, the 
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academic representation on the governing body of this university is limited to two 
persons. 
Table F: List of Governors from University of St. Pancras, Scotland (Post-1992). 
S/ Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ No. 
N Governor Status (Years) Occupational of 
Status Motv 
I Bloomfield St. Pancras, Scotland M Lay Gov (3yrs Ed. Adm. /Snr Acti- 
Post-92 Manager ve 
2 Prof. St. Pancras, Scotland M Chair (5yrs) Engr. /Bus/ Acti- 
Roberts Post-92 CEO/Chair ve 
3 Prof. George St. Pancras, Scotland M Senate Rep Prof. of Fin/ Acti- 
Post-92 3 rs Acct ve 
4 Mr. St. Pancras, Scotland NI -Staff Rep Economics Acti- 
Richards Post-92 3 rs Bus Exec ve 
5 Mrs Keith St. Pancras, Scotland F Senate Rep (18 Acad Staff Acti- 
Post-92 months) ve 
Committees of Governing Body: The governance work of this governing body is 
supported by seven committees namely audit, nominations, remuneration, students 
affairs, health and safety, honorary awards and policy and resources committees. All the 
committees have lay representation and lay governors as chairs. There is no strategy 
committee in this university and strategy is determined by the whole governing body in 
collaboration with the executive. The student affairs committee is a unique body that is 
peculiar to this governing body of the seven studied and it is specifically concerned with 
issues pertaining to the welfare of students generally. This appears to indicate the special 
focus by the governing body on student matters. 
Induction and Development: The governing body organises formal induction for new 
members which lasts about six weeks. The induction process involves formal briefings on 
governance issues and the academic enterprise by the chair of governors, secretary to 
governing body, the principal and deans of faculties. It also uses the mentoring system 
which they referred to as a "buddy" system where a new governor is attached to a more 
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senior and experienced governor for the purpose of induction into the governance roles and 
responsibilities of the governing body. All members of the university governing body are 
also encouraged and sponsored to attend development programmes organised by the CUC 
in collaboration with the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education. 
The governing body also organises special briefing sessions aimed at educating its 
members on strategic issues confronting the university. Such special briefing sessions 
precede the meetings of the governing body and it last for about an hour. As part of the 
process of up-dating the knowledge of the university governors, the principal briefs them 
on the activities of the academic board. The chair of governors can also attend meetings of 
the academic board as observer. 
Risk Governance: The governing body governs the university strategic risks through the 
policy and resources committee (PRC). 
Effectiveness Review: The governing body of this university has reviewed the 
effectiveness of its governance practice using various corporate governance guides in the 
public domain as well as that of the CUC (2004) as a governance benchmark. According 
to the chair of governors, the review was conducted by a governance panel constituted for 
the purpose. 
3. University of Gangeshire, Scotland (Post-1992) 
History of Establishment: This university is one of the largest single-site institutions 
with a modem outlook situated in an urban centre of Scotland. Its history as an 
educational institution dates back to the late 19th century when it started as a college and 
later developed to a college of technology under the category of central institutions in 
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Scotland. The university as presently constituted is a merger of two educational 
institutions. 
Legal Status: The university was incorporated into an independent higher education 
corporation by the Education Reform Act, 1988. It was later constituted as a full-fledged 
university by an Act of Parliament in 1993 which was based on the enactment of the 
Further and Higher Education Act 1992. The membership of the corporation is limited to 
members of the governing body which is known as court. The staff are regarded as 
employees of the institution. 
Mission: One mission statement of the university is that it is committed to being a 
university that offers academic programmes with special focus on producing employable 
graduates that meets the skills demands of the economy. It is also committed to 
maintaining strong links with commerce and industry locally and internationally. The 
university has a current annual budget of just under £100m. 
Curriculum: The university offers academic programmes in six faculties which includes 
health sciences, information technology, engineering, business, environmental science 
and social sciences. The teaching and research activities of the institution are focused on 
meeting the practical needs of its students, stakeholders in business, industry, community 
and government. 
Enrolment: The university has over 17,500 students which include about 11% overseas 
students from about 100 countries worldwide. 
Composition of Governing Body: The governing body of University of Gangeshire is 
composed of 18 members including 12 lay governors, the principal, two academic and 
one non-academic staff representatives and one student representative. The lay governors 
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are appointed from business, industry, the professions, local community and academia. 
Both the chair and lay governors can serve for three terms of three years cach up to a 
maximum period of nine years. The current lay governors have served an average of 5 
years on the governing body. 
Table G: List of Governors from University of Gangeshire, Scotland (Post-1992). 
S/ Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ Work 
N Governor Status (Years) Occupational Sta- 
status tus 
I Mrs. Carlton Gangeshire, Scotland F Lay Gov (4) Law/I Icaith Acti- 
Post-92 Snr. staff ve 
2 Mr. Gangeshire. Scotland M Lay Gov (6) Accountant Acti- 
Maclaren Post-92 NED ve 
3 Mr. Charles Gangeshire, Scotland I M Chair (I) Engr. /Markct/ Acti- 
CEO/NED ve 
4 Mr. Gangeshire, Scotland M Lay Gov (7) Acct/Mgt Con/ Acti- 
La ertield Post-92 CEO/Chair ve 
Committees of Governing Body: The detailed work of the governing body is delegated 
to about six committees which include the audit, finance and general purpose, court 
membership, remuneration, health and safety, and staff policy committees. These 
committees are composed of mostly lay governors and chaired by a lay member. There is 
no special strategy committee in this governing body. This appears to imply that all 
members of the governing body could have the opportunity to contribute to the strategic 
debates of the institution. 
Induction and Development: The governing body organises a detailed orientation for 
new governors which lasts about six months and also sponsors all its members to attend 
training and development programmes organised by the Leadership Foundation for 
Higher Education. As part of the education of governors, the governing body organises 
special briefing sessions on issues of strategic importance to the university prior to the 
commencement of the meeting of the body. 
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Effectiveness Review: A look at the governance website of this university shows that up 
to three reviews have been conducted by this governing body in the past and have 
resulted in a comprehensive documentation of its governance structures and processes as 
well as roles and responsibilities. The regular review of governance practice, 
effectiveness of the governing body, committees and individual governors is an 
entrenched practice in this institution. The chair of governors also evaluates the 
performance of the chairs of committees based on the achievement of some pre- 
established objectives for the committees. 
6.3.0 Comparison of the Case Study Institutions 
In this section, I have attempted a comparison of the characteristics of the case study 
institutions in order to highlight the divergence in their governance structures and 
processes based on the same dimensions used for the individual institutions. I will first of 
all make a comparison of the country cases and then the institutional cases. In the country 
cases, a comparison is made between the English and Scottish universities while in the 
institutional cases it is between the Pre-1992 and Post-1992 institutions in this study. 
6.3.1 Country Cases 
In the country cases, there are four English and three Scottish case institutions in this 
study as highlighted in the preceding section. A comparison between these institutions 
showing their differences along three contextual dimensions is presented below. 
Type of Campus: Most of the English universities (3 out of 4) in this study are situated 
in single-site campuses, whereas the Scottish institutions (2 out of the 3) are cited in 
multi-site campuses. The multi-campus nature of the Scottish institutions in this study 
could be as a result of the various merger arrangements they had with other educational 
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institutions in the history of the universities. However, this does not mean that all English 
and Scottish universities are cited on single and multi-campuses respectively. 
Composition and Size of Governing Body: The governing body of the English 
universities is known as council (or board of governors in the post-1992 institutions) 
whereas in the Scottish institutions it is called Court. This is however, different from the 
University Court in English universities which is more like a stakeholder forum that is 
provided for in the charters of the institutions. 
In this study, the size of the governing bodies of the English universities in terms of 
number of members is larger than those of the Scottish institutions. For the English 
universities it ranges from 24 to 30 members while in the Scottish institutions the range is 
from 18 to 24 members. However, the governing bodies of the three Scottish institutions 
in this study seems to comply with the lay majority recommended by the Dearing Report 
(1997) and the CUC (2004) governance guide for university governors. But it appears the 
size of some of the governing bodies in the English universities exceeded the number 
recommended by Dearing (1997). 
In terms of the tenure of university governors, the lay governors in the English 
universities could serve from 3 to 6 years on their governing bodies, whereas in Scotland 
they can serve between 3 and 9 years. The number of years of service of lay governors 
depends on the provisions in the statutes of each of the universities. 
The mode of appointment of three of the chairs of governors in the English universities is 
mostly by direct appointment from outside the institution but in the case of University of 
Ashgrove, the chair was elected from among the current lay governors. All the governing 
bodies of the Scottish institutions in this study elected their chairs from among the 
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serving lay governors. However, the mode of appointment of the chairs of governors 
would depend on the specific provision in the statutes of the individual universities. 
Committees of Governing Body: Among the participating institutions in this study, the 
strategy committee appears to be a governance structure that is more common to the 
governing bodies of the English universities than those of the Scottish institutions. This 
committee is usually composed as a joint committee of the governing body, the executive 
and the senate of the institutions. But the composition of this committee shows that there 
are more academics than lay governors on it and it is usually chaired by the vice 
chancellor. The lay membership of this committee appears to be limited to only 2 or 3 
persons. This could mean that the strategies of the universities where this committee 
exists would be determined and influenced more by the academics than the lay governors. 
But at the same time the strategy committee would limit the participation and 
contributions of the majority of the lay governors to the strategic debates and decisions of 
the university during the strategy process since most of them are not members of this 
committee. 
Risk Governance: In governing the risks of the university, the governing bodies of the 
English universities in this study delegated this function to their audit committees while 
in the three Scottish institutions, risk is governed on behalf of the governing bodies by 
some other committees. 
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6.3.2 Institutional Cases 
There are three Pre-1992 and four Post-1992 case institutions in this study as highlighted 
in the previous section. A comparison examining the contextual differences between the 
institutional case studies along nine dimensions is presented below. 
History of Establishment: The Pre-1992 universities are those institutions that were 
established some 30 to 300 years ago (Ackroyd, 1999) before the expansion of the higher 
education system in the UK in 1992. In England, the Post-1992 institutions were the 
former polytechnics which were funded by and under the control of Local Education 
Authorities and were made independent higher education corporations by the legislation 
of the Education Reform Act 1988. In Scotland, the Post-1992 institutions were the 
former colleges of technology that were constituted as central institutions by the Central 
Institutions (Recognition) (Scotland) Regulation 1988. The polytechnics in England and 
central institutions in Scotland offered academic degree programmes validated by the 
Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA). By 1992, these institutions were 
upgraded to the status of university and granted degree awarding powers through the 
enactment of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992. 
The Pre-1992 universities in this study arc located on single-site campuses while the 
Post-1992 institutions are mostly situated on multi-site campuses. Almost all the Post- 
1992 universities in this study are cited on multi-campuses as a result of their mergers 
with other higher educational establishments in order to form a university and at the same 
time to become competitive with others in the sector. Most of the Pre-1992 universities in 
this study operate on single-site campuses because they appear to have the resources 
more than their Post-1992 counterparts to develop their infrastructures on one site. But 
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these characteristics may not be typical of all the Post-1992 and Pre-1992 universities in 
the UK. 
Legal Status: The Pre-1992 universities in this study were established by Royal Charter 
granted through the Privy Council and are therefore known as chartered universities as a 
result of their mode of incorporation. The Post-1992 institutions were established through 
incorporation by the Education Reform Act 1988 and granted university status by the 
Further and Higher Education Act 1992. They are referred to as higher education 
corporations as a result of their incorporation. While the Pre-1992 universities are 
governed by charters and statutes, the Post-1992 institutions are conducted by instrument 
and articles of government. The law establishing the Pre-1992 and Post-1992 universities 
are quite different and this appears to have implications for the ways they are governed 
and managed, their mission statements and the roles they are expected to play in society. 
In the Pre-1992 universities, membership of the institution comprises the members of the 
governing body, members of the University Court, staff, students and graduates of the 
university but in the Post-1992 institutions, membership of the corporation is limited to 
only members of the governing body. This appears to have implications on their 
participation in the governance of the institutions because those in the Pre-1992 
universities are better represented on the governing bodies of their institutions than their 
Post-1992 counterparts. These are all provided for in the various instruments of 
incorporation of the universities. 
Mission: The mission statements of the three Pre-1992 universities seems focused more 
on their research activities and they 
have an average annual budget of about £180m. On 
the other hand, the four Post-1992 universities appear committed to teaching and 
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widening participation and have smaller annual budgets to support their activities despite 
having more students. The higher budgets of the pre-1992 over the post-1992 institutions 
in this study may be because they are research-intensive and attract a lot of research 
funds from the higher education funding councils, the research councils and from 
collaborative activities with large industries. This is in addition to receiving funds for 
teaching from the funding councils. However, some Post-1992 universities in the UK are 
becoming research-intensive too. 
Enrolment: In the Pre-1992 universities in this study, student enrolment ranges from 
10,000 to 16,000 with an average of 13,000 students while in the Post-1992 institutions 
student population is between 10,000 and 17,500 with an overall average figure of 15,000 
students. The higher enrolment figures of students in the Post-1992 institutions seem to 
be a reflection of their commitment to widening participation of more persons in higher 
education as entrenched in their mission statements. However, this does not mean that 
their Pre-1992 counterparts do not engage in widening participation activities. 
Composition and Size of Governing Body: In terms of composition of their governing 
bodies, the Pre-1992 universities have a wider range of members than the Post-1992 
institutions whose members are limited to mainly persons from business, industry and 
professions. Also, there are more academic staff representations (at least six academics) 
on the governing bodies of Pre-1992 universities than those of Post-1992 institutions (one 
or two academics). This difference in number appears to suggest that academics in the 
Pre-1992 universities participate in governance more than their colleagues in Post-1992 
institutions. The instrument of government of the Post-1992 institutions that provides for 
a unicameral governance structure (Shattock, 2006; Lapworth, 2004) even excludes 
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academics, students and other staff members from being members of the governing 
bodies of their universities, therefore restricting their participation in university 
governance (Lapworth, 2004). But some of them have amended their statutes in order to 
include one or two staff and student representatives on their governing bodies. 
Moreover, in terms of size, the governing bodies of the Post-1992 universities in this 
study are smaller than those of the Pre-1992 institutions. The size of the governing bodies 
of the Post-1992 institutions is between 18 and 25 persons while those of the Pre-1992 
universities range from 22 to 30 members. This appears to indicate that the Pre-1992 
universities still has fairly bigger governing bodies than the Post-1992 institutions which 
conform more to the pattern recommended by the Dearing report (1997) which sets the 
maximum size at 25 members. The larger size of the governing bodies of the Pre-1992 
universities appears to emanate from the structure provided in their charters and statues 
prior to the higher education governance reforms. Some of the governing bodies of Pre- 
1992 universities had as many as 25 to 60 members (Bargh et al, 1996) made up of 
mostly academics prior to the higher education governance reforms which appears to 
show that they have not fully complied with the recommendations of the Dearing Report 
(1997) on the size of these bodies. 
Induction and Development: Induction and development of university governors are 
common features of these Post-1992 universities and intended to keep governors 
informed of their governance roles and responsibilities and developments in governance 
matters as well as issues within the higher education sector. The induction process for 
governors in these institutions is usually comprehensive and could last between 6 weeks 
to 6 months depending on the institutions. The governors are also encouraged and 
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sponsored to attend governor training and development programmes and courses 
organised by the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education in collaboration with the 
Committee of University Chairmen and the higher education funding councils. 
In the Post-1992 universities induction and development appears to be dealt with 
formally by the governing body. But the lack of information on this issue from the Pre- 
1992 universities does not necessarily mean that the governors do not undergo such 
orientation and development programmes. Sometimes these issues are left to the 
individual governor to decide for themselves and while at other times they are handled 
informally by the governing bodies. 
The minutes of meetings obtained from the websites of the Post-1992 universities also 
appear to indicate that a common governance practice that is aimed at improving the 
quality of information received by the governors and which is also intended to build their 
governance capacity is the special briefing sessions held by the Post-1992 institutional 
governing bodies on issues of strategic importance to the universities. These briefing 
sessions usually take place before or after the main governing body meetings and could 
last about an hour. The governing bodies of most of these Post-1992 institutions have 
also established special collaborative working relationships with the academic boards of 
their institutions which require lay governors to attend meetings of the academic board as 
observers. This appears to be aimed at ensuring collaborative working relationships 
between the two bodies and to enable the lay governors to understand and appreciate the 
academic side of the university enterprise. There is, however, no indication of these 
practices in the Pre-1992 universities. This could be as a result of the provisions of their 
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legal framework that attempted to separate university governance by the governing body 
from academic governance by the senates of the institutions. 
Review of Effectiveness: The review of the effectiveness of the governance practices 
and the performance of the governing body is intended to identify areas of weaknesses 
for improvement. It is a health check for the governance activities of the university 
governing body. All the governing bodies in this study have reviewed their effectiveness 
at least once in the last two years in compliance with the recommendations of Dearing 
Report (1997) and CUC (2004). The governing bodies of the Pre-1992 universities in this 
study mostly use self-assessment questionnaire distributed to all members to complete 
and engage the services of external assessors to assist in reviewing the effectiveness of 
their governance practices as well as their own performance as a body. The use of 
external assessors could introduce some objectivity and more validity into the entire 
effectiveness review process since self-assessment have been noted for its potential for 
biases (Ingley and van der Walt, 2005; Schimdt and Brauer, 2006). But in the case of the 
Post-1992 universities, the review is internally conducted either by the secretary of the 
governing body or by a special panel appointed for the purpose. 
6.4.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have highlighted some of the characteristics of the individual governing 
bodies and their institutions in this study along eleven different contextual dimensions. 
The information given relates to the institutions that form the sample of this study which 
may not necessarily represent the whole system of 
higher education in the UK. I have 
also examined the characteristics of the 
institutional and country cases through a 
comparison of Pre-1992 and Post-1992 
institutions and English and Scottish universities 
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in this study. The information for this chapter was obtained from the documents that 
emanated from the institutions and materials on the wcbsites of the universities. The 
characteristics of the institutions participating in this study show that they have diverse 
backgrounds as a result of their histories and constitutional frameworks. Although the 
governing bodies of these institutions tend to adopt a similar approach to governance as 
recommended by the UK combined code on corporate governance and the CUC (2004) 
governance framework for university governing bodies in the UK, this does not mean that 
they necessarily have a common approach to governance as we shall see in the 
subsequent three empirical chapters. 
The next three empirical chapters of this thesis, I presented the outcomes of the analyses 
of data obtained during the fieldwork of this research. Chapter six is a presentation of the 
interpretation of data concerning the recruitment of the university governors, their 
motivations for participation in university governance and their perceptions of the 
governance roles of their governing bodies. Chapter seven is about the presentation of the 
findings on the strategy and risk governance roles and practices of the university 
governing bodies. Chapter eight is about the findings of the study on the perceptions of 
the university governors concerning the accountability and review of the governance 
effectiveness of their governing bodies. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WHO ARE GOVERNORSAND HOWARE THEYSELECTED? 
7.0.0 Introduction 
The higher education reform reports of Jarratt (1985), Dearing (1997) and the Education 
Reform Act, 1988 specifically recommended that university governing bodies be 
composed of a majority of external lay members appointed mainly from business, 
industry and the professions, because of their skills, knowledge and expertise in corporate 
governance and management issues to enable them to entrench a managerial and 
enterprise culture in these institutions. The growing importance of lay-dominated 
governing bodies has also increased with the emergence of an enterprise culture and the 
subsequent managerialisation of higher education institutions which are an extension of 
the wider reforms taking place in the public sector in the UK (Bargh et al, 1996, Deem, 
1998). 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine some related themes concerning persons who 
are university governors, such as their educational and occupational background 
characteristics, their perceived motivations for participating in university governance, 
how they are recruited and appointed as members of university governing bodies, how 
they perceive their governance roles and their perception of the distinction between their 
governance roles and the management roles of the executives of the institutions. 
The data obtained for this study were analysed, explained and interpreted by drawing on 
the relevant theoretical and empirical literature about these issues and how they relate to 
the governance reforms in the higher education sector in UK. 
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7.1.0 Governors' Background and Motivation 
In this section, I examined the demographic characteristics of lay governors and their 
motivation for participating in university governance. Out of the 27 university governors 
that took part in the study, 19 lay governors were interviewed on their background 
characteristics and motivations for becoming university governors. The remaining eight 
persons are internal members of the governing bodies. 
7.1.1 Governors' Educational and Occupational Background 
The data on the background characteristics of 19 lay university governors were obtained 
from them during the interview as well as from documents emanating from the 
universities and the websites of the institutions when they are available. 
All the lay governors in this study have educational qualifications of a first degree and 
above, distributed across the arts/social science and the science/engineering disciplines. 
Two of the lay governors have attained the rank of professor but arc engaged in business 
and industry. Bargh et al (1996) also found similar educational characteristics of the 
university governors in their study of the composition of governing bodies in the UK. 
About 12 of the lay governors were found to be still engaged in employment of various 
kinds while 7 others are persons who have retired from active working life. Eleven of the 
lay governors are chief executives, managing directors or senior managers in their 
various employments while 4 are non-executive directors (NEDs) in firms of different 
types and the remaining 4 lay governors are from other sectors of the society. The lay 
governors are mainly from the professions, industry and commerce and they appear to be 
high in occupational status. Bargh et al (1996) also found similar occupational 
characteristics among the lay governors of universities in the UK in their study. 
178 
In terms of the educational and occupational characteristics of the lay governors, there 
were no observed differences between those from Pre-1992 and Post-1992 institutions 
and also those from English and Scottish universities. 
These findings are consistent with those of Smith (1994) when in his review of literature 
on voluntary participation observed that people engaged in governance activities possess 
both high levels of educational and occupational characteristics. These background 
characteristics of the lay governors and chairs of university governing bodies in this study 
appear to mimic the corporate model of board composition in business organisations. The 
occupational backgrounds of these lay governors are also consistent with the 
recommendations of the HE governance reform reports of Jarratt (1985) and Dearing 
(1997) and the Education Reform Act, 1988, that lay persons with background and 
experience in business, industry and professions should be appointed or even co-opted 
onto university governing bodies. One implication of this observed semblance in the 
background characteristics of lay governors of the university governing bodies in this 
study with those of non-executive directors of boards of business organisations is that 
they may have similar views on corporate governance and management practices which 
the various government initiated HE reforms advocated. 
After knowing the educational and occupational backgrounds of those who are lay 
university governors, it was also important to examine why these categories of persons 
chose to participate in the governance of universities. In the next sub-section, the 
perceived motivation of university governors to participate in institutional governance 
was examined. 
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7.1.2 University Governors' Motivation 
In this sub-section, data was generated from the interviews with 24 respondents and were 
analysed for the perceived motivational factors associated with their voluntary 
participation in university governance. A total of 34 motivational factors were perceived 
by the 24 university governors (made up of 19 lay and 5 internal governors) out of 27 that 
took part in the study. Data from the remaining three governors were not available 
because they prefer to talk about some other governance issues than their motivation for 
participation in governance. 
Based on insight from the literature on motivation for participation in voluntary activities, 
the 34 motivational factors were conceptually grouped together to form a motivational 
typology of six motivational categories as shown in Table 1 below. 
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Table H: Motivational Typology of University Governors 
S/No motivational Motivational Items 
Categories 
1 Development of - To contribute to development of university. 
Governing - To widen access/increase participation in university. 
Board/University - To identify with vision and aspiration of university. 
(12 Items) - To raise level of corporate governance. 
- To use experience of governance and management to develop university. 
- To ensure university adopts good governance and management practices. 
- To put in place good governance practices. 
- To ensure equity in personnel administration. 
- To use professional knowledge to raise funds and create access. 
- To give external view/ perspective to decisions of governing body. 
- To offer a view on decisions of university. 
- To help due to many years of business collaboration with university. 
2 Personal - Appeal of working in higher education sector. 
Benefits - To understand governance and management of higher education institutions. 
(14 Items) - To be associated with an important public institution. 
-Invited to join governing body by Principal/Registrar/Chair/other governors. 
- Strong affection to serve the university. 
- To get involved in public sector governance and management. 
-I lappy to be part of university. 
- Governing body is where to influence the decisions of the university. 
- Appeal of joining a university at retirement. 
- Personal attachment to institution as a result of living close to university. 
- Be part of the ultimate decision-making body of the university. 
- To widen experience of chairing a public organisation 
- To know more about higher education sector. 
- Interested in how a university works. 
3 Development of - To give access to people and under-represented groups to obtain university 
Community/ education. 
Society - To safeguard and ensure effective utilisation of public funds. 
(3 Items) - To ensure audit processes are working well. 
4 Previous -I lad previous business relationship with university 
Relationship -I lad previous social relationship with university when conferred with 
(2 Items) honorary degree. 
5 Representational - To represent Senate, to represent the staff. 
(I Item) 
6 Responsibility - Part of job responsibility 
(1 Item) 
Majority (18 out of 24, i. e., 75%) of the respondents have multiple motivations for 
joining their respective university governing bodies and most of the university governors 
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in this category were lay governors. For example, My Lander, a lay Governor of Liberty 
Trust University, England (Post- 1992) perceived such multiple motivations thus: 
"1 got involved with the university on the basis that I want to try and get 
more access to people who do not have 5 GCSE. This university had a 
track record of doing that...... " (1). I asked if I could help with 
involvement and participation to people who would not normally come to 
university. I had an interest in that particular area and I still do" (2). "1 
was recommended by another governor because of my commercial skills 
because the university was perceived to have weakness in commercial 
activities... " (3). 1 had helped them pull together some commercial 
activity to raise some sponsorship money for the university in the past " 
(4). 
Less than a third (6 out of 24, i. e. 25%) of members of university governing bodies gave 
only one motivational factor. The respondents in this category were mainly 
representatives of senate/academic board, alumni of the universities, ex-officio members, 
members of university courts and a few lay governors who were co-opted into the 
governing bodies to perform some specific tasks. The findings on multiple motivations of 
governors is consistent with those of earlier studies conducted by Smith (1994), Deem et 
al (1995) and Bargh et at (1996) on educational governance which suggest that persons 
who voluntarily participate in the activities of organisations perceive multiple 
motivations for doing so. Bargh et al (1996) had argued that such multiple motivations 
are able to sustain the interest and commitment of university governors to the task of 
governance over a long period of time. Multiple motivations may also enable the 
governors to engage in several activities in the course of governing their universities. 
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TABLE 1: No. (%) of University Governors in English and Scottish Institutions in 
Different Motivational Categories 
Motivational Categories No. (%) of Governors in Motivational Cat egories 
S/N for Joining Governing English Universities Scottish Universities Total 
Board 
1 Development of 
Governing 
8 (62%) 7 (64%) 15 (63%) 
Body/University 
2 Personal Benefits 9(69%) 764% 16(67%) 
3 Representational 3(23%) 3(27%) 6 (25%) 
4 Development of 1(8%) *3 (27%) 4 (17%) 
1 Community/Society 
5 Previous Relationship 4(31%) - 4(17%) 
6 Responsibility 2(15%) - 2(8%) 
No. of Governors in English Universities - 13 
No. of Governors in Scottish Universities - 11 
TABLE J: No. (%) of University Governors in Pre-1992 and Post-1992 Institutions 
in Different Motivational Categories 
Motivational Categories No. (%) of Governors in Motivational Cat egories 





1 Development of 
Governing 
Body/University 
5 (45%) * 10 (77%) 15 (63%) 
2 Personal Benefits 
8(73%) 8 (62%) 16 (67%) 
3 Representational 
4(36%) 2 (15%) 6 (25%) 
4 Develop of 
Community/Society 
1(9%) 3 (23%) 4 (17%) 
5 Previous Relationshi 3(27%) 1(8%) 4 (17%) 
6 Responsibility 
2(18%) 
- 2 (8%) 
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1. Development of Governing Body/University: Twelve motivational factors were 
classified under this category and they are concerned with the perceived motivation by 
the respondents for wanting to contribute in one way or another to the development of the 
governing body and the university. The respondents think that the knowledge and 
experiences they possess will enable them to perform a developmental role in the 
university. The motivational factors under this category are internally-directed towards 
the university. 
A little bit more than half (about 63%) of the number of respondents was motivated by 
the motivational factors in this category (Table 1). For example, a lay governor of the 
University of Gangeshire, Scotland (Post-1992, Mr. Lagcrficld expressed his motivation 
to join the governing body as the desire "... to use my knowledge and experience to bring 
understanding of governance and management issues in private sector to contribute to 
the development of the governing body". Such expressed confidence by individuals in 
their ability to cause change is described as efficacy by Inglis and Cleave (2006), Smith 
(1994), Widmer (1985) and Wandersman ct al (1987) in their respective studies on 
voluntary participants. Bargh et al (1996) in their study also found some elements of 
perceived efficacy among members of university governing bodies in the UK. The 
majority of those who were motivated by this motivational component arc mainly 
external lay members of their university governing bodies whose backgrounds arc from 
industry and also have knowledge and experience in corporate governance and 
management issues. 
The motivations of the respondents in this motivational category could also be described 
as altruistic because they expressed their being motivated by a concern to contribute to 
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improving the governance practices of their governing bodies as well as developing the 
institutions. This aspect of the developmental motivation can be referred to as altruism. 
Widmer (1985) described altruism as the "concern for others as opposed to the concern 
for self' (p. 11). This altruistic motive was also found to be a very strong reason for 
persons who voluntarily participate in group and organisational activities (Widmer, 1985; 
Smith, 1994; Inglis and Cleave, 2006; Deem et al, 1995; Bargh et al, 1996; Taylor et al, 
1991). 
There is no noticeable difference between English and Scottish institutions in the number 
of respondents motivated by developmental factors in this category (Table I). However, 
more respondents (about 77%) from Post-1992 universities than those from Pre-1992 
institutions (45%) appear to express the need to contribute to the development of their 
governing bodies and institutions as reasons for participating in the governance of their 
universities (Table J). This difference may be attributable to the need for immediate and 
rapid development in Post-1992 institutions in order to catch up with their well- 
established Pre-1992 counterparts since competition is being encouraged among British 
higher education institutions by government. 
2. Personal Benefits: Fourteen motivational factors that are conceptually similar were 
grouped under this motivational category. The motives pertain to issues that will 
personally benefit the respondents or enhance their psychological well-being through 
participation in the governance of their institutions. 
About two thirds (67%) of respondents claimed they were motivated to join their 
respective governing bodies in anticipation of some intangible personal benefits that will 
accrue to them as they participate in the governance of the institutions (Table 1). These 
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personal benefits, derived from participating in governance may result in a sense of inner 
satisfaction for the governors. A lay governor of the University of Waterloo, England 
(Pre-1992), Mrs. Thomas expressed her motivation to serve on the governing body of her 
institution as the personal desire to know more about the functioning of a higher 
education system thus: "I have been interested in how a university works in more 
details". An ex-officio member of the governing body of University of West Albion, 
England (Pre-1992), Prof. Joseph is of the view that he is motivated "to serve as part of 
the ultimate decision-making body of the university ". 
There is some difference between respondents from Pre-1992 universities and those from 
Post-1992 institutions with the former having a higher percentage (73%) over the latter 
(62%) in their perceived motivation to participate in governance by intangible personal 
benefits that would accrue to them (Table J) which could be a coincidence. One reason 
for this could be that Pre-1992 universities have a higher status and are more prestigious 
than the Post-1992 institutions and people are more likely to want to identify and be part 
of the success stories of these institutions. A look at the academic activities the three Pre- 
1992 universities in this study (see Chapter 6) shows that they have a high reputation in 
some areas of research and are widely recognised for a particular brand of academic 
programmes, products and services they offer to big multinational firms and society. 
This type of motivation is what Clary et al (1998) and Inglis and Cleave (2006) in their 
independent studies referred to as enhancement of self which they described as attitudes 
and behaviours that are intended to give some intangible benefits to a person. 
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3. Development of Community/Society: Three motivational factors from the accounts 
of the respondents fall under this category. These are attitudes and behaviour of the 
university governors that are aimed at developing society through participation in the 
governance activities of the universities governing bodies. This particular motivator is 
directed at helping persons in the community or society to benefit from higher education. 
The respondents think that by serving on the governing body of a university they may be 
able to create opportunities within the institutions for people in the society to benefit from 
university education. In this case, the motives for participating in university governance 
are externally-directed at individuals in the community and society. 
Less than a quarter (17%) of the total number of respondents claimed to be motivated by 
this motivational category (Table 1). A lay governor, Mr. Silberston from the University 
of Stokefield, Scotland (Pre-1992) expressed this motivation thus: "... to create 
opportunityfor people to benefit from university education ". 
The data, however, shows that more respondents from Scottish universities (27%) than 
English institutions (8%) appear to be motivated by their desire to develop their 
communities and society (Table I). This country difference might be a reflection of the 
community orientation of Scots in general. 
Table J also shows that respondents from Post-1992 institutions (23%) were more 
motivated by this motivational category than those from Pre-1992 universities (9%). 
Their motivation to serve on the governing bodies may be their response to the UK 
government policy on fair access and widening participation of traditionally under- 
represented social groups in higher education. Widening participation as a strategic 
objective of the Post-1992 institutions 
in this study is highlighted in their mission 
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statement as indicated in Chapter 6. Their comparably high student population over those 
of the Pre-1992 universities is a reflection of this commitment. The policy is aimed at 
addressing the issue of equity and social inclusion in British society and to raise the level 
of educational attainment of the target groups. It may not be surprising for university 
governors in the Post-1992 to be motivated to serve on the governing bodies of their 
institutions in order to ensure their communities benefit from the policy objectives. The 
governors may also have the attitude towards community development and choose to 
exercise them in relevant higher education institutions. This confirms the study of Inglis 
and Cleave (2006) that board members rated community service highly as a motivating 
factor for voluntary participation in board governance. The participation of lay governors 
in governance of educational institutions in order to contribute to the development of 
society and the immediate community can be attributed to what Deem ct al (1995) 
described as a `career' in active citizenship. The concept of active citizenship as related 
to the participation of citizens in the governance of educational institutions is a UK 
government policy which confers on them the powers to be involved in making decisions 
concerning the production of educational services for the economy and consumers in the 
society. The concept of active citizenship is also conceived by Bargh ct al (1996) as 
being operationalised through voluntary lay involvement in university governance. 
4. Previous Relationship: The two motivational factors arc included in this category. 
Under this motivational category, respondents expressed the desire to join their university 
governing bodies in order to advance and strengthen previous business or social 
relationships they had established with the universities through participation in the 
governance of the institutions. Less than a fourth of the respondents (3 persons) in this 
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study expressed this motivation (Table 1) although this number may be too small to 
support this claim. For example, a chair of governors of the University of West Albion, 
England (Pre-1992), Mr Lawrence said he was motivated to join the governing body in 
order to continue his long standing relationship with the institution thus: "I've been 
involved with the university for 30 years. I got involved through collaboration with the 
university on an area of research relevant to one of my companies. I want to continue in 
the area of governance too... " 
More respondents from Pre-1992 universities (27%) than their counterparts in Post-1992 
universities (8%) appear to be motivated by items in this motivational category (Table J). 
The reason for this may be because the Pre-1992 institutions are older and more 
prestigious and therefore may have attracted more people to establish close business or 
social ties with them and such persons would want to continue the relationship by 
voluntarily participating in the governance of the institutions (Smith, 1991; Taylor, Chait 
and Holland, 1991). Another probable reason could be that since Pre-1992 institutions are 
older they may also have a stronger alumni association. Alumni are noted for their 
overwhelming interest and moral commitment to helping their alma mater achieve its 
goals and aspirations (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 1991; Mael and Ashford, 1992 and 
Tom and Elmer, 1994). 
5. Representational: Only one motivational item was conceptually identified as 
belonging to this motivational category and this applies to mostly the institutional 
governors. The respondents say they 
join the university governing body because they 
were nominated by a statutorily recognised 
body within the institutions. However, the co- 
opted lay governors in this study 
did not mention that they were motivated to represent 
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any constituency or even the governing body that co-opted them to participate in the 
governance activities of the university. 
About a fourth (25%) of respondents perceived that they were motivated to join the 
governing body because they were nominated by their constituencies (Table 1). A staff 
governor from the University of Stokefield, Scotland (Pre-1992), Prof. Kenneth says he 
joined the university governing body because he is "an elected representative of 
academic council ". 
More respondents (36%) from Pre-1992 universities than their Post-1992 counterparts 
(15%) joined the governing body because they were elected to represent their 
constituencies (Table J). This apparent difference between the institutional cases may be 
attributable to the fact that in Pre-1992 universities there is a constitutional provision for 
some formal groups in the institutions such as senate, students, staff bodies and alumni to 
be represented on the university governing bodies thereby making governance decision- 
making a democratic process. In Post-1992 institutions, there is no statutory provision for 
such representations but some governing bodies have requested staff and student bodies 
to nominate one or two of their representatives to join in the task of governance which 
Dearing (1997) recommended. In the Pre-1992, as in Post-1992 universities, the number 
of such representations on institutional governing bodies has been reduced drastically 
over the years as a result of the recommendations of the Jarratt Report (1985) and the 
Dearing Report (1997) on HE governance reforms. This appears to be a perspective of 
the New Right political ideology of NPM of the Conservative government and the 
modernisation agenda of the New Labour government in public sector institutions which 
allows for some form of participatory decision-making by multiple stakeholders from in 
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and outside the organisation in decision-making in public institutions. It also aims to give 
more voice to the users and consumers in services and products they consume (Newman, 
2000; Deem et al, 1995, Bargh et al, 1996). Representation allows for participatory 
decision-making in governance of institutions. Bargh et al (1996), in their study also 
observed that the internal (staff) governors perceived this representational and 
participatory motivation as a most influential factor for joining their governing bodies. 
6. Responsibility: The motivational item in this category is that being a member of the 
university governing body is part of the official job assignment of the individual. The ex- 
officio governors were mainly motivated by this motivational factor. For example, the 
position of deputy 'vice chancellor confers automatic membership of the governing body 
on the incumbent. 
Only 8% of respondents say the reason they are part of their university governing bodies 
is because their official job positions statutorily make them members (Table I). In this 
study, the respondents who gave such a reason are mainly ex-officio members of the 
executive of the universities. An ex-officio member of the University of West Albion, 
England (Pre-1992), Prof. Joseph expressed this reason thus: "I'm there because of my 
posting as pro-VC. it is part of the responsibility of my job ". Widmer (1985) and Smith 
(1994) also observed that some of the board members in their respective -studies had 
expressed similar employment reasons for joining the governing boards of their 
organisations. 
In the next section, I presented empirical findings on the mode of recruitment of lay 
governors into the seven university governing 
bodies in this study. 
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7.2.0 Recruitment of Lay Governors 
University governing bodies in the UK are composed of external lay people, internal cx- 
officio members who are members of the university executive management, internal staff 
members who are representatives of senate, academic and non-academic staff bodies, 
representatives of the student body as well as representatives of university courts (as in 
English universities). The higher education governance reform reports (Jarratt, 1985; 
Lambert, 2003) recommended that the composition of university governing bodies be 
made up of majority of external lay governors recruited mainly from business, industry 
and the professions with very few from other sectors of the economy. These persons were 
also to be recruited based on the possession of specific knowledge, skills, expertise and 
experience that would meet the governance and management needs of the governing 
body and the university (Jarratt, 1985; CUC, 2004). These recommendations are 
consistent with those of Cadbury (1992) and Higgs (2003) reports on the reformed 
corporate governance that is taking place in business and industry. The representatives of 
internal statutory bodies are usually nominated to the governing bodies through an 
electoral process while the ex-officio members who arc the vice chancellors/principals 
and deputy vice chancellors/principals are automatic members of the governing bodies by 
virtue of the positions in the institutions. 
In the previous section of this chapter, I examined the background characteristics of lay 
university governors and their motivations or reasons for voluntarily participating in the 
governance of their institutions. In this section, I am interested in examining the 
recruitment process adopted by university governing bodies in recruiting the lay 
governors who they think can perform the work of governance effectively. The purpose is 
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to discern the recruitment practices adopted by university governing bodies since an 
understanding of what works in one governance setting can be adopted and applied to a 
similar setting to ensure the effectiveness of governance across the higher education 
sector. It also examines how such practices conform to the higher education governance 
reforms earlier mentioned in this study. These issues are explored through in-depth 
interviews with the lay governors themselves and analysis of some official documents 
obtained from the universities and other relevant bodies associated with these institutions. 
After exploring the university governors' motivation for voluntarily participating in 
university governance, it is pertinent in the next section to examine how they are 
recruited to enable them to make a reality of their desires. 
7.2.1 Recruitment Process 
Despite the motivation of the university governors to participate in institutional 
governance, they still have to indicate interest in such voluntary activity and be formally 
recruited by the governing bodies of their universities. The Cadbury Report (1992) 
recommended the creation of a nominations committee to assist the boards of corporate 
firms in their recruitment of suitable non-executive directors. CUC (2004) governance 
guide also recommends that university governing bodies should have a nominations 
committee whose remit is to recruit lay governors who are external and independent of 
the institution and who possess specific knowledge and experience that is required in the 
universities. The Jarratt Report (1985) and the Education Reform Act 1988 specifically 
mentioned that lay governors should 
be appointed from among persons with a 
background and experience in business, industry and the professions. In this section, the 
process of recruitment of 
lay governors is examined through interviews with the 
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participants in this study as well as materials obtained from the wcbsitcs of the 
institutions. 
The respondents were asked how they were appointed and their perceptions of the 
recruitment practices adopted by their governing bodies in engaging the voluntary 
services of lay governors in their institutions. One account some of the respondents on 
the recruitment process gave was that they were invited by the chair of governors of the 
vice chancellor to join the governing body of the university and they responded positively 
to the request. They think that someone may have recommended them to the university 
before an invitation was extended to them. A lay governor, Mr Silbcrston from the 
University of Stokefield, Scotland (Pre-1992) narrated his experience of how he was 
recruited to join the governing body as follows: 
"... I got a letter from the Principal inviting me to come along and see 
whether I was interested and whether we could work together...! 
suspect somebody must have put forward my name to hint ... 
I was 
appointed thereafter" 
This method of recruiting university governors is referred to as co-option since there was 
no formal application from the candidates and no formal interview was conducted by a 
recruitment panel. There was no evidence of the involvement of the nominations 
committees of the university governing bodies in this regard. Co-option is a 
recommended practice for the recruitment of lay governors by both the Education Reform 
Act 1988 and the CUC (2004) guide for governors. However, almost all the respondents 
who claimed they were recruited in this manner had been on their governing bodies for 
upwards of 4 years. They may have been recruited prior to the constitution of a 
nominations committee by their respective university governing bodies. 
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The accounts of some of the governors also indicate that university governing bodies 
have a nominations committee that is charged with the recruitment of lay governors. In 
discharging this responsibility, they were of the view that the nominations committee 
determines the existing lay governors' vacancies as well as the skill and expertise that are 
required of the candidates that may enable them and the governing bodies to function 
effectively in their governance roles. The respondents claimed that the nominations 
committee depends on two main sources of nominations for the recruitment of lay 
governors. One way of doing this is for potential lay governors to be recommended by 
serving university governors, staff (both academic and non-academic) and students to the 
nominations committee of the governing body. Another way is for adverts to be placed in 
local and national newspapers and on the websites of the universities calling for suitable 
persons to apply as lay governors. Most times a combination of both sources are utilised. 
The respondents recount that a short-listing of potential candidates who meet the laid 
down criteria for a lay governorship position is made and a few of them are interviewed 
and selected by the nominations committee for appointment by the governing body. 
A staff governor, Mrs. Keith from University of St. Pancras, Scotland (Post-1992) 
recounts the recruitment practice by her governing body thus: 
"There's actually a call by Nominations Committee for lay governors 
being advertised in the newspapers specifying expertise in various areas 
that are relevant to the major activities of Court (governing 
body)... Those who meet the criteria are then interviewed and 
recommendations are made for appointment by the university governing 
body. 
The chair of University of West Albion, England (Pre-1992) Mr. Lawrence gave a more 
vivid descriptive account of similar views expressed by other respondents concerning the 
recruitment of new lay governors thus: 
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"Well we have a Nomination Committee which we've had for a long time 
of which I'm the Chairman... We've got some well worked out terms of 
reference with our Nominations Committee... and our key role is to ensure 
that the Council and this committee have got the right membership... 
We've got a profile of every member of Council and what their skills are. 
we then discuss how many vacancies we have, what skill mLr we would 
like to bring in to fill the gaps that are emerging... We advertise 
nationally,... around the university, we ask members of Council for 
suggestions for possible members and get a short list... We agreed this 
morning that the Vice Chancellor and I are going to have dinner with 2 
people that we discussed this morning. We draw tip a short list... we will 
say right that person is a national figure in the health field and we need 
somebody like that because the medical school is going through a 
particular development, or that person has got a very strong financial 
background experience and we are going to lose the Chairman of the 
Audit Committee next year so we'll bring that person in. We then 
persuade those people to join our Council and appoint them ... 
1{e want 
some people from the region, so today we had the top 50 companies based 
in the region and who the key people are, and we also had another list 
which was the biggest companies in the Midlands and the (alumni) 
graduates who are in those companies at a senior level, and we had 
another list which was the 50 richest people in the Midlands, and we had 
names put forward by individuals in the university so we have a lot of 
sources for ideas. " 
An examination of the governance websites of the universities confirms the accounts of 
the respondents on the existence of nomination committees in all the university governing 
bodies represented in this study. Such nomination committees arc headed by the Chair of 
governors and composed of the vice chancellor, the majority of lay governors and an 
academic governor (CUC, 2004). This is one aspect of the reform of higher education 
governance structures that has been implemented by the institutions represented in this 
study in terms of changes in the recruitment practices of university governing bodies. 
Bargh et al (1996) and Shattock (2006) also observed that the existence of nomination 
committees in universities has altered the process of recruitment of lay governors in UK 
universities. 
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However, the overwhelming majority of lay governors with backgrounds in business and 
industry in this committee may be viewed as an attempt to populate the governing bodies 
with persons of similar a background and experience in order to foster and support a 
managerial and enterprise culture in the institutions in line with the managerialisation of 
public institutions taking place in the wider society (Clarke et at, 2000). The membership 
of these nomination committees did not reflect the composition of the various internal 
groups represented on the governing bodies, especially in the case of Pre-1992 
universities that have more of such representatives than the Post-1992 institutions. 
7.2.2 Role of Chair and Vice Chancellor in the Recruitment Process 
However, evidence abound in some of the universities as in the above account of the 
chair of governors of University of West Albion that the chairs and vice chancellors 
dominate and influence the recruitment process of lay governors despite the existence of 
nomination committees. An example of such a situation is when this chair of governors 
said the vice chancellor and himself went to discuss with and persuade some nominated 
persons to join the governing body to the exclusion of other members of the committee. 
Another example is when the chair of governors of University of St. Pancras, Scotland 
(Post-1992), Prof. Roberts personalised the issue of recruitment of lay governors by 
saying: 
-... What I personally look for is someone who is committed to the 
cause ... 
So when I interview somebody or chat to somebody who's a 
potential member, I'll look straight in their eyes and say are you 
prepared to commit yourself to the time that's required to do a good 
job? " 
This overbearing influence of the chairs and vice chancellor appears likely to undermine 
the independence, transparency and objectivity of the nomination committee and the 
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whole democratic process of selection of lay governors as advocated by Nolan (1995), 
Cadbury, (1992) and CUC (2004). A similar control over the recruitment process by the 
chairs and vice chancellors was also observed by Bargh et al (1996) in their study of 
university governing bodies in the UK. 
7.2.3 Mode of Attracting Prospective Lay Governors 
Prior to the higher education governance reforms names of potential governors were 
mainly recommended by members of the university (Bargh ct al (1996). But based on the 
above accounts of respondents, there is now a widespread use of advertisements in local 
and national newspapers and university wcbsitcs by nomination committees to attract 
potential lay governors to participate in the governance of universities. The CUC (2004) 
guide had recommended the publication of such governorship vacancies by a nomination 
committee of governing bodies to attract potentially suitable lay governors. However, the 
criteria for recruitment following the recommendations of the higher education reform 
reports may exclude certain persons or groups in the society from being recommended or 
applying for lay governorship position in order to participate in the governance of UK 
universities. 
The account of the chair of University of West Albion, England (Prc-1992). Mr 
Lawrence was similar to that of many of the other respondents indicating a deliberate 
attempt by university governing bodies to recruit lay governors from the upper middle 
and upper classes of the British society with a background in business and industry in line 
with the higher education governance reform recommendations of Jarratt (1985), 
Lambert (2003) and the resulting CUC (2004) code of governance practice. The social 
background and account of this chair of governor as with those of the other chairs and lay 
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governors in this study appears to perpetuate a certain oligarchy and class hegemony by 
privileging the corporate upper-middle classes to serve on the governing bodies of 
universities through the recruitment process of lay governors. This is what Clark (1989) 
and Zahra and Pearce (1989) refer to as "capitalist control of societal institutions" (p. 
300). It is consistent with the class hegemony theory which is based on Marxist sociology 
that views the governing board of an organisation as one way in which the capitalist class 
controls social and economic institutions. The presence of this category of people on 
governing bodies appears to be the beginning of a corporate takeover of universities and 
the subsequent institutionalisation of enterprise culture in academe as observed by Clark 
(1989). This may bring about an elite takeover of university governing bodies in order to 
take control of the highest decision-making organ in a university which had earlier been 
observed by Bargh et al (1995) in their study of university governing bodies in the UK. 
There is a glaring dissimilarity between the compositions of the academic-dominated 
university governing bodies before the higher education governance reforms and the 
current lay-dominated structure which favours elites from business and industry 
backgrounds. According to Sample (2006) and Sekulic and Sporer (2002) elites in 
positions of power and authority are able to perpetuate themselves through various 
recruitment practices and criteria which exclude other people from different segments of 
society. The near exclusion of academics and other internal and external representative 
groups from institutional governance through recruitment processes of governing bodies 
is glaring in this study especially in the Post-1992 institutions. 
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But a lay governor of Ashgrove University, England (Post-1992), Mr. Matthew objects to 
the perpetuation of an elite class in the governing body of his university when he argued 
for more diversity in composition of the body during recruitment of lay governors thus: 
"1 mean within, one could argue that our Council have this issue of 
middle class white older people. We ought to have younger different 
ethnic backgrounds, diversity ... yes" 
The privileging of the business, industry and professional elite class for appointment into 
lay governorship positions and the process of such appointments by university governing 
bodies can be viewed as a paradox in relation to the social exclusion crusade of 
government through its widening participation policy in higher education institutions. 
There seems to be no difference between Pre- and Post-1992 universities in England and 
Scotland in their approach to the recruitment of lay governors. The governing bodies 
represented in this study appear to have adopted similar recruitment practices, same 
sources of potential lay governors and similar criteria for recruitment. 
There is then evidence that the higher education governance reforms initiatives (Jarratt, 
1985; Dearing, 1997) are being implemented by the governing bodies of universities 
concerning the recruitment of lay governors but the consequences of this for democratic 
and open governance are considerable. 
After examining the recruitment process and the appointment of lay governors, it is 
imperative in the next section of this chapter to also explore the perceptions of the 
governors concerning the governance roles of their governing bodies in the university and 
how they have been able to distinguish such roles from those of the executive. 
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7.3.0 Governance Roles of University Governing Bodies 
The purpose of this section is to examine the perceptions of university governors 
concerning the various governance roles they perform as a governing body that is 
charged with the ultimate authority for directing and controlling the university to achieve 
its purpose. The governance roles specify the various functions the university governors 
carry out as a governing body and as individual members of the body and the attitude 
towards these functions or tasks and their authority relationship with other people they 
interact with, in and outside the university, in order to accomplish the purpose of the 
institution. 
In the interview the governors were asked to give what they perceive and understand as 
the governance roles of the university governing bodies. The chair of governors of 
University of Gangeshire, Scotland (Post-1992), Mr. Charles mentioned that the primary 
governance roles of the university governing body are: 
`... setting the strategy (strategic direction) of the university (strategy 
role),... compliance with Scottish Funding Council for Higher Education 
and Scottish Executive and indeed Westminster's policies (compliance 
role)... and monitoring executive activities and to make sure we are in 
best practice... and benchmarking against others (monitoring 
role)... there is an ambassadorial role which I think each governing 
body member has to play by linking the university with senior politicians 
and people of influence in the Diaspora (ambassadorial/external 
relations role)... engaging in very senior disciplinary and grievance 
cases (disciplinary/appeal role) ". 
(I have added the items in bold letters to clearly demarcate the governance roles). 
The governance roles mentioned here are strategy, compliance, monitoring, 
ambassadorial (external relations) and disciplinary and grievance (appeal) roles. 
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Other governance roles were also perceived by the respondents. A lay governor of 
Liberty Trust University, England (Post-1992), Mr. Lander perceived the governance 
roles as: 
'The key functions of the university governing body is to deliver 
assurance that monies are spent in an appropriate way 
(accountability) ... 
determining the strategic direction of the university 
(strategy)... check through committees that executives are delivering 
what they say they are going to deliver' (monitoring). 
In this case, the key governance roles mentioned by this respondent arc accountability, 
strategy and monitoring roles. 
Another lay governor from Ashgrove University, Mr. Francis perceived the governance 
role of the university governing body as: 
"... to ensure there's a system of internal controls' (audit)... review 
effectiveness of the university (assess ment)... to manage risk' (risk 
governance) .... manage strategic 
direction' (strategy)... receive reports 
on how the university is actually operating (monitoring and 
accountability)". 
This lay governor mentioned the governance roles as audit, assessment, risk management, 
strategy, monitoring and accountability roles. 
A chair of governors of University of Waterloo, Mr. Carrington perceived the governance 
roles of the governing body as: 
"... the ultimate decision maker of the organisation (decision-making 
role) ... appointment of a new Vice Chancellor as well as appointing the lay governors (recruitment role... it's responsible for human resources 
generally (recruitment role) ". 
In this particular case the governance roles perceived by the respondent arc decision- 
making and recruitment roles of the university governing body. 
In summary, the accounts of the above respondents arc representative of the overall 
perceptions of the 27 university governors in this study concerning the governance roles 
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of the university governing bodies. These governance roles include strategy, compliance, 
monitoring, ambassadorial (external relations), disciplinary/grievance (appeal), 
accountability, assessment, risk governance, recruitment and decision-making roles. 
A critical examination of the accounts of the university governors in this study (see Table 
K below), however, indicate that most (more than 70%) of the respondents perceive 
accountability, - strategy, monitoring, compliance and assessment (performance 
evaluation) roles as key governance roles they perform. A little more than half (less than 
60%) of the respondents view recruitment and decision-making roles as other governance 
roles they perform. About 40% of the respondents are of the view that the governing 
body also performs audit and risk governance roles. Just under a third (less than 33%) 
perceives support, disciplinary and grievance (appeal), ambassadorial (external relations) 
and assurance roles as governance roles performed by their governing bodies. These 
figures appear to indicate the importance and the frequency with which the university 
governing bodies discuss and engage in the performance of these governance roles. (See 
Table K for the analysis of university governors' perceptions of governance roles). 
The accounts of respondents indicate multiple governance roles performed by the 
university governing bodies. Bargh et al, (1996) and Hung (1998) have similarly in the 
past observed in their respective studies that governing boards of organisations perform 
such multiple governance roles. Bargh et al (1996) in their study of university governing 
bodies in the UK had identified strategic, audit, supervisory, support, representative, 
managerial, appeal and negotiating roles as governance roles performed by them. 
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TABLE K: University Governors Perception of Governance Roles Performed by 
their Governing Bodies. 
SN GOVERNANCE UNIVERSITY GOVERNING BODIES 
ROLES ENGLISH UNIV. SCOTTISH UNIV. TOTAL 
PRE- 92 POST- 92 PRE- 
92 
POST-92 (%) 
UW UWA A 
U 
LTU US USP UG 
1 ACCOUNTABILITY 3 5 3 4 3 5 3 26(96%) 
2 STRATEGY 3 5 3 3 3 5 3 25 (93%) 
3 MONITORING 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 21(78%) 
4 COMPLIANCE 3 4 3 2 3 4 2 21(78%) 
5 ASSESSMENT 2 2 4 4 1 4 2 19 (70%) 
6 RECRUITMENT 3 1 1 4 1 3 2 16(60%) 
7 DECISION- 
MAKING 
4 3 2 2 1 4 1 16 (60%) 
8 AUDIT - 2 2 2 1 2 2 11(41%) 
9 RISK 
GOVERNANCE. 
1 1 2 2 2 2 1 11(41%) 
10 SUPPORT 1 2 1 - 1 3 1 9 (33%) 
11 APPEAL I 2 1 4(14.8%) 
12 EXTERNAL REL. 1 1 2 (8%) 
13 ASSURANCE 1 1 2 (8%) 
* Figures in cells indicate number of university governors mentioning a particular 
governance role performed by their governing bodies. 
KEY 
UW - University of Waterloo LTU - Liberty Trust University 
UWA - University of West Albion AU - Ashgrovc University 
US - University of Stokefield USP - University of St. Pancras 
UG - University of Gangeshire 
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Although some of the governance roles perceived by the respondents do not completely 
fit into some of the categories of governing body roles identified by Bargh et at (1996) 
and Hung (1998) in their independent studies, but they basically perform similar roles. 
Bargh et al (1996) argued and cautioned that the perceptions of university governors 
concerning their governance roles may not actually represent the extent of their 
involvement in each role. The perception of an individual university governor may not 
also necessarily reflect the perception of the governing body as a whole. Moreover, the 
perception of the chair of governors who invariably are the leaders of these bodies and 
the governance arrangement adopted by them may to a large extent determine the 
governance roles and the extent of involvement of the governing body in the performance 
of these roles. Some researchers assert that contextual factors such as `board power', 
`environmental uncertainty', `information asymmetry', `history of the organisation', 
`conduct of board meetings', `board-executive relationship' and `social composition of 
boards' appears to affect the extent of involvement of the board in a particular role 
(Hendry and Kiel, 2004 and McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). 
The extent of involvement of the university governing body and the governors in the 
performance of the strategy, risk management, performance review and accountability 
roles will be examined in-depth in the next two chapters. I have chosen to examine these 
particular governance roles because much emphasis is placed on them by the various 
higher education reform reports of Jarratt (1985) and Dearing (1997), the CUC (2004) 
code of governance guide, the higher education funding councils of England and 
Scotland and the wider public institution modernisation agenda of government. 
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In the next section, I examine how university governors have been able to distinguish 
between governance and management despite the expressed practical difficulties in doing 
so in the literature on governance (Houle, 1989; Greer and Hoggett, 1997). 
7.4.0 Distinguishing between Governance and Management Roles 
The prescriptive literature on governance and governing boards attempts to separate the 
governance role of the governing body from the management role of the executive but in 
actual practice it has been difficult for board members to distinguish between both sets of 
roles (Greer and Hoggett, 1997; Carver, 2006; Bennett, 2002; Gill, 2005; Houle, 1989; 
Bargh et al, 1996). During the interview session, the respondents were asked for their 
perceptions of the demarcation between the governance roles of the university governing 
body and management roles of the executive management of. thc institution and whether 
they are cognisant of the expectations of their governance roles and those of the 
executive. 
In order to convey the differences between governance and management roles most of the 
respondents described both roles in terms of the perceived statutory relationship between 
the governing body and the executive of the institution as represented by the vice 
chancellor and mostly within the framework of the strategies and policies of the 
university. 
Generally, the respondents perceived and described the management roles of the 
executive of the university as enumerated below. 
1. Development of Strategies and Policies: Most of the respondents arc of the view that 
the management role requires the executive of the university to develop the strategic plan 
of the university which should specify strategies and the policies to guide the 
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accomplishment of the strategies of the university based on the strategic direction that 
had been determined in collaboration with the governing body. The developed plans are 
presented to the governing body for approval. A lay university governor described this 
management function thus: 
,, Well clearly they're there to develop the strategies of the university in line 
with the direction that has been agreed with Court and to bring those 
strategies and policies to the lay members and to the Court (governing 
body) and to have that approval given. (Mr. Bloomfield - Lay Gov., 
University of St. Pancras, Scotland, post-1992) 
The views of these respondents are consistent with their occupational background and 
corporate governance and experiences in industry and business from which they were 
recruited onto university governing bodies. Traditionally, strategic planning and the 
strategy process has been under the ambit of the executive management of an 
organisation (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Rowley, Lujan and Dolence, 1992) but recent thinking 
in corporate governance is emphasising a more active role for the governing board in 
strategy (Judge and Zeithalm, 1992; Jarratt, 1985, Golden and Zajac, 2001; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999). 
2. Implementation of Strategic and Policy Decisions: Another role of management 
from the perspective of all the respondents is that the executive is responsible for 
implementing and achieving the strategic plan and all other strategic and policy decisions 
of the governing body. The accounts of two chairs of governors illustrate this view of 
management role. The chair of governors of University of St. Pancras, Scotland (Post- 
1992), Prof. Roberts recounts thus: 
"They are the executive team; they have clear responsibility and 
operational responsibility to deliver plans. " 
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Also the chair of governors of Liberty Trust University, England (Post-1992), Mr. 
Barry perceives this management role thus: 
"Implementation is down to the executive. It's down to the chief executive 
or the Vice Chancellor to basically to work within his management 
team ... and 
he will agree to do it within a certain time frame. " 
The views of these two chairs of governors are consistent with those of the literature on 
management which places the role of the chief executive and management as 
implementing the decisions of the governing board of an organisation (Farrell, 2005; 
Carver, 2006). 
3. Responsibility for Academic Matters: The respondents perceive academic matters 
and decisions as the preserve of senate (Pre-1992 universities) and the academic board 
(Post-1992 institutions) but the vice chancellor, who is the chief executive of the 
institution, co-ordinates the activities of these bodies and reports to the governing body 
regularly on academic matters. The accounts of two internal members of the governing 
bodies of a Post-1992 institution and a Pre-1992 university illustrate this management 
role. Prof. George, an academic staff member of the governing body of University of 
St. Pancras, Scotland (Post-1992) presents this management role as follows: 
"In effect I would say academic board is responsible for all the academic 
decisions taken by the university. Court (governing body) does not take 
academic decisions. So all of the sub-committees of the university and the 
schools organise the school structures, so the school boards report 
through the academic development committee, the planning and 
implementation committee, all reporting to academic board for the 
academic decisions to be taken and then they're simply reported for 
information to Court. " 
Another ex-officio member of the University of Stokcficld, Scotland (Pre-1992), 
Prof. Kenneth presents his view on this management role thus: 
"The main body of decisions that Court doesn't discuss have to do with 
academic matters which are resolved by Academic Council. Court will 
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receive reports from Academic Council and will normally just note 
them.... " 
The Jarratt Report (1985) also recognises the vice chancellor as both chief executive and 
academic leader in charge of academic matters in the institutions. Bargh et al (1996) 
observe the role of the vice chancellor as "academic leader of the university, being chair 
of the academic board and is responsible for representing academic interests internally to 
the board of governors... " (p. 138). The respondents were unanimous in their view that 
the governing body does not discuss or take academic decisions. This appears to be one 
area where the corporate model of governance in the private sector have limitations when 
applied to universities. Although, the articles of government and statutes of Post-1992 
institutions grant the governing body power over academic decisions, the accounts of the 
respondents from these universities indicate that it is the academic board which still 
determines academic matters in the institutions. The lay-dominated Post-1992 university 
governing bodies whose members are recruited from business and industry appear to lack 
the necessary knowledge and experience to deal with academic matters which is the core 
activity of universities. 
4. Accountability to the University Governing Body: The respondents are also of the 
view that the executive is accountable to the governing body for the day-to-day effective 
management of the institution and for the efficient use of resources to accomplish the 
purpose of the university. A staff governor Prof. George of University of St. Pancras, 
Scotland (Post-1992) viewed this accountability role of the university executive 
management as follows: 
"The Principal is the chief executive officer in a sense and he is 
responsible just as in the business analogy as any chief executive. He is 
sitting with his board of directors, he is responsible for running the 
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organisation and therefore he is being accountable and held accountable 
by the board or the Court for the way he's conducting his business. " 
Accountability of the executive requires that they report to the governing body the extent 
to which they have achieved the strategic objectives and purpose of the institution. This 
accountability perspective is consistent with the agency theory view which stipulates that 
management should act in the best interest of the organisation and be accountable to the 
governing board (Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 1997). The accountability role of the 
executive is also in line with the provisions of the CUC (2004) governance guide and the 
HEFCE (2005) financial memorandum. The role of the vice chancellor in the 
accountability process of the university will be explored further in Chapter 9. 
The perception of the individual university governors concerning governance and 
management in organisations as well as their previous experience of governance and 
management issues may also to a large degree determine the extent to which they draw a 
dividing line between the two sets of roles. 
7.5.0 Perception of Demarcation between Governance and Management Roles 
Some of the respondents were of the view that it is improper for university governors to 
deliberately engage in the day-to-day operations of the institution since those functions 
have been statutorily delegated to the vice chancellor and the executive management of 
the institution. They claim that conscious attempts arc made by their governing bodies to 
restrain university governors from performing such delegated functions. The chair of 
governors, University of St. Pancras, Scotland, (Post. 1992) Prof. Roberts expressed this 
concern vividly in his interview account thus: 
"The non-executive team must never cross the line Into the executive role 
and the executive team shouldn't cross the line into governance role and 
the governing body is very sensitive to this. Whatever we do we must not 
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try and run the university like an executive team. We have to ensure that 
the executive team are running the university properly. That's the 
difference ..... we are not running 
it we are ensuring that it is run. " 
This view was supported by an ex-officio of University of West Albion, England, 
Post- 1992), Prof. Joseph when he remarked that: 
"But my own, and I hold this very strongly personally and I think it affects 
the views of the institution, is that you must make a clear distinction 
between governance and management. The governing body is not there to 
run the university; it is there to make sure the university's run properly" 
These views appear to indicate that some respondents are conscious of the tendency for 
some governors to want to perform day-to-day management roles sometimes referred to 
as micro-managing, and therefore, stress the need for demarcating between governance 
and management roles in order to avoid conflict between the governing body and the 
executive. Garratt (2003) had argued that the role of the board is to oversee the activities 
of the executives and to ensure that they accomplish the purpose of the organisation and 
perceives as ignorance the inability of boards to distinguish between "directoral and 
executive roles" (p. 1). 
7.6.0 Navigating the Boundary between Governance and Management Roles 
The respondents were asked whether they experienced any difficulty in negotiating the 
boundary between governance roles of the university governing body and the 
management roles of the university executive. The accounts of the ex-officio members 
and the lay governors who occupy managerial positions in the university and in business 
and industry respectively are worthy of note in this regard. The ex-officio members are of 
the view that they were very clear about the boundary between the governance roles of 
the governing body and the management roles of the executive by virtue of their dual 
membership of both bodies. They claim that understanding what their roles entail as 
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executives and as members of the governing body and the demands of the governing 
body on the executive and how they arc supposed to respond to such demands enables 
them to see the visible lines of demarcation between both roles. An cx-otliicio of the 
University of St. Pancras Scotland (Post-1992), Prof. George explains this distinction 
thus: 
"... I'm sitting as a member of the executive on Court and... 1 have a full 
understanding of the executive side of the university business. But I've also 
seen it from a Court perspective and what the Court requires from the 
executive in order to carry out its accountability and government 
requirements. Court should satisfy itself that the university is being well- 
run, etc. So it's quite interesting observing that from my position as a 
member of the executive and also a member of Court... There seems to be 
a clear understanding of what is required at the macro level...... " 
Another ex-officio from University of West Albion, England (Pre-1992), Prof. Simpson 
also perceives the same ability to demarcate between governance and management roles 
in view of his dual membership of both the governing body and the cxccutivc thus: 
"It's quite clear to me because obviously I'm a member of both the 
executive and of course the Council so I see both sides of the operations. 
So I think they are clear to me. You see... effectively it's the role of the 
executive to manage right, but that has to he done and overseen by 
Council to make sure that it's reasonable and it's effective... " 
Apart from belonging to both governance and management groups these two ex-off cio 
members seem to be able to demarcate between the both governance and management 
roles because they also appear to have the inside working knowledge, information and 
experience of an academic enterprise. They appear to have an insider perspective of the 
various interacting institutional contextual factors which enables them to distinguish the 
boundary between both roles which the external lay governors lack. 
However, the accounts of some of the lay governors in this study indicated that 
separating governance and management roles in practice could be a bit daunting 
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especially for those of them that are engaged in managerial roles in their areas of primary 
work outside the university and who really want to use their expertise and experience to 
contribute towards the development of the institution by adding value to the university 
decisions and processes. The view of a lay governor of Ashgrove University, England 
(Post-1992) Mr. Fratton is consistent with the perceptions of the other respondents who 
hold similar perspectives thus: 
"We're here as independent and we're not the executive. We can suggest 
but we shouldn't do and that's a very difficult task for somebody that's 
been actively involved in business with senior posts where you are 
expected to be actively involved and were held accountable for 
delivering... 1 think if you can add value it's awfully difficult to stand back. 
But if you can't add value you shouldn't be here. But if you're going to 
get members who can add value, who have the skills then you do run the 
risk of having people that want to dabble (into management roles) and 
that's what you have to accept...... " 
This appears to present a typical situation where lay governors attempt to perform 
executive functions in their effort to use their skills, expertise and experience of 
management issues and business background to `add value' to the processes of the 
institutions. The inability of the lay governors to demarcate between these roles could 
generate a lot of role conflict between the lay governors and the executive management 
of the institutions. Greer and Hoggett (1997) and Edwards and Cornforth (2003) had 
argued that governing boards find it difficult demarcating between governance and 
management roles. 
7.7.0 Conclusion 
There is evidence from the study to suggest that lay governors were highly educated 
corporate elites from the upper and middle classes recruited mostly from industry and the 
professions into the seven university governing bodies that participated in this study. The 
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lay governors appear to have multiple motivations for participation in university 
governance. They were mostly motivated by their desire to contribute the improvement 
of the corporate governance and management arrangements of the institutions as well as 
the overall development of the universities and the communities within the operating 
environment of the institutions. The reasons the institutional governors participated in 
governance were because they were either representing their constituencies or that it was 
part of their job schedule. In the country case studies, the lay governors from university 
governing bodies in Scotland appeared to be motivated to participate in governance in 
order to develop their communities than their counterparts in England. This difference 
between the country cases can be attributed to the community orientation of the Scots. 
The evidence from the institutional case studies indicates that lay governors from Post- 
1992 universities were motivated to participate in university governance in order to 
contribute to the improvement of the governance and management practices as well as 
the overall development of the institutions than their counterparts in Pre-1992 universities 
because they want to catch up with their more developed Pre-1992 universities. 
The recruitment process of the lay governors appears discriminatory in favour of people 
with the above stated background characteristics, experience and knowledge to the 
exclusion of other persons from most segments of the society. However, the 
characteristics of these lay governors appeared to be consistent with the 
recommendations of the higher education reform reports of Jarratt (1985), Dearing (1997) 
and Lambert (2003). There was no evidence from this study to suggest country and 
institutional differences in the approach to recruitment and appointment of lay governors. 
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The university governors in this study perceived multiple governance roles such as 
accountability, strategy, monitoring, compliance, performance assessment, recruitment, 
audit, risk governance, support, appeal and ambassadorial roles being performed by their 
university governing bodies. The accountability, strategy, compliance, risk and 
performance review roles appear to be new governance roles of the university governing 
bodies in this study. These are consistent with the newly emerging governance roles 
identified in the literature of board governance as well as those emphasised by the higher 
education reform reports and the modernisation of public institutions agenda of 
government. 
It appears the university governors are conscious of the need to demarcate between their 
governance roles and those of the executives in order to avoid conflict between both 
bodies. But in their attempt to use their skills, knowledge, expertise and experience to 
`add value' to the processes of the university they found it `difficult to stand back' from 
engaging in management roles in practice. Such interference in management functions 
portends areas of potential conflict between the governing bodies and the executives of 
the institutions. It was observed that in all the case study institutions, the ex-officio 
members appear to be able to clearly demarcate between governance and management 
roles than most of their lay colleagues. This 
is because they appear to have a better 
working knowledge of the academic enterprise 
by virtue of the dual roles they play both 
as members of the governing body and the executive and the long years they have been 
working in academia. They also appear to 
have a vested interest in doing so in practice. 
The case studies did not show any particular institutional and country pattern in the 
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perceptions of university governors concerning their governance roles as well as in the 
demarcation between governance and management roles. 
In the next chapter, 1 examine in more details the role of the governing body and the 
university governors in the strategy process and the governance of the risks of the 
institutions since strategy and risk were perceived by the governors in this chapter and 
emphasised in the board literature as one of the main roles performed by the governing 
bodies. I also examined how the risks associated with the strategies of the university are 
governed by the governing bodies of the institutions since the governance and 
management of organisational risks have been observed to be important in reducing the 
failure to achieve strategic objectives of a firm (Turnbull, 1999; Jones and Sutherland, 
1999; HEFCE, 2005). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PROCESSES OF GOVERNANCE: PERCEPTIONS OF PRACTICES 
8.0.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I examined the background characteristics of the university 
governors, their motivations for participating in governance and their method of 
selection. I also examined their perceptions of their governance roles and how they were 
able to distinguish between governance and management roles. The purpose of this and 
the next chapter is to examine some newly emerging governance practices in universities 
as a result of the various governance reforms started since the Jarratt (1985) report. Some 
of the new governance practices as they affect the role of the university governing bodies 
are strategy, risk governance, performance review as well as the renewed burden of 
accountability. These governance processes are examined in this chapter because they are 
conceptually inter-related. This chapter is sub-divided into two sections with the sole aim 
of examining the perceptions and the role played by the university governors and their 
governing bodies concerning their strategy and risk governance activities. 
8.1.0 Governors' Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
The purpose of this section is to examine the strategy. role of university governing bodies 
with particular reference to the extent of participation of university governors and their 
governing bodies in the strategy 
based on the interview accounts of the university 
governors and evidence 
from the observation of meetings of the governing bodies and 
other documentations of the university where applicable. This was examined within the 
framework of the theoretical debate on the passive-reactive and active-proactive roles of 
corporate boards of organisations 
in the strategy process (Golden and Zajac, 2001; 
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Hendry and Kiel, 2001) and the empirical model of board participation in strategy 
developed by McNulty and Pettigrew (1999). 
The analysis of data shows two distinct approaches adopted by the university governing 
bodies in this study for participation in the strategy process of their institutions. The 
approaches are enumerated below. 
8.1.1 Passive-Reactive Approach to Strategy 
The respondents from two out of four English universities namely the University of West 
Albion (Pre-1992) and Ashgrovc University (Post-1992) perceived the approach to 
participation in strategy as passive-reactive mode. In this passive-reactive approach the 
accounts of the respondents indicate that the strategy process commences with the 
executive proposing the strategic focus and the strategies of the university to a strategy 
committee. The strategy committee then debates all strategic issues confronting the 
university as proposed, make necessary input and later present their recommendations to 
the governing body for discussion, approval and subsequent adoption for implementation 
by the executive. It is in this committee that the strategic decisions of the executive 
appear to be challenged by members of the strategy committee. 
In explaining this approach an ex-officio member of the University of West Albion, Prof. 
Kay recounts that the governing body does not "brainstorm strategy " but that "strategy 
is much more driven from our academic community and the executive". The chair of 
governors of the University of West Albion, Mr. Lawrence disclosed that there is a 
"strategy committee that looks at strategy for the university" and that the remit of this 
committee is to discuss such strategic issues Iike the "mission and strategies" and the 
"key performance indicators for the university" as proposed by the executive. The 
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mission in this case is the reason for the existence of the institution which serves as the 
framework for developing the strategic areas of focus and strategies of the university. The 
key performance indicators (KPIs) are the measures of the expected performance of the 
institution in the areas of strategic focus of the institution (Rowley, Lujan and Dolence, 
1997). University governing bodies in the UK are required to adopt the use of KPIs to 
gauge the performance of their institutions and this is based on the recommendation of 
the CUC (2004) in its governance framework derived from the Dearing Report (1997) 
which suggested that governing bodies should monitor the performance of their 
institutions especially in those areas of their strategic activities. This appears to be a new 
dimension in the practice of university governance adopted from the business sector. 
It was observed from the governance websites of the two universities that the strategy 
committees are dominated by the executive and senate members with very minimal lay 
representation. The respondents were of the view that, based on the debates of the 
strategy committee, a collective perspective of the strategic focus of the university is 
formed, which is then taken into consideration by the executive in the preparation of the 
final draft strategic document that will be presented to the university governing body for 
approval. A lay governor of Ashgrove University, Mr. Francis who is also a member of 
the strategy committee represented this perspective in his account thus: 
"If we (strategy committee) feel that that (proposed strategy) is correct or 
we might make some changes in the committee which we will then take to 
the council of the university saying 'This is our strategic plan for the next 
five years ". 
In commenting on the passive-reactive role of the governing bodies in the strategy 
process, the chair of governors of the 
University of West Albion, Mr. Lawrence disclosed 
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that the role of the governing body is limited to approving the decisions of the strategy 
committee. He said: 
"The reality is that a lot of decisions (of the governing body) are to 
approve things that committees of the governing body have pul forward 
and I have just mentioned strategy committee ". 
When the role of the lay governors and the governing bodies is restricted to approving 
strategic decisions it is said to be involved in 'taking strategic decisions' based on the 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) model of board participation in strategy. In their study, 
they found that all boards approve strategy which is consistent with the above findings. 
The establishment of the strategy committees in these universities, however, appears to 
limit the participation of majority of the lay governors in the strategy process and perhaps 
reduce the opportunity for them to use their skills, expertise and experience to influence 
and shape the strategic decisions of the executives since only a few bf them can 
statutorily serve on this committee. 
However, the perception of the respondents is that lay governors and the entire governing 
body should be actively involved in determining the strategic direction and strategies of 
their universities rather than just approving the strategy as proposed by the executive. A 
lay governor of Ashgrove University, Mr. Matthew reaffirms this position when he said: 
"1 think council is saying we ought to be involved at an earlier stage with a 
view to actually establishing the strategy rather than just approving the 
strategy" 
This perception of the lay governors appears to be consistent with the thinking of the 
proactive-active school of thought that boards should play an active role in the strategy 
process of the organisation (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Hendry and Kiel, 2001; Jarratt 
1985) and determines its strategic direction and strategies. 
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This passive-reactive approach to strategy adopted by the lay governors and governing 
bodies of the two English institutions is consistent with the findings of Bargh et al (1996) 
and Farrell (2005) that governing bodies of educational institutions are mostly reactive 
and they do react to the strategic decisions of the executives. However, it seems only the 
few lay governors in the strategy committee are given the opportunity to be involved in 
the `shaping strategic decisions' and `shaping of context, conduct and content of 
strategy'. It is this scenario that appears to have informed the call by the respondents for a 
more proactive and active involvement of lay governors in the strategy process of their 
institutions. 
8.1.2 Proactive-Active Approach to Strategy 
Respondents from the three Scottish universities (University of Gangeshire, Scotland, 
Post-1992; University of St. Pancras, Scotland, Post-1992 and University of Stokefield, 
Scotland, Pre-1992) and those from two English institutions (University of Waterloo, 
England, Pre-1992 and Liberty Trust University, England, Post-1992) in their accounts 
perceive a proactive and active approach to the performance of the strategy role by their 
respective governing bodies. The respondents recounted that the strategy process of the 
university is initiated by the governing body through convening special strategy meetings 
involving the executive, some senior academics and senate members where strategic 
issues are raised for discussion and decisions are taken as to the future strategic direction, 
areas of strategic focus and the strategies of the institutions. In this case, lay governors 
appear to have an opportunity to contribute to the strategic debates of the institutions. 
During these meetings, the respondents reported that the executive management of the 
institutions take copious notes of the collective strategic perspectives put forward and 
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would develop them into a strategy document which will be rc-presented to the governing 
body at a later date for discussion and approval. The chair of governors of University of 
Waterloo, Mr. Carrington affirms this approach in his account thus: 
"The governing body sets the strategy... and the way we do that is that the 
Council actually has a special ordained meeting usually once every 3 
years to debate strategy and form a view. And then the executive 
officers of the university write the proposed strategy document in the 
light of the discussion that's taken place at the meeting, and they bring 
that back to Council for approval and then there may be a few more 
iterations. " 
Mr. Carrington further recounts that the special meeting is "the key event that focuses the 
strategy". 
If the views and decisions of the university governors arc not incorporated in the 
proposed strategy document, then there is the possibility that it may be rejected when it is 
re-presented by the executive to the governing body for formal approval. The approval of 
the strategic proposal developed by the executive which incorporates the earlier views of 
the governors means that the governing body is involved in 'taking strategic decisions' as 
explained in the McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) model. 
The above perspective on the proactive-active approach to strategy was re-affirmed by a 
lay governor from Liberty Trust University, Mr Lander when he said: 
"So the (governing) board brings together the non-executive members and 
the executive members in producing a strategy... Once we've agreed a 
piece of strategic intent, the executive members through a series of papers 
will come to the (governing) board over time and say: in line with our 
decision around that strategic intent this is the activity we are putting in 
place and these are the results we should see as a result of it " 
The proactive-active approach to strategy was confirmed during my observation of a 
meeting of the governing body of University of St. Pancras, Scotland, Post-1992 when an 
existing campus development strategy document was presented to the whole governing 
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body for revision and update by the chair of governors. The observation notes taken at 
that meeting read thus: "A campus development strategy document was presented for 
discussion and approval... The discussion was a brainstorming and problem-solving 
session... A total of 27 contributions were made by the governors before the discussions 
were concluded on the issue... The vice chancellor was requested to review the document 
in the light of the discussions and to re-present it for further discussion and approval in a 
subsequent meeting. The governing body spent one hour and fifteen minutes discussing 
the strategy document" (Observation Notes). Debating the strategy document of this 
nature afforded the lay governors the opportunity to participate in the discussions and 
contributed to shaping the contents of the document by using their knowledge, skills and 
experience, thereby `shaping the content of strategy' of the institutions concerning the 
campus development strategy. The specially convened strategy meetings of the governing 
bodies may have created the opportunity and forum where both governors and executives 
are encouraged to think strategically and to ensure strategies are deliberately formulated 
and implemented. These actions of the governing bodies appear to define the framework 
for the strategy process to take place in the universities, thereby `shaping the context and 
conduct of strategy'. 
The accounts of the respondents also revealed the procedure adopted for monitoring the 
implementation and achievement of the strategies of the institutions. The chair of 
governors of the University of 
Waterloo, Mr. Carrington commented on the procedure 
and the accountability of the executive 
for the achievement of the strategic objectives 
which are also all aspects of `shaping conduct of strategy' as 
follows: 
"... the (monitoring) process is to make plans and then receive reports of 
the actual results and compare them with plans... 
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In the meeting of the governing body of University of St. Pancras mentioned above, a lay 
governor also raised the issue of risk which was not addressed in the strategy document 
that was presented to them for discussion and this appears to be one example of the way 
in which they `shape content of strategy' through scrutinising the strategic document. A 
part of the observation note taken at the meeting reads thus: 
"Chair requested members to present their views on the issues raised in 
the strategy document ... a member observed the absence of risk analysis in 
the strategy document ... A Strategy Review Working Group is also in place 
to monitor the performance of all aspects of the strategy document " 
(Observation Notes) 
The approach to strategy adopted by the governing bodies of these universities appears to 
be proactive-active and usually collaborative and consensus-driven between the 
governing body, the executives and the senate (academic board in Post-1992 institutions). 
The approach enables the involvement of university governors in all the three levels of 
participation in strategy as revealed in the McNulty and Pcttigrcw's (1999) model such as 
`taking strategic decisions', `shaping strategic decisions' and 'shaping the context, 
conduct and content of strategy'. 
The actions of the university governing bodies arc in accordance with the advocacy of an 
active board participation in strategy (Dcmb and Neubauer, 1992; Hendry and Kiel 
(2004); Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996); Golden and Zajac, 2001; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999; Jarratt, 1985; Tricker, 1984). The proactive-active approach to strategy 
adopted by the governing bodies is consistent with the findings of Stiles and Taylor 
(2001), Hendry and Kiel (2004) and McNulty and Pettigrew's (1999) that boards 
generally collaboratively formulate strategy with the executive management and that it is 
the responsibility of the executives to develop the strategies. This finding also 
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corroborates the observation of Judge and Zeithaml (1992) in their study that boards, 
which are highly involved and active in strategy do have members who collaborate with 
executives to determine and develop the strategic direction of their organisations. 
The proactive approach to strategy by these governing bodies is also consistent with the 
recommendations of the higher education reform report of Jarratt (1985) that requires 
university governing bodies to play a more active role in determining the strategies of 
their institutions. 
The adoption of the proactive-active approach to strategy by all three Scottish universities 
in this study, which enables everyone to participate fully in the strategy process, might 
not be unconnected with the Scottish cultural values that encourage what Harrison (1997) 
described as `participatory and consensual' and Patterson (2003) as a `collectivism and 
partnership' approach to group activities by Scots. 
This proactive approach enables members of governing bodies to use their knowledge and 
experience to add value to the important decisions of the universities. However the 
contribution of lay governors in the strategy process is likely to be limited to the non- 
academic areas of strategy in view of their insufficient knowledge of the core strategic 
activities of universities, which are teaching and research. 
Five out of the seven university governing bodies represented in this study adopted the 
proactive-active approach to strategy, which appears to be evidence of the gradual 
institutionalisation of discourse and practice of strategy by university governing bodies in 
this study (Bargh et al, 1996; Jarzabkowski, 2005), which appears to result from coercive 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) from government, the higher education funding 
councils, CUC (2004) and the recommendations of the Jarratt Report (1985). 
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The next session deals with the university governors' perception of how their govcming 
bodies engage with the process of risk governance and management in their various 
institutions. Universities develop strategies to enable them to accomplish certain strategic 
goals and there are risks associated with the strategies that could hamper the realisation of 
these goals if they are not determined and managed properly 
8.2.0 Governors Perceptions and Approach to Risk Governance 
When the respondents were asked about their perceptions of risk assessment and 
management in their universities, their responses did not vary considerably across the 
individual governors and across the case study institutions. The respondents perceived 
risk as an important aspect of the organisation of the universities which needs to be given 
due consideration. They were also of the view that a system of identifying the various 
risks confronting the institutions and assessing their impact should be put in place in 
order to mitigate their negative effects on the institutions. They also consider risk 
assessment as an aspect of a good governance and management practice. The perception 
of the chair of governors of University of Waterloo, England (Pre-1992), Mr. Carrington 
captures some aspects of this perspective on risk assessment this way. 
"Risk assessment is part of good governance which Includes having a 
system for identifying and assessing the risks that you are exposed to and 
considering whether you can take mitigating action to guard against those 
risks ". 
A lay governor of University of Stokefield perceives risk assessment thus: 
So I mean we should identify and manage the risk we face and that's 
why I believe there should be a sort of no surprises culture" 
Perceiving risk as a phenomenon that can be identified and managed appears to indicate 
that the respondents have a technocratic perspective (realist view) about risk in their 
226 
various universities. Identifying risks as recounted by the respondents seems to suggest 
that risk is a phenomenon that exists in nature and assessing it appears to indicate that it 
can be `measured and controlled' using some rational or technical means (Lupton, 1999, 
p. 9). The accounts of the respondents are consistent with those of The Royal Society 
(1992) in their report on risk (cited by Lupton, 1999), which stated that there is a variety 
of `objective risks' which can exist in any situation and which people and groups respond 
to accordingly. 
The technocratic disposition of the respondents to risk is not surprising since the majority 
of them have industry or business backgrounds and experience where the identification 
and the management of risks and uncertainties are key governance and management 
activities. The respondents appear to draw on their background characteristics and 
industry risk experiences to shape their technical perception of risk and to deal with 
issues concerning risk and uncertainties in their governance activities (Lash and Urry, 
1994; Smallman and Smith, 2003). 
The accounts of the respondents also indicate that they take mitigating actions against the 
identified risk which seems to show that risk is perceived as a negative phenomenon that 
needs to be overcome. Treating risk in this manner might suggest that the respondents 
have a risk-averse behaviour which would mean avoiding as many risks as they can in'the 
course of governing the business of the university . Their risk-averse behaviour is also 
consistent with the `no surprises culture' mentioned by one of the respondents. However, 
this does not mean that governors are necessarily risk-averse. Most of them take diverse 
risks in their active employment 
in industry and business since risk-taking offers some 
competitive advantage to 
individuals and organisations in business. This risk-averse 
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attitude of the lay governors could also be related to the requirements of government for 
control and accountability (Newman, 2000), which appears to inhibit risk-taking 
behaviour by officials of public institutions. Their conservative approach to risk in the 
universities they govern can also be attributed to government's directives to institutions 
through the funding councils that the diverse risks the institutions face should be 
identified, assessed and managed in order to avoid financial losses as they attempt to 
achieve their strategic goals. The governing bodies therefore seem to favour a situation 
where the executives of the institutions would engage fully with the identification, 
assessment and control of risk in their approach to managing the strategic risks of the 
institutions (Lupton, 1999). Beck (1992) had pointed out that human society has 
progressively tried to eliminate risk but that some risks cannot be controlled. So both the 
governors and the executive are looking for risk they can control using a technical means, 
but there are a whole lot of risks that cannot be controlled and which can affect the 
universities adversely. For example, the universities were unable to identify and control 
the outbreak of the SARS epidemic in Asian countries that affected the recruitment of 
foreign students from that region of the world, which impinged on their source of 
revenue. This appears to reveal the weakness of their adoption of a technical approach to 
risk to the exclusion of other approaches that might improve the effectiveness of the risk 
management practice. 
The perceptions of the respondents that the governance and management of risk is good 
organisational practice are consistent with the recommendations of CUC (2004) and 
HEFCE (2005) that university governing bodies should ensure that there is a system of 
risk assessment, management and governance in the institutions. It could also be an 
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attempt by the university governing bodies to deal with the various risk associated with 
the numerous governance and management changes that are taking place in their 
universities. Risk management seems to have been adopted by public institutions as well 
as universities in line with the modernisation agenda of the New Labour government 
aimed at ensuring economy, effectiveness and efficiency in public and social service 
delivery. 
8.2.1 Role of the Governing Body in Institutional Risk Management 
The respondents were asked what they perceived to be the main role of their university 
governing bodies in the management of risk in their respective institutions. Most of the 
respondents perceive their governing bodies as mainly governing risk through their 
respective audit committees. The audit committees submit reports to the university 
governing bodies on the various risks confronting the institutions and how these risks are 
being controlled or mitigated by the executive of the institutions. The part played by the 
main governing body according to the respondents is to ensure and receive assurance 
from the audit committees that the various risks facing the universities have been 
identified and managed effectively by the executive. A lay governor of University of 
Stokefield, Scotland (Pre-1992), Mr. Silberston represents the views of the other 
respondents when he said: 
"Well most of the risk aspect gets looked at by the audit committee ... and 
then they report to governing body on the basis of risk and their risk 
schedules. But obviously we (governing body) need to be satisfied that 
the university is looking at its risks and managing and mitigating them 
" properly """ 
The use of audit committees by university governing bodies to govern (oversee) risk was 
recommended by the higher education 
funding councils and the CUC (2004) governance 
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guide. However, audit committees do more than just govern risks since they also examine 
the finances of the universities, ensure the effectiveness of the financial control systems, 
establish a system of whistlcblowing, review the system of internal audit, assess the 
performance of the external auditors as well as review the statement of corporate 
governance of the institution. 
However, in some universities, it is the strategy committee that performs this function on 
behalf of the university governing body. A lay governor of Ashgrovc University, England 
(post-1992) Mr. Francis represents this view in his account thus: 
"... We (governing body) govern risk through the Strategy Committee and 
through other committees as well, but it's quite important that when a 
project is put in front of us we understand the degree of risk there is with 
that project ". 
The use of the strategy committee to govern risk on behalf of the governing body appears 
to be unusual as strategy represents the future whilst audit deals with the past and present. 
The evidence from the case study institutions showed that while the university governing 
bodies in England utilise their audit committees to govern risk their counterparts in 
Scotland use other committees for the same purpose. It is difficult to explain this 
difference in practice between the two country cases. 
In confirming the part played by risk reports in enabling the governing body monitor the 
risks and system of risk management in the institutions, a chair of governors of Liberty 
Trust University, England (post-1992) Mr. Barry represented the majority views of the 
respondents thus: 
"... we (governing body) will want regular reports on it so that we know 
the extent to which the risk is either materialising or is in fact under 
control... We want to be in a position where we are getting regular 
reports and if something is going wrong... what we don't like is a silence 
for a long time and then suddenly you fall off the edge of the precipice " 
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During the observation of the meetings of five of the university governing bodies, risk 
reports were presented for discussion by either the risk committees or the vice 
chancellors. When these reports were presented, the governors discussed those risks that 
were considered high level risks and they asked the vice chancellor how these risks are 
being mitigated. They mainly commented on financial risks and some other issues that 
are connected with the non-academic areas of the institutions. They sometimes offered 
suggestions on how such risks can be mitigated, based on their previous experiences of 
dealing with such situations and this appears to indicate further that they are mostly 
concerned with risks they can control. They rarely commented on the risks associated 
with the academic areas of the university. This seems to suggest their limited knowledge 
of risks associated with academic issues and which may be one weakness in their attempt 
at governing the institutions effectively. 
It seems risk communication through risk reports is a monitoring and controlling 
mechanism adopted by the governing bodies to oversee the activities of the executive and 
the institution. 
8.2.2 Linking Risks Confronting the University with Strategy 
The evidence in this study based on the observation of meetings of five university 
governing bodies indicates that governors discuss the risks that are linked with the 
strategies of the institutions. It was observed that they discussed risks connected with 
strategies for the recruitment of 
international students as a source of funding, funding of 
the university pension scheme, the security of students, financial management and 
industrial disputes. A discussion with the chair of governors of Liberty Trust University, 
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England, Post-1992, Mr. Barry after a meeting of the governing body affirms this 
observation in his account thus: 
"We have risks associated to all aspects of our strategic plan. So we have 
a comprehensive schedule and what was talked about at the meeting today 
as you are aware was linking that risk with the performance indicators. So 
somebody was saying that the performance indicators are flashing red, 
red alert on one particular item and what was being discussed today is 
that that item currently isn't linked to our risk register. 
Linking risk with strategy in this manner accords with the recommendations of CUC 
(2004) and HEFCE (2005) and is also consistent with the views of Stokes (2004) that the 
determination of the risks associated with the areas of strategic focus of the institution 
helps to direct attention to the significant threats to realisation of organisational 
objectives. In this regard, risk governance can be viewed as a part of the strategy role of 
the university governing bodies in this study. 
Two respondents also expressed the view that the whole practice of risk governance and 
management is a new phenomenon in UK universities which started a few years ago 
based on the recommendations of the Turnbull Report (1999) and which the higher 
education funding councils have adopted in producing a separate risk guide for 
universities. The chair of governors of University of Waterloo, England. (Prc-1992) 
recounts as follows: 
"So but there have been various bodies that have recently looked at 
governance practice in companies and have made recommendations for 
change....... recommendations about the duties of directors. And a very 
important aspect of it (duties of Directors) has been risk assessment that 
as good governance includes having a system for assessing the risks that 
you are exposed to and considering whether you can take mitigating 
action to guard against those risks... And companies are expected to report 
that they do have such a system and that the board of directors controls it 
and supervises it, and universities are now expected to do the same thing. 
The higher education funding council has told universities that it expects 
them to follow that kind of pract ice " 
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Peters (2005) argues that a risk management framework is being adopted by the UK 
government as a form of social regulation to effect compliance of educational institutions 
with the educational policies and goals of the state and which appears to be consistent 
with the thesis of Hood et al (1999) that describe the UK as a regulatory state. The 
imposition of risk codes by the funding councils and their subsequent adoption by 
university governing bodies could foreclose the use of any other approach to risk 
management in these institutions. 
8.2.3 Perceived Risk Confronting Universities 
The respondents were asked their own perceptions of the types of risks confronting their 
universities. They recounted that the following risks were perceived to be high on the risk 
profile or register of their institutions. These risk factors were perceived to occupy the 
attention and discussions of the university governors and their governing bodies. The 
identified risks are shortfall in revenue, change in government policy, low international 
student recruitment, poor quality of human resources, breakdown in technology, reduced 
quality of courses, poor development of the estate, ineffective safety and security 
measures, inadequate implementation of strategic and business plans and poor reputation 
of the university. The account of the chair of governors of Liberty Trust University, 
England, Mr. Barry represents most of the views of the respondents thus: 
"For example, there is risk associated with government changing its 
Policy ... shortfall 
in international students recruitment... so we have risks 
associated to attracting the right kind of students... the right quality of 
courses and changes in courses; sources of revenue right down to 
operational control matters; getting the right estate strategy ... You know 
we have risks associated to all aspects of our plan. 
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Another respondent, a lay governor of University of Gangeshirc, Scotland, Mr. Maclarcn 
perceives other significant risks facing the university to be breakdown of technology and 
poor and inadequate human resources thus: 
"To pick an example of risk is technology. It's very important that there 
isn't a breakdown of the technology that allows the university to function 
on a day to day basis... And the biggest risk that we run as a university 
which sort of covers all the other risks is that we don't have the right 
people in the right places ". 
All the perceived risk associated with the activities of the universities by the respondents 
were similar to those mentioned in the HEFCE (2005) guide on risk management practice 
in higher education institutions in the UK as well as those listed by Cassidy ct al (2003) 
for US universities. The areas of risks identified in these documents include strategic, 
financial, operational, compliance, teaching and rcputational risks. The similarity 
between the UK and the US list of higher education risk factors is not surprising because 
both lists were generated in conjunction with PriceWaterhouse Coopers albeit at different 
times and locations. The HEFCE list of risks has the potential to bias the type of risk 
identified by the various universities as confronting them. This may explain why the risks 
identified by the universities represented in this study arc similar to those compiled by 
HEFCE. The list of risks identified by the executive of the institutions may in the same 
manner preclude the university governors from detecting other risks which may affect the 
institutions. 
There is no evidence from the study to suggest that the seven university governing bodies 
assess the various risks associated with their own governance activities which could 
enable them mitigate the potential for mis-governance. They rather seem to focus their 
attention on managerial risks. 
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8.3.0 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I examined the perceptions and participation of university governors in 
strategy and risk governance processes. The determination of strategy is intertwined with 
determining and managing the risks associated with them to ensure the successful 
realisation of the purpose of the universities. The findings concerning the strategy role of 
university governing bodies in this study seem to indicate that while 2 out of 7 
universities adopted an executive-driven reactive-passive approach to strategy, five 
institutions embrace a collaborative and consensus-driven proactive-active approach to 
strategy involving the governing bodies, executives and academics. While it also appears 
the proactive-active approach affords a greater number of lay governors and the entire 
governing body the opportunity to actively contribute to the strategic decisions of their 
universities in the strategy process, the participation in strategy in two governing bodies 
is constrained by the adoption of a reactive-passive approach to strategy. The 
establishment of a strategy committee to take charge of strategy issues on behalf of the 
governing bodies of their universities also limit the participation of lay governors in 
strategy process. The case studies seem to indicate that while two English universities out 
of 4 adopted the reactive-passive approach all the three Scottish institutions opted for a 
proactive-active approach. But there was no noticeable difference between Pre-1992 and 
Post-1992 universities in terms of the approach their governing bodies adopted to conduct 
strategy. 
However, university governors, whose participation in strategy are constrained by the 
reactive-passive approach of their governing 
bodies and the establishment of a strategy 
committee, express a strong 
desire to be actively involved in the determination of the 
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strategies of their institutions, since they think they possess some relevant expertise and 
experience to do so. This appears to indicate that there is a potential for them to become 
proactive and engage fully with the strategy process in the future. 
The apparent high level of involvement of most of the university governors and their 
governing bodies in the strategy process in this study may be an indication that they are 
becoming more active and assertive in directing and controlling the future of their 
institutions thereby breaking the dominance of executive management over the strategic 
decision making in the universities. This also challenges the assumptions of the 
managerial hegemony perspective in the strategy process. It also showed that the 
stewardship theory perspective which advocates collaboration between board and 
management in strategy and board human resource as an organisational resource for 
determining the strategies of the institutions could be used to explain this aspect of the 
governance activities of the university governing bodies. 
The foregoing findings on the strategy role of university governing bodies appears to 
indicate a shift in the governance role of university governing bodies from a purely 
traditional monitoring role to a more performance-oriented strategy role to enable them 
to meet the challenges imposed on the institutions by their external environment. That the 
majority of university governing bodies represented in this study adopted the proactivc- 
active approach to strategy appears to be an evidence of the gradual institutionalisation of 
discourse and practice of strategy by university governing bodies in this study. 
The study also seems to affirm the relevance of the theoretical model proposed by 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1991) for the study of board members participation in strategy 
and as a good instrument for the explanation and understanding of the strategy role of 
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university governing bodies in the UK in the absence of any overarching theory of the 
strategy role of these bodies. 
In this chapter, I also explored the perceptions of university governors. concerning risk 
assessment in their institutions and the role of their governing bodies in the governance 
and management of the diverse risks confronting their institutions. The evidence from 
this study seems to suggest that the university governors perceived risk from a 
technocratic perspective since they viewed risk as a phenomenon that should be identified 
and mitigated in their universities. The governors view risk assessment in their 
universities as good governance and management practice. The realist view of risk 
adopted by the lay governors is not surprising considering their background 
characteristics as persons who are mostly senior managers, executives and non- 
executives in industry and business where the discourse and practice of risk management 
is along the technocratic line of thinking and where their operating business environment 
favours such an approach to dealing with risks. 
Evidence from the case studies indicated that while the university governing bodies in 
England use their audit committees to governance risk, their counterparts from Scotland 
utilise some other committees. The evidence 
from the study seems to indicate that the lay 
governors are risk-averse in the universities, which appears to be in conflict with their 
risk-taking attitude in their areas of primary employment in business and industry. This 
could be as a result of adopting a risk management framework imposed on them by their 
funding councils that appears to be risk-averse and also regulatory. 
The evidence from the study also reveals that university governors perceived financial, 
operational, compliance, reputational and teaching risks as confronting their institutions. 
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These risks seem to be those that can easily be identified and controlled by the 
universities. But there are other risks that could affect the institutions which cannot be 
identified and controlled. The identified risks were also linked with the strategies of the 
institutions. 
It was observed from the study that the seven university governing bodies adopted the 
risk management guides proposed by HEFCE (2003) for their practice of risk governance 
and management in the institutions, which appears to be a governmental strategy for 
regulating the activities of universities to conform to and accomplish the purpose of 
government. The accounts of the respondents reveal that the practice of risk governance 
and management is a new phenomenon in the organisation of higher education 
institutions in the UK. This appears to be one aspect of the change of culture that UK 
universities are currently experiencing as a result of the general public institutional 
reforms initiated by the New Labour government in the UK to ensure financial 
allocations to institutions are used in accordance with government goals without 
incurring losses. The findings on the risk governance role and practices of the seven 
university governing bodies in this study have contributed to knowledge of risk 
governance activities of university governing bodies in the UK. 
In the next chapter, I present the empirical findings on the accountability of the university 
governors and their governing bodies as well as how the effectiveness of their 
governance practices and performances are perceived and reviewed. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
UNIVERSITY GOVERNORS' ACCOUNT OF ACCOUNTABILITYAND 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
9.0.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to obtain some insights into how university governors and 
their governing bodies perceive, engage with and attach meaning to the concepts of 
accountability and performance reviews of their activities, which have recently acquired 
many diverse meanings and interpretations within the context of university governance. 
The accountability of university governors and their governing bodies were explored 
through the following questions: To whom (if anyone) are university governors 
accountable? To whom (if any) do they feel accountable? What kind (if any) of 
accountability mechanisms exist for governing bodies? 
I also examined the perception of university governors' ideas about the effectiveness of 
their own governing bodies and explored how governors engage with reviewing the 
effectiveness of these bodies as recommended in the Dearing Report (1997), by a CUC 
(2004) governance code and by the UK Government's agenda for the governance of 
public institutions. 
The issue of accountability and performance of university governors and their governing 
bodies are explored in this chapter because both concepts appear interlinked with each 
other. Cadbury (2000) and Holland 
(2002) contend that both accountability and 
performance are important 
issues for any governing board of a corporate firm and that 
these boards need to be accountable for their own performance and that of the 
organisation to their various stakeholders. 
Ramson (1986) asserts that the evaluation of 
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performance is also an integral aspect of accountability. Accountability therefore appears 
to enhance performance and vice versa. 
9.1.0 University Governors' Perceptions of their Accountability 
In this section of the chapter, I explored the accountability of university governors and 
their governing bodies through interviews and analysis of documents. The university 
governors were asked to whom are they accountable and to whom do they feel 
accountable? The respondents perceived and conceived of their accountability and that of 
their governing bodies in various ways which arc enumerated below. 
1. Accountable to Government through Governmental Bodies: Most (20 out of 27) of 
the respondents perceive their governing bodies arc accountable bodies and do account to 
the higher education funding councils and by extension the UK government for the 
efficient use of public funds allocated to them for the effective governance and 
management of the institutions. They perceived the funding councils as the authoritative 
bodies to whom they relate with formally. An ex-officio member of the governing body 
of University of West Albion, Scotland (Pre-1992), Prof. Kay expresses this view as 
follows: 
"Council members are accountable to the Funding Council and to 
Government... But essentially Council is accountable to Government 
largely through the Funding Council" 
Their perception of the governing bodies' relationship with government through the 
higher education funding councils is not surprising because they allocate a substantial 
amount of research and teaching funds to universities using some funding formulae and 
the institutions are expected to account to these bodies for the utilisation of such funds. 
This type of accountability relationship is advocated by the UK government in its higher 
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education reforms policy where it wants to know how universities are spending the 
monies allocated to them to achieve its social policies for education and the economy and 
to make them comply with its accountability requirements and standards. 
The governors also mentioned that the funding councils, Public Accounts Committee and 
the National Audit Office (NAO) could also call the governing body to give information 
on the accounts and the operations of the institutions if deemed necessary. Although the 
giving of information may not necessarily constitute accountability, it can enhance it 
(Mulgan, 2000). The financial memorandum issued by the respective funding councils, 
which accompanies the allocation of funds to UK universities, demands that the 
institutions should report on how they complied with the directives on the use of the 
funds in order to ensure continuous funding. The chair of governors of University of St. 
Pancras, Scotland (Post-1992), Prof. Roberts expressed this calling to account thus: 
"The Scottish funding council has a document called the financial 
memorandum... It's a kind of document of understanding and they hold 
us, us being Court responsible for ensuring that the money they provide 
the university to run it is properly used" 
The financial memorandum serves as a means of holding the universities to account 
annually. These bodies also have the power of sanction over the governing bodies and the 
universities if they renege of their accountability role. Officially the NAO are the 
government auditors that have the 
legal right to audit any public institution that receives 
financial allocation from government. 
Cognisant of the autonomy of universities and their governing bodies in the UK, a lay 
governor of University of Waterloo, 
England, (Pre-1992), Mrs Thomas think that 
governing bodies are held to account 
by government only if there is a major problem in 
the institution. 
241 
We are in a sense ... it's quite 
frightening... held responsible if things go 
wrong. Well I think they (government) only step in when something is 
going wrong. Don't they? That's the norm. Isn't it... as soon as things go 
wrong they want to know why you're doing something wrong " 
This respondent did not elaborate on the type of problems that may warrant government 
calling the university governing body to account. However, she may be referring to such 
previous cases of financial crises as occurred University of Wales College, Cardiff in 
1986-87 (Williams, 2006) and the University of Lancaster in the mid 1990s (Deem, 1998; 
Rowe, 1997) and also the instances of management and governance malpractices as 
occurred in the universities of Portsmouth, Glasgow Caledonia and Thames Valley 
(Rowe, 1997, Shattock, 2003; Warner and Palfreyman, 2003) which caused government 
to call the institutions to account for such failures in order to remedy the situations. This 
type of accountability is of a principal-agent relationship, which is given support by the 
agency theory perspective on corporate governance, where the UK government in this 
case acts as the principal and the university governing bodies as its agents or stewards. 
The principal calls or holds the agent to account for its stewardship and performance of a 
public institution. 
2. Accountability to Stakeholder Groups: Apart from being accountable to government 
through the funding councils, about half the number of respondents perceived the 
university governing bodies are also accountable to some stakeholders of the institutions 
such as the staff, students, local community, research sponsors but expressed the 
difficulty involved in trying to account to a whole range of stakeholder groups that have 
different expectations for the university. The chair of University of St. Pancras, Scotland, 
(Post-1992), Professor Roberts said: 
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"There is a whole number of people we are accountable to and I mean 
the students themselves, staff, local authorities, the economic 
development agencies. It goes on and on and on. So we have a whole lot 
of stakeholders, and it's very difficult to try and ensure that they're all 
informed" 
Such multiple accountabilities have been observed to exists in both governmental and 
non-governmental organisations and have resulted in problems of accountability for these 
institutions (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Romzek and Dubnik, 1987; Romzek, 2000). The 
difficulty of accounting to multiple stakeholder groups has been identified as one of the 
weaknesses of the stakeholder theory of boards of organisations and that stakeholder 
accountability, though desirable, is difficult to operationalise. Rather what organisations 
do is to seek ways to manage stakeholders' interests during decision-making at board 
meetings and during the entire governance processes (Clarke, 2004; Belal, 2002; Stiles 
and Taylor, 2001). Stakeholder accountability is assumed to be one of the ways by which 
organisations can assure their various stakeholders that their interests are adequately 
protected in order to earn their trust and legitimacy for the organisation. In as much as 
about 50% of respondents perceived that their university governing bodies are 
accountable to stakeholders, they did not mention specifically how this accountability is 
practised in reality. This may be as a result of the sometimes abstract nature of 
accountability. 
3. Self Accountability: Only three respondents think that the university governing bodies 
are not accountable to any formally constituted higher authority or any stakeholder 
groups other than to itself. These three university governors are of the view that 
university governing bodies are the ultimate authority and decision making bodies in the 
universities and are therefore not accountable to anyone. They cite the law establishing 
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the institutions as giving the governing bodies the final say in all things that pertain to the 
universities and do not specify any particular stakeholder group(s) to which they are 
accountable. It appears accountability is interpreted to mean that the university governor 
and their governing bodies are capable of directing their actions to achieve the purpose of 
governance and the universities to which they voluntarily accepted to accomplish in their 
role as governors. A lay governor of Ashgrove University, England (Post-1992), Mr 
Matthew perceives this legal independence and autonomy of the universities and 
governing bodies in relation to their accountability as follows: 
"To whom is Council accountable? Well I think it's accountable to itself 
in the sense that at the end of the day some of the decisions made, the 
buck stops with us so in that formal way we're not accountable to 
anybody else, we are the last point within this process... We have a 
Charters and articles of government or statutes. -from the 
Charter it 
seems to me we run ourselves" 
This particular view of these respondents is not surprising because apart from the various 
legal instruments of incorporation of the universities, even the CUC (2004) corporate 
governance framework did not stipulate to whom the governing bodies arc accountable. It 
only specified that universities arc "accountable through a governing body which carries 
ultimate responsibility for all aspect of the institution" (p. 37). Two of the respondents 
referred to this type of self-accountability as moral accountability. Mr. Matthew, lay 
governor of Ashgrove University, England (Post-1992) expressed this moral 
accountability thus: 
"I mean you could argue couldn't you that there is a kind of moral 
accountability towards the students and the staff and the university body 
as a whole" 
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A staff governor of Liberty Trust University, England (Post-1992), Mr. Atkinson 
buttressed this point further by saying that the governing body is not legally bound to 
account to any stakeholder groups: 
"In terms of actually demonstrating accountability to the diverse 
stakeholders, 1 guess the governing body can probably be as 
accountable as it wishes to be if I am being honest. You know it is not 
required to report to those stakeholder groups " 
This moral accountability perspective of the governors is consistent with the views of 
Baird (1997), Mulgan (2000), Carver (2006) and Sinclair (2006) that board members 
could take responsible action based on their inner moral and ethical values to ensure they 
achieve the purpose of the organisation in line with the expectations of the stakeholders. 
However, the respondents did not mention how this moral accountability is demonstrated 
in practice. Based on Kogan's(1986) description of responsibility, it can be implied that 
moral accountability as perceived by these three respondents is actually a fiduciary 
responsibility on the part of the university governors and their governing bodies to act 
always in the best interest of all stakeholders and the society which they claim to 
represent (even though they are not formally elected) without formally being accountable 
to them directly. This appears to mean that there is no formal accountability relationship 
on the part of the university governing 
bodies with their identified stakeholder groups, 
because they are not legally bound to account to them. The stakeholder groups also 
appear not to possess any formal authority or power or any legal right to call or hold the 
university governing bodies to account unlike the case of the funding councils that can 
use the threat of withdrawal of continuous 
funding as a means of enforcing 
accountability. The chair of governors of 
University of St. Pancras, Scotland (post-1992) 
represents this view thus: 
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"In theory yes but in practice no. I mean I don't know what our 
stakeholders would do if they thought we were doing a bad job. It's not 
like a private company where the shareholders can cause a change in 
management...! don't think the formal process is there for them to do 
that, if we're not. Our stakeholders in general don't really have the 
authority to do that... " 
The views expressed by the respondents show the inability of stakeholders to call 
university governing bodies to account which accords with Stewart's (1984) model of 
accountability that stakeholders may not possess the authority to hold an accountable 
body to account and even the power to sanction them. 
However, Stiles and Taylor (2001) contend that boards arc not accountable to 
stakeholders. Clarke (1994) also argued that the concept of stakeholder accountability is 
not practicable and that it is just a public relations device. Shattock (1998) had also 
observed that the 1992 Education Reform Act appears to be unsuitable for the purpose of 
public accountability. He observed further that the Act makes governing bodies to 
assume they are accountable but in practice they do not account to any constituency. A 
number of reasons can be advanced for this seeming lack of accountability of these 
university governing bodies to stakeholder groups. Firstly, this may be as a result of the 
lack of authority on the part of the identified stakeholder groups to enforce the 
accountability of the university governing bodies. Secondly, the chairs of university 
governing bodies and their lay governors who constitute a majority on the governing 
bodies also do not seem to represent any defined stakeholder group and therefore have no 
obligation to account to any constituency of interests internal or external to the university. 
Thirdly, the law establishing the universities appears not to specify an accountability 
relationship between the governing bodies and any stakeholder groups, and therefore, 
does not make it legal for them to be accountable to these groups. 
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4. The Executive is the Accountable Body: In spite of the previously expressed 
conceptions of accountability of the university governing bodies, three other respondents 
argued that it is the vice chancellor that is actually accountable and not the governing 
body. The respondents perceived the vice chancellor as the officially designated 
accountable officer of the university that reports the activities of the university to any 
recognised group with an interest in the affairs of the institutions. They are of the view 
that the governing body does not account for the management of the institutions to any 
external or internal bodies. A lay governor of University of St. Pancras, Scotland (Post- 
1992), Mr. Silberston represented this position in his account thus: 
"Well we (governing body) don't report to them (funding council). The 
Principal reports presumably to the funding council. There are reports 
that go off to the funding council saying what we're doing... " 
Furthermore, a lay governor of University of West Albion, England (Pre-1992), Mr. 
Tyler also argued strongly in support of the above views thus: 
"No-one, full stop, no-one ... 
Let's do the arguments. If the university were 
to find itself with a big systems failure ... the person who is accountable to 
the Government and to Parliament formally speaking, to Public Accounts 
Committee is the Vice Chancellor. The Vice Chancellor carries the lead 
burden of accountability for the delivery of the university, not just to the 
governing body but also to the funding council, not just the funding 
council but the other funders and to all. Vice Chancellors are formally 
appointed as accountable to Parliament... Alongside that, any other 
allegations of accountability are sort of shadowy. Think about it ". 
In the event of a "systems failure", as expressed by Mr. Tyler, which could result from 
misuse of funds allocated to the university or general maladministration as had occurred 
in some post-1992 institutions in the past, it is the vice chancellors and not the governing 
bodies that resigned. The previous working relationship of Mr. Tyler with universities 
and the higher education funding council appears to present him with a broader 
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perspective of the accountability and reporting relationship between UK universities and 
all formal and informal groups. The perceptions and the arguments put forward by these 
two lay governors appear to correspond with the official position about the accountability 
relationship between universities and all other stakeholders of the institutions including 
the higher education funding councils for England and Scotland. The CUC (2004) 
governance framework for university governing bodies in UK also stipulates clearly that 
the vice chancellor is the accountable officer of the university and that the role of the 
university governing body in the accountability process is limited to "receiving and 
approving the annual accounts (audited financial statements) " (p. 18) and to also hold the 
management of the university to account. Even the Financial Memorandum issued by the 
higher education funding councils of England and Scotland stipulates that the vice 
chancellor is the accounting and accountable officer in terms of the finances and effective 
management of the institutions. Both the interview accounts of the two respondents and 
documentary evidence suggest that the university governing bodies arc not in reality the 
accountable bodies, but the vice chancellors are the accounting and accountable officers 
of their institutions. 
Another interpretation and . 
dimension of accountability which data from the study 
suggests is that the governing body is legally required to call the vice chancellor to 
account for the finances and the overall management of the institution. This particular 
function of calling the executive to account by the governing body can also be delegated 
to its Audit Committee who scrutinises and evaluates various accountability and 
monitoring reports and forms an opinion about them. They then make their 
recommendations to the governing body for consideration and approval. The Audit 
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Committee by statute is a committee of the governing body usually composed of majority 
of lay governors and chaired by a lay governor with experience in finance matters. A lay 
governor of University of Waterloo, England (Pre-1992), Mr. Dickson perceives this 
particular accountability role of the governing body of holding the vice chancellor to 
account for the general performance of the institution thus: 
"It is our (governing body) function to see that the university conducts its 
business in a proper manner, and if necessary to express ourselves as to 
how that is being done if we're not happy with it... I mean particularly if 
I think of the work of the Audit Committee... I think it's demanding on the 
people on it and it's also demanding on those that come before it 
including Vice Chancellors. Everyone can be called in to report to us on 
how and why they're doing what they're doing. Now that is a very good 
way of checking what is happening in the university and of course that 
committee reports to Council" 
This finding is consistent with those of Deem et al (1995) and Levacic (1995) when they 
observed that schools governing bodies do not particularly perform any major 
accountability role in their institutions. 
The accountability of the vice chancellor to the university governing body, as revealed in 
this study is an internal upward and hierarchical process, which is consistent with 
Kogan's (1986) and Baird's (1997) managerial accountability model. It is also consistent 
with the agency theory and Stewart's (1986) accountability perspectives, which requires 
the vice chancellors as the agent or accountable body to render account to the governing 
body and the funding councils on how the funds allocated to the university have been 
utilised to achieve the strategic goals of the 
institution. Holland (2002) in their study of 
board accountability found that boards are not accountable and that it is the responsibility 
of the CEO to convey the 
decision to the stakeholders. 
249 
9.2.0 Mechanism of Accountability 
The mechanisms of accountability are the means through which universities render 
account to the funding councils, stakeholders and the public at large. During the 
interviews, the respondents were asked what mechanisms of accountability exist for the 
university governing bodies. 
The respondents mentioned the university annual report which is forwarded to them by 
the vice chancellor. The annual report is a document containing the chair of governor's 
report, the vice chancellor's report, the auditor's report, the statement of corporate 
governance, governors' responsibilities, the financial statement of account and other 
relevant information. These annual reports are also placed on the websitcs of the 
institutions for the various stakeholders and the public to access. These annual reports are 
prepared by universities based on the templates provided by the university funding 
councils for their own evaluation needs and to meet the demands of the accountability 
requirement of government. This is also in response to the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 which makes it mandatory for public institutions to respond to public requests for 
information they hold. In response to the Act, information such as annual reports of the 
universities is placed on their websites to satisfy the information needs of the public 
about the institution. Mr. Atkinson, a staff governor of Liberty Trust University, England 
(Post-1992) said: 
"It does so through placing its financial statements (annual accounts) in the 
public domain through things like freedom of information being available " 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 is a UK Act of parliament which gives the public 
the general right to know and access on demand information held by public institutions. 
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The Act requires public institutions to maintain proactive "Publication Schemes" in 
anticipation of such requests for certain information from the public. . 
This appears to have been done also in compliance with the Nolan (1996) principles of 
standards in public life which aimed to make the activities of public institutions open and 
transparent for scrutiny. 
Another mechanism of accountability mentioned by the respondents is the use of the 
university website to communicate information to the public, staff, current and potential 
students. An ex-officio member of the governing body of University of West Albion, 
Scotland (Pre-1992), Prof. Kay attested to the use of the university website to 
communicate information but argue that a lot of that information is to some extent a 
publicity device and may not reflect the reality of the activities and performance of the 
university thus: 
"It isn't ... er... that accountability 
is not implemented or effected in any 
easily tangible way other than through either public opinion or in how 
we as an institution publicise our performance and activities .... er... so 
it's our publicity material, its what we say on our website" 
The perception of this respondent receives support from Christensen and Skacrbaek 
(2007) and Farrell and Law (1999) who also observed that annual accounts are used by 
governing boards as a mechanism of accountability 
but sometimes utilised with the 
intention to create a particular reality about the organisation in the minds of the 
stakeholders and the public at 
large. 
The data reveals that the annual report and websites of universities were used as 
mechanisms of accountability 
by the university governing bodies in this study. However, 
there is no evidence from this study to suggest that university governing bodies actually 
use these mechanisms to account 
for their stewardship of the institutions. Rather these are 
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the structures utilised by the vice chancellors for their own accountability and to meet the 
information needs of the public about their universities. This appears to be the reason 
Deem et al (1995) observed that very few mechanisms are in place to make school 
governors accountable to the interests they purport to represent, because they are not 
contractually bound to account to their stakeholders. However, as mentioned earlier in 
this section, the mere provision of information to the public does not amount to 
accountability. 
Having examined the issue of the accountability of university governors and their 
governing bodies, I explore in the next section what constitutes the effectiveness of the 
governing bodies and how the university governors engage with the review of the 
effectiveness of these bodies. One of the elements of accountability which the higher 
education funding councils require universities to submit is a report on how the 
governing bodies complied with the CUC (2004) governance guide and how they 
determined their own effectiveness and those of the governors. 
In the next section of this chapter, I examine the perceptions of the university governors 
about how they determined their own effectiveness and how they review their governance 
effectiveness and performance. 
9.3.0 Review of Effectiveness of Performance of University Governing Bodies 
In the literature of corporate governance, there is no generally accepted definition or 
conception of governance effectiveness. The perceptions of the university governors as to 
what constitutes the governance effectiveness of their governing bodies and how they 
engage with the issue of reviewing the effectiveness of performance of these bodies were 
examined in this study. I also examined whether they have reviewed the effectiveness of 
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their governance practices, that of their governing bodies and the individual governors as 
recommended by the Dearing Report (1997) and the CUC (2004) governance framework. 
9.3.1 Determinants of Effectiveness 
The elements of effectiveness discussed below were considered by the respondents to be 
crucial in determining the effectiveness of the performance of the university governing 
bodies represented in this study. 
1. Knowledge, Skills and Expertise: Most (about 19 out of 27) of the respondents 
perceive the knowledge, skills and expertise (human resource) possessed by university 
governors as important elements that provide the preconditions for the effectiveness of 
the governing bodies. Specifically, the respondents mentioned such attributes as general 
and industry specific knowledge, general professional experience, technical and specialist 
expertise and competencies of the governors as factors that could determine their 
effectiveness and that of a governing body. They perceive these attributes as enabling the 
governors to perform their governance roles and responsibilities effectively and to 
support the vice chancellor, the executive and the university in achieving the strategic 
goals of the institutions. The chair of governors of University of Stokefield, Dr Miller 
represents the views of the other governors concerning the need and usefulness of these 
attributes to the effectiveness of the governing body and the university as follows: 
"I think it's important that the Court (governing body) should have 
amongst its lay members a range of skills each of which is relevant to the 
effective governance and management of the university... someone with a 
legal background. -financial 
background... chartered accountants or have 
had accounting experience... HR... Someone should be skilled in 
entrepreneurial activities... somebody who has worked in the past in the 
school or education sector... retired academic from another 
university... experience in business, experience in a major administrative 
sector who can bring that kind of perspective to bear on the different 
aspects of the institution ". 
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Governing bodies of universities place a very high premium on recruiting persons with 
relevant human resource as lay governors to contribute to the strategic debates of the 
governing bodies and to direct the institutions to achieve their purpose. The Jarratt Report 
(1985) on higher education governance reform emphasised the need for the recruitment 
of external lay governors with relevant skills, knowledge and experience onto university 
governing bodies. This recommendation was incorporated in the Education Reform Act 
1988, which specifically states that such persons should be appointed from business, 
industry and the professions. The recruitment of lay governors by university governing 
bodies examined in Chapter 7 actualised these recommendations. Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004) and Leblanc and Gillies (2005) had also noted the contribution of knowledge, 
skills and expertise of board members towards the effectiveness of governing boards of 
organisations when they proposed their different theoretical frameworks for investigating 
the governance effectiveness of boards. Nicholson and Kiel (2004), Van der Berghe and 
Levrau (2004) and Leana and Van Buren (1999) argued that there should be a match 
between these attributes possessed by members of boards and the specific governance 
roles they are expected to perform, which invariably contributes to effective governance 
performance. 
The perception of the respondents concerning the contribution of these attributes of the 
lay governors to the governance effectiveness of the governing body can be explained 
from the theoretical perspective of the stewardship theory of board corporate governance. 
The theory advocates a governing board with relevant human resource that can be utilised 
to support the executive, the governance and university processes in order to ensure the 
achievement of the set strategic direction and strategies of the institutions. 
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According to some of the respondents, one way by which the university governing bodies 
maximise the use of the knowledge, skills and expertise possessed by lay governors for 
effective governance performance is to appoint them to serve on specific committees of 
the body where they can contribute effectively to the discussions and debates at that 
level. Most of the detailed discussions and debates of the governing bodies are presumed 
to be done at the committee level. Professor Simpson, an ex-officio member of the 
governing body of University of West Albion represents this particular view expressed by 
more than half of the respondents in this study as follows: 
"Well I think in the key areas, for example... you obviously have lots of 
committees that report to Council, and therefore you try and match up the 
expertise of the people you have to those that you require on those 
committees. So for example, clearly Finance and General Purposes, you 
need someone who understands about finance... For strategy, well 
Strategy Committee, everyone's a member of that basically-So it's clear 
that particular committees have particular expertise and you try and 
match up the type ofperson you have with the type of skills you need". 
Maximising the use of human resource in this manner has been advocated in the various 
corporate governance codes and guides and it is viewed as an aspect of good governance 
practice which can raise the level of corporate governance in the universities. However, 
some of the respondents were quick to add that the knowledge possessed by lay 
governors does not cover the academic side (teaching and research) of the universities. A 
lay governor from Liberty Trust University, Mr. Lander disclosed this viewpoint in his 
account thus: 
"What we're here to do is to add value in areas where you have less skill. 
So we're not here to come and to show you how to teach; you know more 
about teaching than anybody else can know, but when it comes to 
commercial activity maybe you're not the best experts in commercial 
activity, we have more experience than you have ". 
255 
This is consistent with similar findings by Deem et al (1995) in their study of school 
governing bodies in UK when they observed that lay governors do not contribute to 
debates concerning purely educational matters such as curriculum. However, two 
university governing bodies represented in this study have made attempts to recruit both 
retired and serving academics from other institutions onto their governing bodies in order 
to bring an outside perspective to bear on the academic aspect of discussions of the 
governing bodies. However, the emphasis on the possession of certain skills and expertise 
by lay governors appears to negate the original principles and practice of lay participation 
in university governance. 
2. Induction and Development: Another element of effectiveness which about half of 
the respondents perceive as an important contributor to the effectiveness of university 
governing bodies is the exposure of university governors to comprehensive programmes 
of induction and development. These are intended to enable the university governors to 
adjust quickly to their new governance roles and responsibilities as well as to enhance 
their governance capacities. It is also an attempt to expose the governors to current issues, 
debates and trends within the higher education sector in order to update their knowledge 
to enable them to make the right governance decisions. The building of the governance 
capacity of university governors were perceived by the respondents as indicative of the 
effectiveness of their governing bodies. A staff governor of University of St. Pancras, Mr. 
Richards represents this view in his account thus: 
"... One of the ways we make members of court(governing body) to be 
effective is that we have an induction programme for new members... Each 
get a mentor... they can discuss whatever it is they have an interest in. It is 
also done by promoting and encouraging and paying for members of 
Court to attend sessions organised by the CUC... I think it's the 
Leadership Foundation that organises that, and there's quite a nationally 
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organised programme of events and courses which we encourage our 
governors to attend. So I think we do it quite well" 
Some of the respondents perceived training and development needs of governors that 
could enable them to build their capacity in order to function effectively in their 
governance roles to include having an understanding of the university/academic culture 
and environment; understanding the sources and mechanisms of funding of universities; 
commercialisation issues; knowledge of the constitutions/charters of universities; 
academic and budget decision-making processes; academic governance and management 
styles; understanding the relationship between the governing body, management and 
senate/academic board. There seems to be a need for lay governors to acquire some 
knowledge and understanding of the processes and environment in which the institutions 
operate to enhance their governance effectiveness since the majority of them are 
appointed from the external environment of the institution and are unfamiliar with issues 
in the higher education sector. A lay governor of Liberty Trust University, England (Post- 
1992), Mr Lander supports the training and development of governors thus: 
"So there's a training aspect that goes in place which means that we then 
get to understand the university environment (interruption) ... 
how a 
university works and operates - how an academic board makes those 
kinds of decisions; how they make decisions about budgets... how they get 
their funding; and we get trained on that ". 
Training and development programmes for lay governors of universities accord with the 
findings of Brudney and Murray (1998) that continuing improvement of boards through 
training and development was perceived by their CEOs as measures of governance 
effectiveness. Kiel and Nicholson 
(2005) and Holland et al, (1989) in their development 
of frameworks for the study of governance effectiveness of 
boards of nonprofit 
organisations and universities respectively also considered 
board improvement through 
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induction, training and development as determinant of board governance effectiveness. 
These development programmes can also enhance the capacity of lay governors to 
differentiate between governance and management roles. 
3. Compliance with Governance Guides and Legal Frameworks: Almost all 
respondents perceived the compliance of university governing bodies with the CUC 
(2004) governance code, the institutions' legal frameworks (e. g. charters and statutes) 
and government policy directives which directly affect the institutions as good 
determinants of the governance effectiveness of university governing bodies. A lay 
governor of Ashgrove University, England (Post-1992), Mr. Matthew represents this 
view thus: 
"... well there are the guidelines, and I'm a great believer that if there are 
procedures and policies ... you 
know that we have the statutes and the 
ordnances and so on. Clearly these are matters that need to be followed 
religiously it seems to me... The guidelines published by the CUC are 
helpful to me. So when we comply with them, they help us govern the 
university effectively ". 
The CUC (2004) governance code is proposed to guide the university governing bodies 
in the UK in their governance roles, responsibilities and practices and it stated explicitly 
that for the university governing body their "effectiveness shall be measured both against 
the statement of primary responsibilities and compliance with the Code" (p. 15). 
However, the code may represent one way of viewing the practice of university 
governance. As revealed in Chapter 6, universities have their peculiar contextual factors 
that could make their governing bodies apply the recommended practices in the code 
differently. For example, the CUC (2004) guide recommended the use of an audit 
committee to govern risk, but some university governing bodies in this study use other 
committees for this purpose. 
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The various institutions also have their individual legal frameworks that guide their 
activities. Apart from these governance codes and legal frameworks, there are the various 
government policies and directives which require the compliance of the universities and 
some of these have legal consequences for non-compliance. This accord with the Dearing 
Report (1997) which recommended that universities should comply with governance 
codes and frameworks or face the threat of withdrawal of funding. 
In the literature on corporate governance, researchers such as Schmidt and Brauer (2006) 
and Leblanc and Gillies (2005) emphasised the use of compliance with governance codes 
as one element of the effectiveness of boards of organisations. Ingley and Van der Walt 
(2005) further argued that good governance is not defined and specified in law but it is 
entrenched within "codes of practice, principles, standards and guidelines" by the 
appropriate stakeholder groups (regulators) reflecting their perception of best practice. 
Steinberg (2000) advocated the conformance of boards with charters and other legislative 
and constitutional frameworks to ensure their governance effectiveness. It is therefore not 
surprising that almost all respondents. perceived the compliance of the university 
governing bodies with externally imposed codes, policies and regulations as components 
of their governance effectiveness. 
However, Garratt (2007) has criticised this notion of equating effective corporate 
governance with compliance with governance codes as demanded by regulators and 
practiced by boards. He argued that Enron was 100% compliant with all the regulations 
but still collapsed because it lacked ethical enterprise. The Lambert Review (2003) also 
perceives governance codes as 
frameworks for the practice of governance rather than 
determinants of governance effectiveness. However, compliance with codes of 
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governance may not necessarily translate to governance effectiveness of the university 
governing bodies. 
In the case studies, there were no noticeable country and institutional differences in the 
various accounts of the respondents concerning the compliance of university governing 
bodies with externally imposed governance codes, policies and regulations as a measure 
of the governance effectiveness of university governing bodies. This may be attributable 
to the fact that all the institutions operate in the same regulated environment and are 
subject to the same control and compliance regimes of government. They are also 
required by their funding councils to adopt the CUC (2004) governance framework. 
4. Achievement of Strategic Objectives of the University: A further determinant of 
governance effectiveness of the university governing bodies that was perceived by some 
(8 out of 27) of the respondents is their involvement in determining and approving of the 
strategic objectives of the universities which invariably leads to the successful 
performance of the institutions. The chair of governors of University of Waterloo, 
England (Pre-1992), Mr. Carrington puts this view in perspective when he said: 
"Well according to the performance of the university and you can't really 
separate out the performance of Council from the performance of the 
university. So we...... I mean the ultimate indicators of our performance 
are whether we have a healthy financial situation, whether we're living 
within our income and achieving good results with that " 
A lay governor of the University of St. Pancras Scotland (post-1992), Mr. Bloomfield 
confirmed this same view when he said: 
"Well the ultimate test, the acid test will be 'does the strategy that we've 
set down and agreed for University of St. Pancras, does that deliver. 
does it make the institution successful..? ', that would be the ultimate test 
of our effectiveness " 
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These respondents appear to link the effectiveness of the university governing bodies 
with the overall performance of the institutions based on their involvement in 
contributing to determining and approving the strategic objectives and strategies of the 
institutions. The CUC (2004) governance code stipulates that the university governing 
body should be involved in developing and approving the strategic plan of the institution, 
thereby playing its strategy role/performance role. There appears to be some evidence 
from Chapter 8 that university governing bodies participate actively in determining the 
areas of strategic focus and even some of the strategies of their institutions. 
This finding is in accord with those of Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin (1992), Van der 
Walt and Ingley (2001), Herman and Renz (1998) and Golden and Zajac (2001) that 
governance effectiveness depends on the overall contribution of the board to the 
performance of the organisation through their engagement with the strategy process of 
their institutions. Leblanc (2004) proposed that the strategic decision making 
effectiveness of the board is the factor that links the board's governance effectiveness 
with the financial performance of the organisation. Some researchers have questioned 
the relationship between effective corporate governance and organisational performance 
(Bennett, 20002; Patterson, 1998; Cadbury, 1997). 
9.4.0 Conduct of Review of Effectiveness 
The conduct of review of effectiveness of university governing bodies concerns how 
these bodies go about assessing the effectiveness of their governance performance. It also 
relates to their compliance with the CUC governance framework. The majority of the 
respondents recalled that their respective governing bodies had reviewed the 
effectiveness of their governance practices using the CUC (2004) governance framework 
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as a guide. A chair of governors of University of West Albion, England commented on 
the review thus: 
"I've conducted two reviews of the governance of West Albion during my 
time on Council. They were primarily to see whether the working of the 
governing body was effective and if not to make it more effective. So we 
looked at the membership of the governing body, the way it operated, the 
papers that it received, the information it received and its general way of 
proceeding, and as a result of and in each case we made some changes 
to the governance. I was also on the CUC working party on governance 
of universities that produced the guidelines a year or so ago. So I've 
been interested to look at governance ". 
In conducting these reviews while the governing bodies of the Pre-1992 case study 
universities engaged the services of external assessors, their Post-1992 institutions used 
some specially constituted committees or were done by the secretaries to these bodies. 
The reviews were conducted using questionnaires distributed to all members of the 
governing bodies to assess the performance of the bodies along certain pre-determined 
dimensions of governance. A lay governor of University of Waterloo, England (Pre- 
1992), Dr Blade represented this view thus: 
"We set up a committee to look at our effectiveness... We had an 
independent person from outside assisting its on that. But we've had a 
questionnaire sent round all the members of Council and it was a 
detailed questionnaire asking how well we did a lot of d jerent activities 
and whether there's room for improvement, and how we can do things 
better" 
The use of a self-assessment questionnaire to determine board governance effectiveness 
is common practice among board governance researchers such as Herman, Rcnz and 
Heimovics (1997), Holland, Chait and Taylor (1989), Smart (1989), Van der Walt and 
Ingley (2001), Leblanc and Gillics (2005), Gill, Flynn and Rcissing (2005) and Shattock, 
2006). But such practice appears to rely on a lot of self reflection on the part of the 
governors and not every one individual has this attribute. 
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Most respondents recount that their university governing bodies do not formally assess 
the effectiveness of the individual university governors and the committees. A staff 
governor of University of St. Pancras, Scotland (Post-1992), Mrs. Keith represents this 
view by saying: "We don't do that in any formal way... at the moment I don't think it is 
done ". 
However, there is an on-going debate within the governors' circle as to whether 
individual governors should be assessed formally or not. A formal performance appraisal 
of individual governors is perceived by most of the respondents to be inappropriate 
because they are not paid like their counterparts in industry. They argue that these 
governors offer free professional service which would have cost a lot of money if the 
universities were to engage the services of external professional advice. 
But a contrary view among the respondents is that if the governors have volunteered to 
serve the universities then they should readily subject themselves to a formal . annual 
appraisal in order to get feedback as to the areas where they need improvement. These 
opposing views are presented below: 
A lay governor from Ashgrove University, England (Post-1992), Mr. Francis who is 
opposed to formal assessment of governors has this to say: 
"There should be no appraisals of members of Council, and after all you 
have to remember that certainly as far as the lay members are 
concerned they're all doing it pro bono out of the goodness of their 
hearts, not because they get any benefit as a result of doing it " 
Another lay governor from Ashgrove University, England (Post-1992), Matthew 
who thinks governors should 
be appraised perceived it thus: 
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"I'd be very happy for someone to say to me Matthew you know we 
appreciate what you're doing but we feel that these are aspects you 
could improve on and if they did it constructively and didn't knock my 
good intentions and the work I put in I would welcome that. I wouldn't 
be adverse to it at all" 
However, the nominations committees of the respective university governing bodies are 
expected to assess the performance of individual governors most especially when such 
governors are seeking re-appointment to serve a further term. But this exercise is not 
often conducted and may not be a reliable method of assessment since it focuses on 
individuals, whilst governing bodies are corporate actors and, as such, have collective 
responsibility. 
Generally, almost all respondents expressed satisfaction with the quality of human 
resource represented of their various governing bodies as well as with the performance of 
the governance effectiveness of the governing bodies, which was revealed as a result of 
the effectiveness review that was conducted. They claimed that the few areas of 
weaknesses identified as a result of the review were being improved upon. A lay 
governor from Liberty Trust University, England (Post-1992) expressed his satisfaction 
with the outcome of the review thus: 
"I'm satisfied with the expertise on the hoard but we're always reviewing 
it and always identifying what as it were we need from the next 
appointed set of governors " 
Another lay governor from University of St. Pancras, Scotland (Pre-1992), Mr. 
Silberston said: 
"After the review, we ended up feeling quite positive about the way Court 
was behaving and we felt it was operating and governing effectively" 
The reviews of governance effectiveness conducted by the various university governing 
bodies were based on self-assessment and the perceptions of the individual governors. 
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The conclusions emanating from such self-evaluation techniques have been criticised for 
their biases (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). 
9.5.0 Conclusion 
Most of the university governors in this study perceived the governing body as the 
accountable body of the university and are accountable to various governmental bodies 
such as the higher education funding councils and the National Audit Office. Some of the 
governors perceive the governing body as accountable to the various stakeholders. A few 
of the governors are of the view that it is accountable to no one but to itself. This appears 
to indicate that university governors and their governing bodies have multiple 
accountabilities to various constituencies. But there seems to be a lack of consensus 
among the university governors as to the exact accountability of their governing bodies. 
These governors did not indicate specifically how the governing bodies demonstrate this 
accountability in practice to these governmental agencies. 
The legal instrument establishing these universities and their governing bodies described 
them as independent and autonomous as well as the supreme authority and final decision- 
making bodies and, therefore, did not specify any clearly defined lines of accountability 
relationship between the university governing bodies and any other stakeholder groups of 
the institutions. 
However, the evidence from the study suggests that the university vice chancellors are 
the officially designated accounting and accountable officers of their institutions. The 
accountability role of the governing 
bodies is limited to calling the vice chancellors to 
account as well as approving the accountability reports prepared by them. The university 
governors in this study also think they are accountable to a host of stakeholder groups but 
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there is no evidence of stakeholder accountability being particularly enforced or practised 
by the university governing bodies represented in this study. 
There was also no official forum through which the university governing bodies could 
account to their stakeholder groups more especially with the lack of prescription for 
university courts in higher education institutions in UK by the 1992 Education Reform 
Act. Despite the empowering of university governing bodies by the 1992 Act, the Jarratt 
(1985) and Dearing (1997) reports in the UK, there appears to be no provision for them to 
enter into an accountability relationship with the stakeholders of the universities. This 
does not provide for a `dialogue of accountability' (Thomas and Martin, 1996) between 
the governing bodies and the stakeholders of the university, thereby resulting in an 
`accountability deficit' between the two parties. 
The findings of this study also indicate that performance reviews have gradually 
permeated the governance activities of university governing bodies in the UK. Though, 
still at its preliminary stage, there is a tendency that it may increase in intensity and the 
evaluation process may become more focused and comprehensive to the extent of 
incorporating formal appraisal of individual governors and the committees. The 
perception of the university governors that engagement with the strategic governance role 
is an indicator of governance effectiveness appears to show that performance issues arc 
being taken seriously by university governing bodies in the UK. The burden of 
compliance regulations as observed in this study has not in anyway deterred the 
university governing bodies from focusing on performance issues. The benefits that may 
accrue to the governing bodies for engaging in such self and internal evaluation may be 
the motivation and the confidence that could be required for them to enlist the services of 
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independent external assessors in the near future in order to make the review process free 
from bias and to entrench rigour into the entire evaluation exercise. 
Most of the perceived elements of the determinants of effectiveness of the university 
governing bodies represented in this study appear to be input and process issues that lead 
to effectiveness which is an output measure. Only the element of achievement of strategic 
objectives of the institution appears to be an outcome issue that can be said to be a 
measure of governance effectiveness. But there is no empirical evidence to link 
effectiveness of corporate governance with corporate performance. Concrete measures of 
governance effectiveness are yet to be fully determined by research. 
In the next and final chapter, I discuss the main findings of this study and the conclusions 
drawn from them in relation to the purpose of the study, the research questions as well as 
within the context of the higher education governance reforms that are taking place in the 
seven universities in this study. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
10.0 Introduction 
This study is about the governance of higher education institutions in two countries of the 
UK, namely England and Scotland, focusing on the perceptions of university governors 
and their accounts of lay governance practices as well as observation of some of the 
activities of university governing bodies, with particular attention to the process of 
corporatisation of university governance. The project is not concerned with academic 
governance and the activities of senates or academic boards of universities, nor is it 
interested in the management activities of the executives of the institutions. However, 
governing bodies do relate to these decision-making bodies and groups in the 
performance of their various governance roles and practices. 
The review of literature on the activities of university governing bodies in the UK shows 
little empirical research on the governance roles and practices of university governing 
bodies in the UK. The only notable study on this issue in UK universities was conducted 
about a decade ago by Bargh, Scott and Smith (1996). Since then numerous governance 
changes appear to have taken place in universities as a result of the Dearing Report 
(1997), Lambert Review (2004), new developments in corporate governance (Turnbull 
Report, 1999; Higgs Report, 2002; Smith Report, 2003; UK Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance, 2003) and the modernisation of public services programme of 
government in 1999 and no comprehensive study has been conducted in order to 
determine the extent to which universities have responded to these governance reform 
initiatives. This study has attempted to fill some of the identified gaps in the literature of 
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university governance in the UK and this chapter summarises the main findings of this 
study as well as suggesting areas of future research. 
The study is based on comparative multi-site case studies of seven universities in 
England and Scotland made up of three Pre-1992 and four Post-1992 institutions 
involving a total of 27 university governors in which about two thirds of them were lay 
governors and chairs of governors. The study was conducted between 2005 and 2008. 
Specifically, it set out to examine how university governors and their governing bodies 
perceive, engage with and attach meaning to their governance roles and practices within 
the context of the various higher education governance reforms in UK universities. The 
governance roles and practices of the governing bodies were explored through the 
perceptions of governors, observation of meetings of governing bodies and analyses of 
various documents emanating from the institutions and other related bodies and materials 
from their websites. 
In order to address the purpose of the study and subject it to empirical and interpretive 
investigation, the following four research questions were framed: 
" RQ1: What are the background characteristics and perceived motivation of 
university governors in seven governing bodies in England and Scotland for 
participating in institutional governance and their mode of recruitment? 
. RQ2: How do members of these seven governing bodies perceive and understand 
their governance roles and practices in English and Scottish universities and how 
have they been able to separate their governance roles from those of 
management? I 
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" RQ3: How do members of the seven governing bodies discuss the performance 
of their governance tasks and how do these governing bodies actually operate? 
" RQ4: In what ways do members of the seven governing bodies claim to assess 
the effectiveness of their governance practices and performance? 
Two main levels of comparative case analyses using thematic framework procedure 
(Ritchie and Spencer, 1994; Lacey and Luff, 2001; Ritchie, Spencer and O'Connor, 
2003) were conducted and these are the country and institutional cases made up of the 
English and Scottish universities and the Pre-1992 and Post-1992 institutions 
respectively. In this study I adopted some organisational governance theories as 
developed in Chapter 3, to explain and interpret the analysed data concerning governance 
perceptions and practices of university governing bodies. 
10.1Governors and their Governance Roles 
In this study I set out to examine the university governors' background characteristics, 
their motivation for participation in institutional governance, their method of recruitment, 
their perceptions of the governance roles of the governing bodies and their accounts of 
their practice and whether they made a distinction between governance and management 
roles. These issues were first investigated by Bargh ct al in 1996 and since then almost no 
other studies have been conducted in this area. The evidence from this study has provided 
some new and detailed insights into these issues in seven English and Scottish 
universities. 
The evidence from this study showed that almost all the lay governors interviewed were 
persons with high educational qualifications and occupational status. The majority of 
them were those appointed from business, industry and the professions (such as 
270 
accounting, finance, law, engineering, etc) with just a few from other fields of 
employment. A very large proportion of these lay governors are non-executive directors, 
directors and senior managers of business and professional organisations in the private 
sector of the economy. These were found to be the types of persons recommended by the 
various higher education governance reforms (Jarratt, 1985; Education Reform Act 1988; 
Further and Higher Education Act 1992; Dearing, 1997; Lambert, 2003) as having the 
required human and social resources as well as the necessary experience to be lay 
governors in UK universities. They also appear to have the capacity to act as change 
agents (Bargh et al, 1996) to initiate and transform the governance and management 
cultures of these institutions from the collegial to a corporate approach which operates on 
business principles and practices prevalent in the private sector. 
The profiles of the lay governors in the seven case study institutions were found to be 
very similar and this is partly because the reform reports recommended the particular 
constituencies from which such persons should be drawn and certain characteristics they 
should possess. For example, lay governors were to be drawn mostly from business, 
industry and the professions and should have relevant experience in corporate governance 
and management issues among others. 
The evidence from this study showed that most of the lay governors had multiple 
motivations for joining their governing bodies. The two most common motivators as 
perceived by the lay governors were their desire to contribute to the improvement of the 
governance and management practices of the institutions and to develop their 
universities, communities and society 
in general. However, some of the lay governors 
were motivated to participate 
in governance because of certain intangible benefits that 
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could accrue to them from such participation. The staff governors and a few lay 
governors were mainly motivated to join their governing bodies because they were either 
nominated or elected by their constituencies in the university as provided in the statutes 
of the institutions. For the ex-officio governors, who are mainly deputy vice chancellors 
and pro-vice chancellors, the reason for joining was because it was part of their job to 
participate in governance decision-making. The multiple motivations experienced by the 
lay governors could enhance their capacity to perform many of the governance roles and 
engender their commitment to institutional governance and development. 
The evidence from the country case studies showed that a higher proportion of lay 
governors from university governing bodies in Scotland than their counterparts from 
England appeared motivated to contribute to the development of their communities 
through participation in institutional governance. This difference between the two 
countries could be partly attributed to the greater community orientation of Scots. This 
might imply that cultural contextual factors arc capable of shaping some aspects of lay 
participation in university governance in the seven governing bodies in this study. This 
difference can also be attributable to the effect of devolution, which gives the two 
countries the opportunity to emphasis certain areas of governance they may wish to 
pursue. 
In addition, a larger number of lay governors from the Post-1992 university governing 
bodies than their Pre-1992 counterparts felt motivated to participate in governance in 
order to develop their universities. This may be due to the need for rapid growth and 
development of these institutions to enable them to catch up with their well-established 
Pre-1992 counterparts and to compete with them. 
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In this study the 34 motivational factors based on the perceptions of the university 
governors was used to develop a typology of six motivational categories and was also 
adopted to classify the motivations of the university governors. This typology of 
motivations could serve as a basis for the development of a new theory of motivation for 
the participation of lay people in university governance in the UK in the absence of any 
overarching theory of motivation for participation in university governance as observed 
in the literature. This typology could be used to classify the perceptions of the motivation 
of persons wanting to join a university governing body, or it could be utilised to 
empirically study the motives of people for wanting to participate in university 
governance. 
There is evidence in the study to suggest that the criteria for appointment adopted by the 
nominations committees of the university governing bodies mostly gave preference to 
persons from business and professional backgrounds to the exclusion of people from 
other segments of the society. The recruitment practice thus appeared to favour the 
establishment of corporate elites on university governing bodies and seemed not to be 
consistent with the social inclusion policy of the English and Scottish governments. 
In terms of the recruitment of lay governors, direct appointment and co-option were the 
two main approaches employed by the nominations committees of the seven university 
governing bodies and these were considered 
by the CUC (2004) governance guide as 
`best practice'. The use of recruitment adverts in local and national newspapers to attract 
potential lay governors with the relevant and required resources for appointment onto 
university governing bodies was also common among the case study institutions. This 
was also found to be a new approach to 
lay recruitment in universities. In this study there 
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is evidence of the existence of a nominations committee in all the case study institutions 
which is also a new governance structure introduced into universities through its 
incorporation in the CUC (2004) governance guide as a result of the recommendations of 
Cadbury (1992) and Nolan (1996) to deal with openness and transparency in 
appointments in public institutions. The chairs of governors in this study were also found 
to dominate the recruitment process despite the presence of a nominations committee and 
this was found to be inconsistent with good recruitment practice entrenched in the Nolan 
(1996) principles of standards in public life. 
In the literature on corporate governance, there is much uncertainty as to the various roles 
governing boards are expected to perform (Johnson, et al, 1996; Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Hung, 1998). This is an area that was explored by Bargh 
et al in 1996 but requires further empirical studies in view of the governance reforms to 
ascertain the actual and present roles of university governing bodies in the UK in order to 
contribute to and advance knowledge in this particular aspect of governance of higher 
education institutions. 
The data from the study showed that the majority of university governors perceived their 
governing bodies as corporate bodies that perform multiple governance roles which 
include accountability, strategy, monitoring, compliance and assessment roles while a 
few others also see recruitment, audit, risk governance, support, appeal and 
ambassadorial roles as key elements. The evidence from the study suggested that the 
accountability, strategy, compliance, assessment and risk governance roles were among 
the governance roles that were also given high premium in the reform of higher education 
governance and the modernisation of public institutions agenda of UK government in 
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order to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and economy in the delivery of quality 
services by universities to their consumers, users and the public. 
Another thorny issue in the literature of corporate boards of organisation is the separation 
of the governance roles of governing bodies from the management roles of the executive 
in order to avoid conflict and to ensure accountability at board and management levels. 
This issue has been little empirically investigated in both for profit and nonprofit 
organisations. Bargh et al (1996) did not also investigate the extent to which university 
governors were able to demarcate between their governance roles and those of the 
executive of the institutions. This study has contributed some knowledge in this aspect of 
the literature of higher education governance. 
In terms of demarcating between governance and management roles, the evidence from 
this study appeared to indicate that the lay governors in their attempt* to be proactive and 
active in performance of their roles as well as to contribute to the decisional processes of 
the institutions do stray into the area of management roles. Although they appeared to be 
able to distinguish between both roles some of the lay governors felt it was `difficult to 
stand back' from engaging in some management roles in practice since their recruitment 
is based on the possession of certain skills and expertise that are required by the 
university. Moreover, the managerial roles they perform in their paid employment 
outside the university encouraged some to 
hold views about the overlapping of 
managerial and governance roles. 
If the governing body is engaged with managerial 
tasks, then the executive cannot be held accountable in any way for the performance of 
the institution. This is because the role of the governing bodies is to ensure the executives 
implement the strategic decisions of the universities and to hold them accountable for the 
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performance of the institutions. This also portends some potential for conflict between 
the governing body and the executive in the governance and management of universities 
and appeared to challenge the modem concept of lay governance and accountability in 
universities in the UK. This seems to suggest the need for a comprehensive induction 
programme for lay governors, which would enable them to distinguish clearly between 
governance and management in practice. The ex-officio members of the governing 
bodies, who are also members of the senior management team of the universities, appear 
to be able to clearly differentiate the boundaries between governance and management 
because they have a vested interest in so doing. It could also be as a result of the dual 
governance and management roles they perform in the university as well as their superior 
knowledge of the workings of an academic enterprise over their lay counterparts. The 
case studies did not show any particular institutional and country pattern in the 
perceptions of university governors concerning their governance roles as well as in the 
demarcation between governance and management roles. 
10.2 Governance Processes 
In the literature of board governance, one key role which researchers have identified and 
is being emphasised in both the theoretical and empirical literature is the strategy role of 
governing boards. Both the Jarratt Report (1985) and Dearing Report (1997) 
recommended that university governing bodies should proactively and actively get 
involved in determining the strategic direction and the strategies of their institutions. But 
the extents to which lay governors and their governing bodies arc involved in the strategy 
process of their universities have hardly been investigated empirically. This situation is 
even more pronounced in UK universities as the only known study was conducted by 
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Bargh et al more than a decade ago. This study provides more empirical support and 
advanced knowledge in the area of the extent of participation of university governing 
bodies in the strategy process of their institutions as recommended by the higher 
education governance reforms in the UK. 
The empirical evidence from my study appears to suggest that the university governing 
bodies in this study adopt two divergent approaches for engagement in the strategy 
process of their institutions. These are the proactive-active and the reactive-passive 
approaches to engagement in strategic decision-making. Two university governing bodies 
in England were found to adopt an executive-driven reactive-passive approach to 
strategy. The role of the governing body in this case was limited to approving the 
strategic decisions of the executive. This approach does not enable the majority of the lay 
governors to contribute to the debates about the strategic direction and the strategies of 
the institution. The governing bodies of these two institutions only react to the strategic 
proposal of the executive. However, the evidence from the study shows that the lay 
governors expressed a strong desire to participate 
fully in the strategy process since they 
possess the necessary human resource to do so. 
The data indicated the presence of strategy committees dominated by executive and 
senate members with at most three 
lay governors in the two institutions that adopted the 
reactive-passive approach to strategy. 
These strategy committees were chaired by the vice 
chancellors of the institutions. 
The managerial hegemony perspective as discussed in 
Chapter 3 appears to dictate the approach to strategy in the reactive-passive system. This 
theory explains that the executive (management) 
leads the organisation in the strategy 
process to determine the strategic 
direction and strategies because they possess all the 
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relevant knowledge and information about the system than the governing body as to 
enable them to make strategic decisions. The role of the governing body would therefore 
be limited to reviewing and approving the strategic decisions of the executive in the 
strategy process. One implication for the university governing bodies adopting the 
reactive-passive approach to strategy in terms of governance is that they may not be in a 
position to direct and lead their universities as expected of them to accomplish their set 
purposes. The university governing bodies adopting the reactive-passive approach to 
strategy may have apparently delegated their organisational leadership role to the 
executive. Instead of the governing bodies leading the universities, it is the vice 
chancellors that have taken over this governance role and combined it with their 
operational responsibilities. Another implication of adopting this approach to strategy is 
that the vice chancellors would control the governing bodies because they have not stated 
their own expectations of what the executives should do or accomplish. In terms of 
monitoring, the governing bodies may not be able to monitor effectively strategic 
decisions they do not take part in making since the whole strategic thinking is 
undertaking by the executive. This appears to be the traditional approach to lay 
governance by university governing bodies in the UK which the various higher education 
governance reforms attempt to reverse. Bargh et al (1996) found this reactive approach to 
strategy among the university governing bodies they investigated more than a decade 
ago, but the university context in which governance is taking place has changed now and 
there is evidence in this study that some university governing bodies are becoming more 
proactive and active in strategy decision making. 
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The other approach to governance adopted by five university governing bodies in this 
study is the proactive-active approach to strategy. In this approach, all the lay governors 
have the opportunity to contribute to the strategic debates and decisions of the institution 
since strategy is a collaborative endeavour between the governing body, executive and 
senate. There are no strategy committees in these institutions. The stewardship theory 
perspective as discussed in Chapter 3 appears to influence the strategy process of these 
institutions. The theory explains that governing boards actively engage in the strategy 
process in collaboration with the executive and senate because they possess certain 
knowledge and expertise to develop strategy in support of the executive and to also 
enhance their stewardship of the organisation. Strategy would therefore be a collaborative 
activity between the board and the executive. For example, in this study, the five 
university governing bodies adopting this approach initiated the strategy process by 
convening a special meeting where all the governors, executives and some academics 
`brainstorm strategy' together to arrive at the areas of strategic focus and direction of the 
universities. The implication of adopting a proactive-active approach to strategy is that 
these university governing bodies would appear to be strategically leading their 
universities by determining the 
future direction of the institutions. Universities exist for 
some purposes and the role of the governing 
body is to ensure their achievement. It is the 
responsibility of the university governing 
bodies as the ultimate decision-making bodies 
to determine and enforce the achievement of the purposes and the missions of the 
institutions. The Dearing Report (1997) specifically entrusted the responsibility of 
`planning the future development' of the university on the governing body. This 
proactive-active approach to strategy provides 
the opportunity for the five university 
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governing bodies in this study to engage in this type of strategic leadership in directing 
the future of the institutions. 
The evidence from the case study institutions appears to suggest that all the three Scottish 
university governing bodies adopt a proactive-active approach to strategy. The Scottish 
participatory and social democratic norms (Harrison, 1997; Patterson, 2003) appear to 
encourage the adoption of this approach to strategy by the lay governors and their 
governing bodies. 
Generally, the evidence from this study seems to suggest that five of the university 
governing bodies are becoming more proactive and active in the performance of their 
strategic role in determining the strategic direction of their institutions. Even those that 
appear to be reactive-passive seems to possess the potential of becoming proactive in the 
future because their lay governors resented their reactive role in strategy. The proactive- 
active approach is particularly relevant in this regard if governing bodies arc to play the 
leadership role expected of them. The proactive-active stance of five institutions 
investigated in this study could be as a result of their compliance with the reform 
initiatives that enjoined them to do so. 
These findings about the participation of lay governors in strategy and the evidence from 
the literature on higher education governance appear to suggest that the strategy role is a 
new governance role that has permeated the activities of university governing bodies in 
this study. The recommendations of the ]arratt Report (1985) and the Dearing Report 
(1997) that university governing bodies should play an active role in strategy suggests 
strongly that they were not used to engaging in the strategy process of their institutions in 
the past. This proactive performance-oriented strategy role has been added to the 
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traditional compliance and monitoring roles of university governing bodies, which is also 
consistent with the new thinking in the literature of board governance. This implies that 
the university governing bodies adopting the proactive-active approach to strategy would 
now be in a position to play their expected leadership role in the institutions. 
The literature on risk does not review any empirical study on the perceptions and 
governance of risk by members of university governing bodies in UK. At the time Bargh 
et al (1996) conducted their study, the discourse of risk had not made any appreciable 
presence in UK universities. Risk governance and management in UK universities is one 
aspect of the higher education reforms initiated by the New Labour government in the 
UK to ensure the efficient and effective use of funds allocated to the institutions to 
achieve its social, economic and political goals. 
The evidence from this study appears to indicate that the realist and technocratic 
perspective of risk dominates the university governors' views about risk and their 
approach to risk governance in their universities. They appear to view risk as a 
phenomenon that exists in nature and which can be identified and its effect mitigated. 
Their views and approach to risk is not surprising considering the background 
characteristics of the lay governors where their operating business environment outside 
the universities favours a rational approach to dealing with risk. 
The evidence also appears to suggest that the lay governors exhibit risk-averse behaviour 
in their attempt to maintain a 'no surprises' culture in the governance and management of 
risks in their institutions. Their risk-averse behaviour seems to be in conflict with their 
apparent risk-taking attitude in their places of primary employment outside the 
universities. Risk-taking is an important aspect of enterprise culture but the risk-averse 
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behaviour of the university governing bodies in this study appears not to be consistent 
with the attempt to institutionalise business practices in UK universities. This appears to 
be a paradox in the risk behaviour of the lay governors especially those from industry. 
One explanation for this might not be unconnected with the requirements of government 
for control and accountability, which appears to inhibit the risk-taking behaviour by 
public institutions (Newman, 2000). The governors that were interviewed also appear to 
have responded to the risk management framework recommended for use by their higher 
education funding councils, which seems to be averse to risk-taking too. 
The evidence from the study also suggested that the types of risks identified by the 
governors as confronting the universities and which appear on the risk registers of the 
institutions were those they can easily detect and mitigate, whereas there are other risks 
facing the universities which cannot be identified. The evidence from the study also 
showed that the governing bodies do not govern risk directly but do so through the audit 
or other committees. The role of the risk governance committees is to ensure that the 
executive performs this function effectively and they also forward a report to the 
governing body. This appears to be one of the checks and balances put in place in 
universities to ensure the effectiveness of their control systems. It is advantageous to use 
an audit committee to govern risk since its activities cover both financial and non- 
financial aspects of the business of the universities and are therefore capable of 
identifying more risks associated with these areas. 
The evidence from the case studies appears to indicate that while the governing bodies of 
universities in England use their audit committees to govern risk their counterparts in 
Scotland use other committees for the same purpose. In this study it was observed that 
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all the case study institutions utilise the risk management framework proposed by the 
Turnbull Report (1999) and as recommended by both the higher education funding 
councils for England and Scotland and the CUC (2004) governance guide. The risk 
framework is designed to ensure funds allocated to universities by the state are used 
efficiently to accomplish the government agenda and the purposes of the institutions 
without incurring losses. The risk management framework appears to be a government 
regulatory mechanism to ensure that no financial losses are incurred in the cause of 
utilising state funds allocated to the universities to accomplish stated purposes (Hood et 
al, 1999). It was also observe that the responsibility for risk management in these seven 
universities lies with the executive. 
However, the university governing bodies do not assess the risks associated with their 
own governance activities but they appear to focus more attention on managerial risks. 
The assessment of the various risks linked to their governance roles and practices could 
help mitigate the potential for mis-governance. Such governance risks include the 
straying of lay governors into management roles, non-attendance of lay governors at 
every meeting of the governing 
body, lack of accountability of the governing body to any 
constituency, lack of knowledge of academic 
issues and the inability of the governing 
body to ensure every member participates in governance debates and decisions. 
The managerial risks identified in this study from the perspective of the governors 
include shortfall in revenue, change in government policy, low international student 
recruitment, poor quality of 
human resources, breakdown in technology, reduced quality 
of courses, poor development of the estate, 
ineffective safety and security measures, 
inadequate implementation of strategic and business plans and poor reputation of the 
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institutions. But it is surprising that the governors did not mention research and the third 
mission activities as classes of risks that require the special attention of university 
governing bodies. It seems the challenges imposed on universities by their external 
operating environment have contributed to the new and increased risks confronting the 
institutions. 
The evidence from the accounts of the governors in this study, the HEFCE (2005) risk 
framework and the lack of any theoretical and empirical literature on risk governance 
behaviours of university governing bodies seem to indicate that the whole practice of risk 
governance and management is a new phenomenon in the governance of higher education 
institutions in the UK aimed at ensuring the strategic risks of the institutions are 
identified and managed effectively to enable the universities to achieve their purposes. 
10.3 University Governing Bodies: Accountable to Whom? 
The evidence from the study showed university governors perceived multiple 
accountability roles for their governing bodies, but there exists an apparent lack of 
consensus within the ranks of the governors concerning the exact accountability of the 
governing bodies in the accountability process of the universities. It is this type of 
scenario that made Kogan et al (1984) conclude that governing bodies of educational 
establishment were uncertain and confused about their accountability. Three decades later 
this seems to still be the case. 
There is little evidence from this study to suggest that stakeholder accountability is 
formally practised by the governing body as has been done in schools and in business 
corporations through the mechanism of annual general meetings where annual reports are 
presented to the stakeholders. Even in institutions in this study where university courts 
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exist, the governing bodies hardly present annual reports to these bodies. It is rather the 
vice chancellors that render accounts to their courts. 
The evidence from the study showed that the authority, mechanism and the forum for 
university governing bodies to practise stakeholder accountability do not exist thereby 
resulting in a lack of `dialogue of accountability' (Thomas and Martin, 1996) and a 
glaring `accountability deficit' (Bargh et al, 1996; Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000; 
Hanberger, 2006) between them and the diverse stakeholders and the society at large they 
claim to represent. The self-perpetuating nature of the university governing bodies and 
the criteria for recruitment of lay governors appear to suggest that they are not democratic 
bodies and this may have accounted for the accountability deficit observed in lay 
university governance in this study. Even the composition and size of university 
governing bodies as presently constituted based on the provisions of the Education 
Reform Act 1988, the Jarratt Report (1985) and the Dearing Report (1997) limit to a large 
extent the participation of internal and external stakeholder groups in institutional 
governance and invariably does not support stakeholder accountability. The stakeholder 
theory of board corporate governance perspective does not appear to explain the 
accountability deficit of the university governing 
bodies in this study because the charters 
and statutes of universities as well as the structures and processes of these decision- 
making bodies do not support stakeholder accountability, 
despite their having numerous 
stakeholders. 
The empirical evidence from this study appears to 
indicate that the role of the governing 
bodies in the accountability process of the universities is calling and holding the vice 
chancellors to account 
for the finances and the achievement of the strategic objectives of 
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the institutions based on the authority provided by the charters and statutes of institutions 
as well as in the Education Reform Act 1988. However, in schools, the legislation of the 
Education (Schools) Act 1992 provided for the accountability of the governing bodies to 
parents and the OFSTED inspectors (Farrell and Law, 1999). 
The overwhelming evidence from the study appears to suggest that the university 
governing bodies in this study are not accountable bodies and are therefore not formally 
accountable in any way to any body despite the enormous responsibilities placed on them 
by government and their empowerment by the various higher education governance 
reform reports and the Education Reform Act 1988. The university governors and their 
governing bodies do not appear to reflect on their own accountability because the 
responsibility for the accountability of the university has been officially delegated to the 
vice chancellors. 
10.4 Performance Review of Governing Bodies 
Various corporate governance reforms in both the public and private sectors have 
emphasised the need for regular review of the effectiveness of performance of governing 
boards, their committees and the individual members of the governing board (Dearing, 
1997; Higgs, 2002; Cadbury, 1992; CUC, 2004). 
Holland, Chait and Taylor (1989) conducted an effectiveness study of trustees of 
governing boards of colleges and universities in the United States but there are no such 
empirical studies on university governing bodies in UK. This study therefore examined 
this issue in order to advance the literature on corporate governance in UK universities 
and possibly contribute to the development of a theory of the effectiveness of 
performance of university governing bodies. 
286 
The study identified various elements perceived by the university governors to contribute 
to the effectiveness of the governing bodies as the human resources (expertise and 
experience possessed by the individual governors), the development and improvement of 
the governors' capacity to govern, compliance of the governing body with governance 
codes and legal frameworks and the achievement of the approved strategic objectives of 
the institution. However, it appears most of the perceived elements of effectiveness are 
input and process issues that lead to the effectiveness of the governing body, whereas 
effectiveness is an output measure as well as a process issue. The element of achievement 
of strategic objectives of the 
institution appears to be the only outcome issue among the 
lot that can be described as a measure of effectiveness. Also the element of compliance 
with governance codes and frameworks 
is perceived by the university governors in this 
study to be one dimension of the effectiveness of university governing bodies that is 
regarded highly by the higher education 
funding councils and the CUC (2004) guide. All 
the elements of effectiveness perceived and experienced by the governors are consistent 
with those mentioned by various researchers 
in the literature on board governance. The 
evidence from the study showed that the governing 
bodies in this study appear to 
determine the effectiveness of their own performance based on their collective 
perceptions of what constitutes effectiveness of 
the bodies. 
The evidence from the study also showed that all seven university governing bodies had 
reviewed the effectiveness of 
their governance practices using the CUC (2004) 
governance guide as the 
benchmark as well as the effectiveness of performance of their 
governing bodies at 
least once. This is in compliance with the recommendations of the 
CUC (2004) governance framework as well as an indication of their commitment to 
287 
improving their governance performance. The evidence from the case studies also 
showed that while the governing bodies of the Pre-1992 universities engaged the services 
of an external assessor to assist in the conduct of the review, their Post-1992 counterparts 
depended on specially appointed committees or the secretaries to the governing bodies 
for the purpose. But the use of independent external assessors for the review exercise 
could result in a fair assessment and less bias process. 
The evidence from the study indicated that the review of the effectiveness of performance 
of individual governors and the standing committees is not a common practice among the 
university governing bodies as only one of these bodies has assessed the performance of 
its governors within the period of the study. This does not accord with the 
recommendation of the Dearing Report (1997) and the CUC (2004) that require 
governing bodies to review the performance of their governors in order to improve their 
governance effectiveness. 
The study found a noticeable divergence of opinion among the respondents in this study 
as to whether the performance of individual members of the governing body should be 
assessed or not. This appears to be a controversial issue which could challenge the 
phenomenon of lay governance in universities in UK. I argue that the effectiveness of the 
performance of individual governors should not be assessed because governance is a 
corporate and collective activity. 
However, the evidence from the study showed that performance reviews have gradually 
permeated the governance activities of university governing bodies in the UK. The 
management of performance such as this appears to be one of the organisational 
management practices of `New Managerialism' which is a set of organisational practices 
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commonly found in the private sector of the economy adopted to manage public 
institutions under the reform initiative of government to management performances of 
organisations and individuals (Deem, 1998; Newman, 2001). 
10.5 The Current Higher Education Governance System in England and Scotland 
Starting from the mid-1980s, corporate governance was proposed for adoption by 
universities in the UK by various government-initiated higher education reform reports as 
the most appropriate governance model that could enable higher education institutions to 
cope with the pressures imposed by a dynamic social, economic and political 
environment. The academic-dominated collegial model of governance was perceived by 
government to be inadequate in overcoming these challenges as a result of cuts in the 
funding of universities as well as the expansion of the system-from elite to a mass higher 
education system (Bargh et al, 1996; Berdahl, 1990; Shattock, 1999). 
The governance reforms in the higher education sector also mirror to a large extent new 
developments in corporate governance practices taking place in the private sector of the 
economy such as recommendations that governing boards should play an active role in 
strategy, engage in risk governance and review their effectiveness as well as the 
modernisation agenda of public 
institutions by the New Labour government, such as 
accountability, organisational efficiency and effectiveness, performance -review and 
collaboration and value-for-money. 
University governing bodies are expected to initiate 
and institutionalise these governance reform practices 
in their various institutions. It is 
within these proposed governance reforms 
that university governing bodies are expected 
to be change agents (Bargh et al, 
1996) and exhibit effective leadership which could alter 
the governance and management cultures of 
their institutions. Governors are also 
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expected to be proactive and active in exhibiting effective and accountable leadership in 
controlling and directing the affairs of their institutions to enable them to accomplish 
their role in society. But are university governing bodies as presently constituted (as a 
result of the Higher Education governance reforms) really reshaping the governance 
system of their institutions as proposed by the reforms? The answer to this question is 
presented below. 
The evidence from the study and the review of the literature on university governance 
show that the governance roles and practices of university governing bodies have 
expanded as a result of the various higher education governance reforms and 
developments in corporate governance in the private sector and the modernising of public 
institutions programme of government. The adoption of governance practices prescribed 
in the CUC (2004) governance framework derived from those in the UK Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance and the regulatory mechanisms put in place for their 
compliance by government through the higher education funding councils have enabled 
these reforms initiatives to be implemented by the university governing bodies. 
It appears certain governance practices associated with business organisations such as 
strategy, performance review and risk governance that were hitherto unknown 
governance roles and practices in UK universities arc some of the new practices which 
have infiltrated the governance landscape of the seven universities in this study. The 
seeming institutionalisation of these practices may have been brought about by the 
presence of lay governors recruited from industry and business, with experience in 
corporate governance and management issues, in the seven university governing bodies. 
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These are persons who are familiar and engaged with these business practices daily in 
their paid employment in the private sector. 
The active participation of these lay governors in the strategic debates and decisions of 
the institutions seems to have made most of the governing bodies in this study become 
proactive in institutional governance and has also enhanced their leadership capacity as 
the ultimate decision-making bodies in the universities. The active participation of the 
university governing bodies in strategy also appears to spur the executives of the 
institutions into thinking more strategically and encouraging them to engage in strategic 
planning activities, since they now have governing bodies that watch over their 
managerial activities. 
Empirical evidence from this study also indicated that the previous reactive (Bargh et al, 
1996) and passive (Shattock, 2003; Bennett, 2002) role of university governing bodies in 
strategic decision-making processes of universities identified in the literature may be 
changing to a more proactive and active role in the institutions in this study. In the 
performance of their governance activities, the university governors bring external 
perspectives to bear on various strategic debates and decisions especially in the non- 
academic areas of their universities, such as finance, audit, personnel, estate, business 
management and entrepreneurship. There 
is, however, no evidence from this study to 
suggest that the lay governors have brought these business practices to bear on the core 
academic activities of teaching, 
learning and research activities of the institutions or even 
on the strategies for implementing these activities, since these have been delegated to the 
academic senates (boards) of the 
institutions. However, it seems the governing bodies can 
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take decisions on the financial aspects of these programmes since they fall within the area 
of their decision-making. 
The evidence from the study also showed that the lay governors appear to lack adequate 
knowledge of a higher education sector they are expected to govern effectively and there 
is also indication of the presence of a glaring information asymmetry between them and 
the executives of the institutions. These appear to have resulted in the lay governors 
engaging in collaborative governance relationships with the executive and the academic 
boards in areas such as strategy in five of the seven institutions in this study, despite the 
statutory separation of the roles and responsibilities of these decision-making bodies. 
Also in two of the Post-1992 universities in this study, the academic boards have allowed 
the lay governors to attend their meetings as observers in order to strengthen this 
collaborative endeavour. 
There is enough evidence from this study to suggest that many aspects of the proposed 
higher education governance reforms in England and Scotland have been implemented 
and the governance approach adopted by the institutional governing bodies seemed to be 
a corporate style of governance in the case study universities as a result of the higher 
education governance reforms proposed by the Jarratt Report in 1985 and the Education 
Reform Act 1988. The business background of the majority of the lay governors on the 
university governing bodies in this study, who serve as the governance change agents 
(Bargh et al (1996), appears to have enabled them to facilitate the entrenchment of a 
corporate culture of governance which is prevalent in the private sector as recommended 
and legislated by the various reform reports and Acts of Parliament respectively. The 
evidence from the study showed that although the institutional and the country case study 
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universities adopt a common governance framework as recommended by the CUC 
(2004), they appear to exhibit some local differences in practice in some areas of 
governance. This difference could be attributed to the peculiar contextual characteristics 
and histories of the establishment of the individual universities. 
The literature on higher education governance did not show that this was how university 
governing bodies in the UK operated in the past. Prior to the higher education governance 
reform initiatives, lay governors were not appointed based on the possession of any 
particular professional qualifications, skills, expert knowledge or experience in any field 
of human endeavour. But the governance reform has brought about a re-definition of the 
meaning of lay governors and lay governance in universities in the UK. The Jarratt 
Report (1985) seems not to have had an immediate effect on the governance of 
universities as evident in the study conducted by Bargh et al (1996) because its 
recommendations were slow in implementation as a result of the initial resistance by the 
universities. But after about 20 years, the evidence in this study strongly suggests that a 
lot of the Jarratt (1985) recommendations are now being implemented by the universities 
in this study. Based on the literature on collegial governance in universities and the 
evidence in this study it appears a lot of the cultural emphasis of the institutions has 
massively shifted from the collegial to corporate culture of governance and management. 
However, this study was unable to determine exactly when the shift took place. Some of 
the implications of this shift in governance culture would be less participation of 
academics in key decisions of their 
institutions and the overwhelming presence of 
'business governors' on university governing bodies, who may not really understand the 
academic side of the higher education corporation. The corporate culture of governance 
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and management adopted by the universities could also lead to more commercialisation 
efforts in the universities but which may distract attention from the core academic 
business of the institutions and even compromise academic values. But basically the 
proactive strategy and risk governance practices of the university governing bodies in this 
study would enable the institutions to focus on the future direction of the universities and 
to ensure and assure the accomplishment of the purpose of the institutions. However, 
despite the adoption of corporate governance practices by the university governing bodies 
in this study, they appear to be unaccountable and risk-averse bodies, much unlike their 
counterpart boards in business and industry that are accountable to their stakeholders and 
also risk-taking. 
10.6 The Role of Theory in University Governance 
In the literature of governance, there is a noticeable absence of an overarching theory of 
university governance to explain and understand the activities of university governing 
bodies. In this study, an attempt was made to adopt a multi-theoretic framework to 
explain and interpret the various governance roles and practices of the seven university 
governing bodies. The evidence from this study indicates that no single theory seemed 
capable of describing and explaining all the governance roles and practices of these 
governing bodies as each theory focuses and illuminates only a particular dimension of 
governance. University governance is a complex practice as evident in the multiple and 
sometimes conflicting goals which the institutions attempt to accomplish at the same 
time. For example, university governing bodies are required to determine the strategic 
directions of their institutions yet government would want to impose some of its 
programmes on them. They are required to maintain high quality education in a mass 
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higher education system within a constrained funding base. This complexity makes it 
difficult for one particular theory to explain the various governance activities of 
university governing bodies. The role of each of the theories adopted in this study in 
explaining various aspects of university governance is presented below. 
In this study, the agency theory was used to explain the accountability relationship 
between universities and the higher education funding councils on one hand and' the 
governing body and the executive on the other. The higher education funding councils (as 
principals in this case) hold the universities to account for the use of the monies allocated 
to them for specific purposes. Without this holding to account by the funding councils, 
the universities could use the monies to pursue their own special interests to the exclusion 
of the purpose for which the monies were allocated to the institutions by government. 
The regulation of the higher education sector by government and the higher education 
funding councils seem to account for the dominance of the agency theory perspective in 
terms of the accountability relationship between the universities and the funding councils 
and also between the governing body and the executive of the institutions. The agency 
theory perspective is about the governing body ensuring the compliance of the executive 
with the wishes and interests of government and the strategic goals of their institutions. 
But agency theory may not be able to explain the need for collaboration between the 
governing bodies and the executives during the strategy process of the universities which 
the stewardship theory expounds. 
The stewardship theory assumes that the lay governors on the governing bodies of these 
universities are a resource themselves 
because of their expertise, skills and knowledge in 
managerial practices, which they could 
deploy to `add value' to the strategic decisions 
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and processes of the institutions. The operation of this perspective was most visible in the 
proactive-active approach to strategy adopted by most of the university governing bodies 
in this study where their strategy role was to collaboratively determine the strategic 
direction and the strategies of the universities with the executive and the senate. They 
work collaboratively with the management to guide the university in accomplishing its 
purpose. They were also able to use their knowledge and experience of corporate 
practices to effect the desired changes in the governance and management practices of 
their universities as evident in the various governance reform areas examined in this 
study. The theory assumes that both the governing body and the executive work together 
to achieve the purpose of the university. 
The stakeholder theory perspective assumes that the different stakeholder groups of an 
organisation would be represented on its governing board so that their varied interests 
would be taken into consideration during governance decision-making and* for the 
governing body to be accountable to the stakeholders. But this theory was found to be 
inapplicable to most of the university governing bodies in this study because of the 
Education Reform Act 1988, the Jarratt (1985) and the Dearing (1997) reports legislated 
and recommended limited representation of stakeholders of these governance bodies. 
This has created the accountability deficit observed among the governing bodies in this 
study. 
In the managerial hegemony theory, it is management that controls the organisation 
through the determination of the strategic direction and strategies of the institutions. The 
role of the board is limited to reviewing and approving the strategic decisions of the 
executive. The managerial hegemony theory perspective was used to explain and 
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interpret the dominance of the executive and the limited role of the governing body in the 
reactive-passive approach to strategy adopted by two of the institutions in this study. In 
the reactive-passive approach to strategy, it is the executive that initiates the strategy 
process, determines the strategic direction and the strategies of the institutions as well as 
implementing them to achieve the purpose of the institutions. The role of the governing 
bodies was confined to taking strategic decisions by approving the strategic proposals of 
the executive. The role of the governing bodies in this perspective is to legitimise the 
decisions and actions of the executive (Cornforth, 2003). Neither the stewardship theory 
nor the agency theory can explain the reactive-passive approach to strategy. 
The class hegemony theory perspective was used to explain the recruitment of corporate 
elites and professionals and their majority presence on university governing bodies to the 
exclusion of persons from other segments of the society in a mass higher education 
system that values social inclusion which appears to be' a paradox. This theory posits that 
elites attempt to install and propagate themselves in key positions in government and 
organisations in order to take control of these institutions through various recruitment 
practices that exclude persons from lower segments of society (Adam and Tomsic, 2002; 
Sample, 2006; Spengler, 1944). 
In terms of governing the risks of the universities, the technocratic perspective based on 
the realist view was used to explain the particular way the governing bodies direct the 
executive to ensure that the strategic risks of the universities are identified, assessed and 
managed effectively. The realist perspective views risk as an objective reality that exists 
and which needs to be identified and assessed to ascertain its severity on the organisation 
and to mitigate its effect (Bradbury, 1989; Beck, 1999; Lupton, 1999; Stahl et al, 2003; 
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Zinn, 2006). It adopts a rational means of assessing risks in an organisation. For example, 
in the risk registers presented to the governing bodies of some of the universities in this 
study, the identified risks were calculated and classified as high, medium and low risk. 
The realist and technocratic perspective of risk was used to explain the approach to risk 
governance adopted by the university governing bodies in this study. 
The university governing bodies were found to have adopted the risk management 
framework recommended by the higher education funding councils to guide the risk 
governance and management practices in UK universities. The risk framework put in 
place by the funding councils and recommended for adoption by the universities is 
viewed as a set of practices or strategy directed at ensuring that the funds allocated to the 
institutions are used efficiently to achieve some purposes without incurring losses. This 
appears to be one explanation for the risk-averse attitude of the seven university 
governing bodies in this study which is perceived as rational behaviour by the governors. 
This study has offered comprehensive analyses of how the existing organisational 
theories can explain in piecemeal the governance activities of the seven governing bodies 
in this study. The evidence from the study reveals that the empirical study and practice of 
university governance requires a multi-theoretic approach to illuminate and explain 
various aspects of governance roles and practices of the university governing bodies in 
this study. There was no overarching organisational theory that could explain the whole 
of the governance role and activities of the university governing bodies in this study. The 
reason for this could be that the universities operate in a different context from other 
organisations such as schools and business. There are certain distinctive and unique 
aspects that are peculiar to universities that are not necessarily found in other types of 
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organisations that could limit the applicability of the theories in these institutions. Such 
things include research, research assessment, international market for staff and students, 
academic governance, fund-raising activities, etc. However; the agency theory, 
stewardship theory, managerial hegemony theory, class hegemony theory and the realist 
perspective of risk theory were found to be most useful in explaining and interpreting 
some aspects of the governance roles and practices of the seven university governing 
bodies in this study. 
As stated in the previous section, the study also provided an opportunity to develop some 
tentative theories of motivation for participation in university governance and theory of 
effectiveness of performance of university governing bodies. The efficacy of these 
theories could be tested to further empirically examine the motivation and effectiveness 
of university governing bodies in the UK. 
10.7 Methodological Limitations 
In a study as this, it should be expected that there would be some methodological 
challenges in conducting a comparative multiple case study research of a phenomenon as 
complex as university governance in England and Scotland. The complexity is even made 
more pronounced given that each of the seven institutions has their own peculiar 
contextual characteristics, which make comparisons among the case study institutions 
more difficult. 
One of the problems of conducting a study examining the perceptions people have about 
their practice through semi-structured interviews is that their perceptions may not 
necessarily translate into what they actually do. Due to the limited time and resources 
available for the study, only one meeting of each of the five governing bodies that 
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granted access was observed. The number of observations made may not be enough to 
make significant claims about the interpretations of some of the data. I did not have the 
opportunity to observe the strategy committee or the special strategy meetings conveyed 
by the governing bodies to discuss strategy since such meetings did not take place within 
the period of the field studies. This could limit the extent to which claims can be made 
about the extent of lay participation as well as the types of contributions they make to 
strategic debates of the institutions. Whatever claims that were made in this regard could 
be regarded as tentative. 
It is also worth mentioning that a few of the study participants did not respond to some of 
the questions, especially when they did not feel comfortable about them. For example, 
only 19 governors responded to questions on the issue of motivation. They would rather 
prefer to talk about other issues. Also time constraints did not enable me to explore this 
aspect with some respondents. All these factors could constitute a limitation on the 
conclusions that can be drawn from such data. 
Some key participants in the governance of universities which were not interviewed were 
the vice chancellors who could have given more insight and alternative perspective to the 
activities of their governing bodies. However, it was felt that it would be difficult to gain 
access to the vice chancellors in the time available for the fieldwork. 
With the benefit of hindsight, a questionnaire survey distributed to the participants to 
collect some information on the activities of the governing bodies could have illuminated 
and strengthened some of the conclusions reached in this study, especially those that 
border on the question of the effectiveness of the governing bodies. 
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However, this study is not without its strengths. For instance, most research on governing 
boards of organisations had been conducted based on questionnaire survey and interviews 
but in this study I was able to observe some of the meetings of the university governing 
bodies in order to gain a greater insight into how they actually perform some of their 
governance activities. Gaining access to observe board meetings is a rarity in university 
governance research. Also related to this is the issue of the difficulty experienced by 
researchers in gaining access to interview corporate elites such as members of boards of 
organisations as discussed in Chapter 5. This difficulty appears to be responsible for the 
paucity of empirical research on the activities of university governing bodies in the UK, 
despite all the governance reforms that had taken place in the system. But in this study, 
that barrier was broken and this is the first empirical study after more than a decade of 
reforms without any studies being conducted in this area. 
10.8 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations that could improve 
the practice of university governance are made: 
1. Representation: Although it appears the universities in this study operate a 
corporate style of governance which limits the participation of staff (academic 
and non-academic) in governance, there could still be provision for more 
academic representation on the governing bodies of these institutions in view of 
the peculiar nature of academic governance, where most of the lay governors have 
limited knowledge of academic business of the university. This recommendation 
if implemented could strengthen the collaboration between the governing body 
and the senate in governance. 
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2. Strategic Leadership: In order to enable the governing body to perform its 
strategic role of leading the university to achieve its purpose, all university 
governing bodies could adopt a proactive-active approach to strategy which 
would ensure every member is given an opportunity to participate in the strategy 
process and contribute to the strategic debates and decisions of the institutions in 
order to direct the future of their institutions. 
3. Accountability: As the leaders of a public institution, university governing 
bodies cannot afford to abdicate their accountability responsibility to the 
stakeholders of the institutions. In order to make them accountable as corporate 
leaders, universities should establish a stakeholder forum (like the university 
courts in the Pre-1992 institutions) where the chair of governors and the vice 
chancellor could formally and jointly account to the stakeholders for the 
performance of the institutions. The chair of governors could give a summary of 
the annual report while the vice chancellor should present the details of the 
performance of the university including the statement of account to the 
stakeholders at an annual meeting. Institutions that operate university courts could 
use that as their stakeholder forum. 
4. Theory Development: Since there is presently no single corporate governance 
theory that can explain all aspects of the governance activities of university 
governing bodies, researchers should make efforts to rethink some kind of 
theoretical frameworks that could explain university governance fully. 
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10.9 Area of Further Research 
There are certain aspects of the governance roles and practices of university governing 
bodies that were either not covered at all or the coverage was inadequate in this study, 
which could be examined in the future. 
Firstly, it was not possible to examine the whole governance role set as perceived by the 
respondents in this study. Those not examined include the compliance, audit, monitoring 
and external relations roles. These roles could be explored in the future. A comparative 
study of the views of the lay governors vis-ä-vis those of the vice chancellors should be 
sought in respect of the performance of these roles by the university governing bodies. 
Secondly, more empirical studies needed to be conducted in the area of the strategy role 
of university governing bodies by observing the extent of lay governors' involvement and 
what kinds of contributions they make to the strategic debates of the institutions during 
special strategy meetings or the meetings of strategy committees. 
Thirdly, research could also be conducted to examine the committee structure of 
university governing bodies and the extent of lay participation and contribution to the 
deliberations and decisions of these committees. 
In summary, this chapter presented some strong evidence that the seven university 
governing bodies have adopted a corporate approach to governance in order to 
strategically direct their institutions within an effective risk governance and management 
framework in order to accomplish their purposes. In adopting a corporate approach to 
governance, new governance and management practices that were hitherto unknown to 
higher education institutions have been introduced into the governance landscape of the 
institutions. I have also made some recommendations that could improve the practice of 
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APPENDIX A: PROFILE OF UNIVERSITY GOVERNORS 
S/ Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ Work 
N Governor Status (Years Occupational -ing 
on Gov. Status Stat- 
Bod us 
I Mrs. Carlton Gangeshire, Scotland F Lay Gov Law/I icalth Acti- 
Post-92 (4 yrs) Snr. staff we 
2 Mr. Gangeshire, Scotland M Lay Gov Accountant Rtrd 
Maclaren Post-92 (6y ) rs NED 
3 Mr. Charles Gangeshire, Scotland M Chair (lyr) Engr. /Market/ Acti- 
Post-92 CEO/NED ve 
4 Mr. Gangeshire, Scotland M Lay Gov Acct/Mgt Con/ Acti- 
La erf ield Post-92 7 rs CEO/Chair we 
5 Bloomfield St. Pancras, Scotland M Lay Gov (3yrs Ed. Adm. /Snr Acti- 
Post-92 Manager vc 
6 Prof. St. Pancras, Scotland M Chair (5yrs) Engr. /Bus/ Acti- 
Roberts Post-92 CEO/Chair ve 
7 Prof. George St. Pancras, Scotland M Senate Rep Prof. of Fin/ Acti- 
Post-92 3 rs Acct we 
8 Mr. St. Pancras, Scotland M Staff Rep Economics Acti- 
Richards Post-92 (3y ) rs Bus Exec we 
9 Mrs Keith St. Pancras, Scotland F Senate Rep (18 Acad Staff Acti- 
Post-92 months) we 
10 Dr. Miller Stokefield, Scotland F Chair (7yrs) Solicitor/ CEO Acti- 
Pre-92 we 
II Mr. Stokefield, Scotland M Lay Gov Engr., MD Acti- 
Silberston Pre-92 8 rs we 
12 Prof. Stokefield, Scotland M Senate D/Prin/ Prof. Acti- 
Kenneth Pre-92 Re 3 rs of English ve 
13 Mr. Fratton Ashgrove, England M Lay Gov Acct/ Fin. Dir. Acti- 
Post-92 7 rs ve 
14 Mr. Ashgrove, England M Lay Gov Univ. Admin. Acti- 
Matthew Post-92 (4y ) rs MD ve 
15 Mr. Francis Ashgrove. England M Lay Gov MD Acti- 
Post-92 R rs we 
16 Mr. Lander Liberty Trust, England M Lay Gov Market/Comm Acti- 
Post-92 6 rs CEO ve 
17 Mr. Barry Liberty Trust, England M Chair (1 yr) Bus/ Acct, Acti- 
Post-92 CEO, Intl Ex p. we 
18 Mr. Liberty Trust, England M. Staff Rep Bus. Admin Acti- 
Atkinson Post-92 2 rs we 
19 Mrs Thomas Waterloo, England F Lay Gov/ Rep. Pers Mgt/ Rtrd 
Pre-92 of Univ Court Chair of Schl 
(6yrs) GB. Voluntary 
work ex r. 
20 Dr. Blade Waterloo, England M Lay Gov Solicitor, LLI3 Acti- 
Pre-92 (10yrs) MD we 
21 Mr. David Waterloo, England M Lay Gov Engr/ Acti- 
Pre-92 (3yrs) Fin. Managcr we 
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22 Mr. Waterloo, England M Chair (4yrs) Univ. Acti- 
Carrington Pre-92 Prof. /Chart'd ve 
Acct/ MD, Dir. 
of Pies. NED 
of 3 Plcs. 
Chair of Govt 
parastals. 
23 Mr. West Albion, England M Chair (4yrs) CEO/IT Cons, Rtrd 
Lawrence Pre-92 Chair of 2 Plc, 
Lay gov. in 3 
schis. Member 
CUC 
24 Mr. Tyler West Albion, England M Lay Gov Former Snr. Rtrd 
Pre-92 (2yrs) Public Servant 
25 Prof. Joseph West Albion, England M Pro-VC (6yrs) Pro-VC/Prof Acti- 
Pre-92 of Maths ve 
26 Prof. West Albion, England M Senate Rep Prof. of Acti- 
Simpson Pre-92 (lyr) Physics/ Dean ve 
of Faculty 
27 Prof. Mrs. West Albion, England F Pro-VC (2yrs) Prof. of Acti- 
Kay Pre-92 Accounting ve 
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APPENDIX B: Number of Motivations of University Governors 
S/ Name of University Sex Membership Professional/ No. 
N Governor Status/Years Occupational or 
Status Moty 
1 Mrs. Carlton Gangeshire, Scotland, Post-92 F Lay Gov (4) Law/I Icalth 4 
2 Mr. Gangeshire, Scotland, Post-92 M Lay Gov (6) Accountant 4 
Maclaren 
3 Mr. Charles Gangeshire, Scotland, post-92 M Chair (1) 3 
Engr. /Market/ 
CEO/NED 
4 Mr. Gangeshire, Scotland, post-92 M Lay Gov (7) Acct/Mgt Con/ 2 
Lagerfeld CEO 
5 Bloomfield 1 St. Pancras, Scotland, post-92 M Lay Gov (3) Ed. AdmJCEO 4 
/MD 
6 Prof. St. Pancras, Scotland, post-92 M Chair (S) Engr. /Bus/ 3 
Roberts MD, Visiting 
Univ Prof. 
7 Prof George St. Pancras, Scotland, post-92 M Senate Rep Prof. of Fin/ 1 I Acct 
8 Mrs Keith St. Pancras, Scotland, post-92 F Senate Rep (2) 1 
9 Dr. Miller Stokefield, Scotland, Pre-92 F Chair (7) Solicitor/ CEO 2 
10 Mr. Stokefield, Scotland, Pre-92 M Lay Gov (8) Engr. 2 
Silberstop 
11 Prof. Stokefield, Scotland, Pre-92 M Senate Rep(3) D/Prin/ Prof. I 
Kenneth of English 
12 Mr. Fratton Ash grove, England, post-92 M Lay Gov (7) Acct/-Fin. Dir. 1 
13 Mr. Ashgrove, England, post-92 M Lay Gov (4) Univ. Admin. 3 
Matthew 
14 Mr. Francis Ash ove, England, Post-92 M Lay Gov(8) MD 
15 Mr. Lander Liberty Trust, EnglandPost-92 M Lay Gov (6) 4 
16 Mr. Barry Liberty Trust, EnglandPost-92 M Chair (1) Bus/ Acct, 4 
CEO, Intl Ex p. 
17 Mrs Thomas Waterloo, England, Pre-92 F Lay Gov/ Rep. Pcrs Mgt/ 4 
of Univ Court Chair, Schl 
(6) GB. Voluntary 
work exp. 
18 Dr. Blade Waterloo, England, Pre-92 M Lay Gov (10) Solicitor 2 
19 Mr. David Waterloo, England, Pre-92 M Lay Gov Engr/ I 
Fin. M t,. 
20 Mr. Waterloo, England, Pre-92 M Chair (4) Univ. 3 
Carrington Prof. /Chartd 
Acct/ CEO, Dir 
of Plcs. NED 
of 3 Plcs. 
Chair of Govt 
para. 
21 Mr. West Albion, England, Pre-92 M Chair (4) CEO/IT Cons, 2 
Lawrence Chair of 2 Plc, 




22 Mr. Tyler West Albion, England, Pre-92 M Lay Gov (2) Former DIES 3 
Dir, Member, 
HEFCE Board 
23 Prof. Joseph West Albion, England, Pre-92 M Ex-officio (6) Pro-VC/Prof 2 
of Maths 
24 Prof. West Albion, England, Pre-92 M Senate Rep (1) Prof. of 3 
Simpson Physics/ Dean 
of Faculty 
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APPENDIX C: RESEARCH INTERVIEW GUIDE 
PRESENT ROLE/EXPERIENCE AS GOVERNOR 
  When were you first appointed into the governing body of this university? 
  How did you become a governor in this university? 
  What were your motivations for wanting to serve as a university governor? 
" Are you on any of the sub-committees of this governing body? If so which ones? 
Why were you appointed to these committees? 
" How have you found the experience of being a governor in this university? Is it 
different from what you expected? 
  Have you been a governor or board member in any other educational 
establishment/organisation? In what capacity did you serve there (Chair/Chair of 
committee/ member) 
  Tell me a little bit about your background. 
GOVERNORS ROLES AND FUNCTIONS 
  What do you think are the main governance roles of governors arc in this 
university? 
  In your view what are the main activities or functions undertaken by the 
governing body of this university. 
" Which particular ones do you perceive as being the most important? 
" What do you think are the major current issues for UK universities from your 
point of view? 
POLICY MATTERS 
  Can you mention some government higher education policies that have 
significantly affected the governance structures and activities of this governing 
body? 
" What sense can you make of such policies and their effects? 
" What was the procedure adopted for formulating these policies? 
  Has the governing body recently needed to review any existing policies? If so can 
you give an example? Why was the policy reviewed? What has come of the 
review? 
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  How are new government policies and directives handled by the governing body? 
  How are new government policies and directives discussed and implemented by 
the governing body? 
DECISION-MAKING 
a What is the procedure for putting issues for discussion on the agenda of your 
meetings? 
  How is decision making carried out by the governing body? Is the consensus of 
members of governing body sought before decisions are made? How is the 
consensus sought? Why is consensus sought? 
" What kind of issues do you discuss at the formal meetings of the governing body 
and why do you think these issues are important? 
  How do you as a governing body gather information that enables you to make 
good decisions? 
  How would you react to the view that university governing bodies act as "rubber 
stamp" for the decisions of management and committees? 
STRATEGY AND FINANCE 
" What role do the governing body play in the strategy process of the university? 
" To what extent are lay governors involved in the strategy process of the 
university? 
  Why is it necessary to have strategies for this university? 
" What do the governing body do with the strategic plan? 
  How would you as a governing body know that the strategic objectives are being 
achieved? 
  What role does the governing body play in the budgeting process? 
" Has the governing body offered any suggestions for fund-raising recently? If so 
can you tell me about it? 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
  To whom is the governing body accountable? Why do you think so? 
" How do you relate with the different stakeholders of the university? Who are 
these stakeholders? 
" To whom is the academic senate / board accountable? Why do you think so? 
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  How do you ensure accountability in the system? 
RISK GOVERNANCE 
  What is your perception about risk in the university? 
  Do you as a governing body engage in risk governance? If so, what are some of 
the risk that confronts the university? 
" Why are these risks important? 
  Do you also assess the risks associated with your governance activities apart from 
those of the institution? 
RECRUITMENT AND COMPOSITION OF GOVERNING BODY 
" How do you as a governing body recruit new members? 
" Do you know of a better way members can be recruited? 
" What attributes and competences do you look out for in potential lay governors 
during recruitment that would enable them perform their governance roles 
effectively? 
  Are there any skills, knowledge and experience you think arc lacking in your 
governing body? If any, how would that affect the performance of the governing 
body? 
  How do you as a governing body maximise the use of skills, knowledge and 
experiences of lay governors? 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
" How do you ensure the effectiveness of your governance practice? 
  How do you assess the effectiveness of the performance of the governing body, 
the committees and the individual lay governors? 
  Are there other means of evaluating this effectiveness? 
" What achievements of the university are attributed to the activities of the 
governing body? 
" What do you think can make the governing body to be effective? 
" Are you aware of the CUC governance framework document? If so, what are your 
views on it? 
" Which aspect of the framework document would you want amcndcd in view of 
your experience as a governor? 
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RELATIONSHIP WITH VICE CHANCELLOR/EXECUTIVE 
  What role does the vice chancellor play in the governing body? 
  Do you think there is any conflict or disagreement between the governing body 
and the vice chancellor concerning their respective roles? If so what is the source 
of this? Is it resolvable? What role does the Vice Chancellor/Principal play in the 
governing body? 
  How would you describe the relationship between the governing body and the 
current Vice Chancellor/Principal? Why do you think so? Is it a trusting 
relationship? Why do you think so? 
" In what ways do you as a governing body support the vice chancellor? 
" How have you been able to differentiate between the governance roles of the 
governing body and the management roles of the vice chancellor? 
GOVERNING BODY RELATIONSHIP 
" How would you describe the relationship between the governing body and the 
academic senate/board of the university? 
  Why do think so? 
  What is the relationship between the governing body and the university court? 
Are there any conflict between the present role of the governing body and that of 
court? If so, how can it be resolved? 
  How does the university governing body monitor and react to significant external 
trends that have consequences for the university? 
  Can you give any recent examples? 
  Have you as a body discussed the issue of linkage/co-operation between this 
university and industry/business? If so, what was the outcome? 
" Are there ways that these linkages /co-operations could be improved? 
GOVERNORS' TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT 
  How is training and development of the governing body carried out? Is this 
necessary for the individual members and the body as a whole? If so, why? 
" What kinds of training and development issues are you are you exposed to? 
  How do you identify the training and development needs of the governing body? 
  How do you determine what constitutes good governance practice? 
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Name, gender, age, occupation, highest 
educational qualification, ethnicity, etc. (Information will be obtained using a mini 
questionnaire). 
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APPENDIX D: THEMATIC FRAMEWORK 
1. Theme: Recruitment (REC) 
Sub-Themes: Appointments/Recruitments (APR), Recruitment Role (RCR), 
Recruitment through Interview (RTI), Recruitment through Co-optation (RTC), 
Recruitment through Apprenticeship (RTA) 
2. Theme: Motivation (MOT) 
Sub-Themes: Advancing Previous Relationship (APR), Development of Community 
(DCM), Development of Governing Body (DGB), Development of University (DUV), 
Group Representation (GRR), Job Responsibility (JRP), Perceived Motivation (PMT), 
Personal Benefit (PBF), Developing Corporate Governance (DCG), Efficacy (EFF), 
Altruism (ALT) 
3. Theme: Monitoring 
Sub-Themes: Monitoring Role (MNR), Assurance Role (AAR), Implementation of 
Decisions (IMP), Monitoring Using Committees (MUC), Monitoring Using Executive 
(NIUE), Monitoring Using KPIs (MUK), Monitoring Using Balance Scorecard (MBS), 
Monitoring Using Minutes of Meeting (MMM), Monitoring Executive Actions (MEA) 
4. Theme: Strategy 
Sub-Themes: Achievement of Strategic Objectives (ASO), Active-Proactive Approach 
to Strategy (APS), Executive Determination of Strategy (EDS), Formulation of Strategy 
(FOS), Implementation of Strategy (IOS), Initiate Strategic Direction (ISD) Participation 
in Strategy (PIR), Passive-Reactive Approach to Strategy (PRS), Shaping Conduct of 
Strategy (SDS), Shaping Content of Strategy (STS), Shaping Context of Strategy (SCS), 
Shaping Strategic Decision (SSD), Strategic Planning (SPL), Strategy Committee 
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(SCM), Strategy Role (STR), Taking Strategic Decision (TSD), Support Role (SUR), 
Policy (POL), Collective Determination of Strategy (CDS), Finance (FIN), Special 
Strategy Meeting (SSM) 
5. Theme: Accountability (ACC) 
Sub-Theme: Accountability Role (ACR), Accountable to Funding Bodies (AFB), 
Accountable to Public (ATP), Accountable to Government (ATG), Accountable to Self 
(ATS), Accountable to Stakeholders (ASH), Executive Accountability (EXA), Held 
Accountable (HAC), Mechanism of Accountability (MAC), Held Accountable (IIAC), 
Accountability Sanction (ACS), Accountable to Students (AST), Accountable to Staff 
(ASF), Held Accountable for Good Governance (HAG), Held Accountable for Finance 
(HAF), Held Accountable by Funding Council (HFC), Element of Account - Finance 
(EAF), Element of Account - Governance (EAG). 
6. Theme: Risk Governance (RKG) 
Sub-Themes: Involvement in Risk identification (IRI), Life as Risk (LAR), Linking 
Risk with Strategy (LRS), Risk Averse Behaviour (RAB), Review Effectiveness of Risk 
Management (RRM), Risk Control (RCT), , Risk 
Governance Role (RGR), Risk 
Management Strategy (RMS), Risk Monitoring (RM), Role in Risk Governance (RRG), 
Technical Approach to Risk (TAR), Types of Risk (TOR), Risk Profile (RPr), Lay Risk 
Perception (LRP) 
7. Theme: Performance Review 
Sub-Themes: Assessment Role (ASR), Compliance with Governance Codes (CGC), 
Conduct of Effectiveness Review (CER), Elements of Governance Effectiveness (EGE), 
Governance Role Performance (GRP), Performance Evaluation (PEV), Self Assessment 
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Questionnaire (SAQ), Assessment by Nominations Committee (ANC), Effectiveness 
linked with Strategic Objectives (ESO), Effectiveness linked with Human Capital 
(EHC), Effectiveness linked with Governors Education (EGE), Review of Governors 
Performance (RGP), Review of Committee Performance (RCP) 
8. Theme: Governors Education (GED) 
Sub-Themes: Training/Development (TDV), Knowledge, Skills Expertise (KSE), 
Induction (IND), Special Briefing Session (SBS), 
9. Theme: Governing Body Relationship 
Sub-Themes: Ambassadorial Role (AMR), Appeal Role (APP), Role Conflict (RCF), 
Governance Relationships (GRL), Relationship with Senate (RWS), Relationship with 
Executive (RWE), Relationship with Stakeholders (RSH) 
10. Theme: Management Role 
Sub-Themes: Separation of Governance and Management Roles (GMR), 
Implementation of Decisions (IDC), Accountable to Governing Body (AGB), Making 
Strategic Proposals (MSP), Accountable to Funding Bodies (AFB), Development of 
Strategies (DOS), Managing Institutional Risks (MIR) 
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APPENDIX I: SAMPLE ('OI)I\(: OF A('(Ot; N'IABII. 11 V UA'I A FOR 
I \_IVERSI'[l OF WATERLOO, ENGLAND (PRE-1992) - I. 00F: 
\T: Is the go%erning body accountable in any %%ay, if so how? 
Mr. Carrington (Chair) - LOOS I CHA: 
In some senses you see the best answer you can give is the community, the public, the 
Comment [G. M1]: ASH. A-11? 
country and it's because you're not necessarily reporting to anyone else. You don't have 
Comment (G. M21: This 
shareholders the way you do in a public company. Of course to some extent the higher , ne-in. Ill., 'thete is no tormal 
n, ruin t r. n, lrr.: count of 
education funding Council is acting for the community and if you were to overspend, it Ilký m, ompanies. 
\nn,. I \I, t nc Ofl ni\ 
your financial controls were unsatisfactory you would he answerable.... you would have 
Comment [G. M31: AFH 
to answer to the higher education funding council in the first place 
....... 
he who pays the piper calls the tune they say. And because we get a lot of our 
money from the higher education funding council we have to take it lot of notice of vc hat 
Comment [G. M4]: Ill-C. U l' 
they want, otherwise we won't get so tauch money next year. Comment [G. M5]: Ac's 
......... \, ou could 
be accountable to government or to parliament if thing, went badly 
wrong. You might he summoned to appear before a parliamentary coiiintittee and cro s- 
tº. ac 
examined about what you're doing. 
Comment [G. M6]: 
Mfrs. Thomas (Lay Governor) - LOOE 2 LAY: 
I NT: Who , Mould you sad the governing body is accountable to! 
RES: Well 1 suppose ultimately to the students and the whole set up here, th e 
organisation. We are in a sense ...... it's quite 
frightening 
....... 
hd d I-csponsIhIC 11 Comment [G. M7]: \\1. ASF 
thins co ww rone. So vkc are accountable as to how thinks go. 
I \"f: Is the governing body in any-, way accountable for anything; at . III? 
RES: Well I suppose you are if you'rc using their money. Comment [G. MS]: FV 
INT: But hoý% is that accountabilih done? 
RFS Ho\c i; it done'' Well I think they only step in when something is going wrong. 
Don't they'' That's the norm. Isn't it. In life as soon tis things go wrong they "ant 
comment [G. M9]: know why you're doing something wrong. . M9ý: it \(j to know why you're doing something wrong. 
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THEME: Accountability (ACC) 
Sub-Themes: Accountability Role (ACR), Accountable to Public (ATP), Accountable to 
Funding Bodies (AFB), Accountable to Government (ATG), Accountable to Self (ATS), 
Accountable to Stakeholders (ASH), Executive Accountability (EXA), Held Accountable 
(HAC), Mechanism of Accountability (MAC), Held Accountable (HAC), Accountability 
Sanction (ACS), Accountable to Students (AST), Accountable to Staff (ASF), Held 
Accountable for Good Governance (HAG), Held Accountable for Finance (HAF), Held 
Accountable by Funding Council (HFC), Element of Account - Finance (EAF), Element 
of Account - Governance (EAG). 
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